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Abstract 
This study takes up the question of the cyborg through a close reading of key historical 
texts in the technical and scientific literature informing modern integrated circuit technology, and 
of twentieth- and twenty-first century texts in continental theory and philosophy, in order to 
present a viable notion of subjectivity for our technological age. To this end, this study 
articulates a morphology of the cyborg as a philosophical, political, and technological subject 
uniquely situated and acting in the world, a subject that upends conceptions of truth and 
knowledge as representation or correspondence. The cyborg instead presents a playful sensibility 
in touch with the openness of existence itself to becoming, newness, and life. Through her 
skillful traversal of the world-machine the cyborg resists established networks of power, creating 
havens of intimacy in the dark away from the searing light of transcendental reason.  
 Stein ii 
Program of Study 
In my pursuit of a subjectivity suitable to our technological age I undertake a historical 
survey of the development of the integrated circuit. I realize, however, that some readers might 
be troubled by the irregular materialism undergirding this survey, and I will be the first to admit 
that I eschew the simple causality and historical linearity upon which perhaps other more typical 
materialisms might rely. I instead follow in the tradition of Heraclitean and Lucretian 
materialism, that materialism of flux and swerve, which finds a new application in Heidegger’s 
thinking of phusis as that which “emerges from itself,” as “blossoming,” as the “emerging-
abiding sway” of Being.1 Jacques Derrida uses a different term for this “sway” in his seminal 
essay “Structure, Sign and Play,” describing it as the “structurality of structure,” the ever-
differing movement of Being that renders it impossible for any ground to maintain itself as 
centre or absolute.2 Such conceptions of matter and the world certainly pose problems to 
foundational theories of truth and knowledge, indeed, to the foundationalism of matter itself, but 
I would like to hazard that these problems are in fact opportunities. In his Voice and 
Phenomenon, Derrida takes up one such opportunity, presenting a reading of the subject that is 
not based on a primarily representational or expressive mode of thought, beginning instead from 
a position of original indication, signification, or deferral, and consequently opening a space for 
a subject intimately in touch with the movement and play of Being.3 But does such a subject 
truly exist in the world, beyond the technicalities of theory? 
                                                 
1 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polk (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 14-15. 
2 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in 
Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2001), 352. 
3 Jacques Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the Problem of the Sign in 
Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. Leonard Lawlor (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
2011), 25-26. 
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It is my intent in this thesis to argue that such a subject does in fact exist, and further, that 
subjectivity as such exists in this way. Circulating throughout this text is the figure of the cyborg, 
an exemplary historical-material concretion of Derrida’s deferred, antifoundational subject—a 
figure that I draw from the pages of Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto, to which I pay careful 
attention in the following pages. The cyborg is one without genealogy, deprived of the possibility 
of a tracing back that would allow her to ground her being in a pure and substantial origin. The 
cyborg cannot pretend to be a transcendental subject because her subjectivity is always already 
within the world, always already a material process, always already coded by another. The 
cyborg is not a spontaneity but, in Derrida’s phrasing, an “originary division,” an “originary 
delay.”4 With the cyborg’s emergence we see that subjectivity never came from without but 
rather arose as an ‘un-gluing’ of existence from within (to borrow a phrase, at a distance, from 
Sartre), an opening of unrealized potentialities already present within Being.5 The cyborg is an 
“ironic dream,” in Haraway’s terms, intimately aware of her own partiality, of the division or 
delay that constitutes her subjectivity as such, and consequently right at home with the sway of 
Being.6  
But it must be acknowledged that such an understanding of the subject also troubles our 
understanding of the human person. Indeed, Haraway’s cyborg embodies this complication, 
standing as the very possibility of a passage beyond the human. Does not such a passage pose 
ethical problems to those who desire it? Is there not something distinctive in the human that we 
                                                 
4 Derrida, Voice and Phenomenon, 75. 
5 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. 
Hazel E. Barnes (London: Routledge, 2003), 21. 
6 Donna J. Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in 
the Late Twentieth Century (1985), repr. Manifestly Haraway, 3-90 (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016), 5. 
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ought to shelter, despite all the destruction human beings have wrought? What is more, is it not a 
sign of this distinctiveness that we can even reach for our own beyond, acting toward the utmost 
possibility of our existence as a species, our collective death, and presume to call such an end 
good?7 Is the human so despicable that we can only hope to discard it, to discard our own 
historical constitution?  
It is not my intent here to mount either a critique or a defense of the human creature, but to 
engage with the question of the subject (which has typically been construed as a human question) 
as it now presents itself in our technical milieu. My thinking on this matter is deeply informed by 
the phenomenological-existential school, by the likes of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, thinkers who do not deny the eminence of the human subject, but rather 
take the human as indicative of certain potentialities or inclinations intrinsic to Being, the in-
itself, the world, which is to say, as an upsurge or decompression that provides us with a point of 
access to the sway, the “bringing-forth,” the coming-to-presence, of what is.8 I am not, therefore, 
concerned with adhering to this or that humanism, but rather with the question of the human 
itself, and all the difficulties that such a question entails (though I certainly do not presume to 
attend to all such difficulties in this thesis). It is for this reason that I rely heavily on the work of 
Jean-Luc Nancy, a Heideggerian and Derridean working in the late phases—the aftermath, we 
might say—of twentieth century continental philosophy. As will be seen in the following pages, 
Jean-Luc Nancy considers the subject to be the occurrence of a unique world-process, a 
commitment that he worries, elsewhere, will lead some to accuse him of a “Christian, idealist, 
                                                 
7 See, for instance, The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, accessed September 22, 
2018, http://vhemt.org/. 
 
8 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 12. 
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and humanist tone” (even established thinkers fear trends!)9 And yet, for Nancy, such an 
accusation would be nothing but a continuation of those “well-meaning virtues and values that 
have loosed upon the world all the things that have driven the humanity of our century to despair 
over itself,” solving nothing.10 For Nancy, something of the human remains to be questioned, and 
more, something of the human calls us to question. 
So, then, what is vital for us at this moment in our history is not to do away with the 
question of “human meaning,” but rather to let “everything that has ever laid claim to the truth 
about the nature, essence, or ‘end’ of man ... be undone,” to deconstruct that which related “the 
earth [la terre] and the human to a specifiable horizon,” and so allow us to think “an earth and a 
human such that they would only be what they are—nothing but earth and human,” intimate 
articulations of existence in its sway. In this way, earth and human, for Nancy, “would be none 
of the various horizons often harbored under these names, none of the ‘perspectives’ or ‘views’ 
in view of which we have disfigured humans [les hommes] and driven them to despair,” but the 
various and varying unfoldings of “the ‘whole’ (all that is) as put on hold everywhere” (we might 
say, with Derrida, deferred, or Baudrillard, later, deterred), the whole “pushed to the outside just 
as much as it is pushed back inside the ‘self,’” the simultaneous rupturing of the bastions of 
subjective ideality and worldly objectivity.11 The horizon that defined and divorced human from 
earth “is no longer a line that is drawn, or a line that will be drawn, which orients or gathers the 
meaning of a course of progress or navigation,” but the “opening [la brèche] or distancing 
[lecartement] of horizon itself, and in the opening: us. We happen as the opening itself.”12 And 
                                                 
9 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), xi. 
10 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, xi. 
11 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, xi-xii. Nancy’s emphasis, translators’ insertions. 
12 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, xii. Nancy’s emphasis, translators’ insertions. 
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in this rupture that we are Nancy sees the “first laying bare [mise à nu] of a world that is only the 
world, but which is the world absolutely and unreservedly, with no meaning beyond this very 
Being of the world: singularly plural and plurally singular.”13 And in the absolute baring of the 
world in this meaning, we see, too, the “bared [dénudé] name of our being-with-one-another,” 
the fact that we “do not ‘have’ meaning anymore because we ourselves are meaning—entirely, 
without reserve, infinitely, with no meaning other than ‘us’”—not as “fulfillment” or “result,” 
not as “end, substance, or value,” but as the opening of the “gift” of Being.14 “Being itself is 
given to us as meaning,” Nancy contends; it “does not have meaning. Being itself, the 
phenomenon of Being, is meaning that is, in turn, its own circulation—and we are this 
circulation.”15  
What we are given, then, what arises from this tradition, from the inscription of this rupture 
in a philosophical school, the inscription of the “emerging-abiding sway” of Being,16 is a sense 
that does not require the fixation of sight or the fixity of foundational knowledge, but rather a 
tactile involvement in the world, the hapticality17 of touching and being touched, the 
responsibility of gardeners and shepherds to tend saplings18 and shelter growth. The human is 
certainly decentred in this picture, but the human is not annihilated, either; rather, the human is 
positioned as both dependent upon the “whole” of which Nancy speaks and as a caretaker of this 
whole from within, neither ruler nor sovereign but part, that unique individuation and deferral of 
Being specially poised to disclose the “with” of Being, the fact that “Being cannot be anything 
                                                 
13 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, xiv. Translator’s insertion. 
14 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 1-2. Translator’s insertion. 
15 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 2. Nancy’s emphasis. 
16 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 15. 
17 I derive this term from Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, The Undercommons: Fugitive 
Planning and Black Study (New York: Minor Compositions, 2013), 97. 
18 I thank the contemporary cyber-bard Austin Walker for this generative law. 
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but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as the with of this singularly plural 
coexistence.”19 This is in no way a complete perspective but a set of hypotheses and 
commitments motivating a line of questioning, which, I believe, finds rich and manifold 
articulation in the figure of the cyborg. Such is the “metaphysical research programme” 
informing my study.20  
                                                 
19 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 3.  
20 I draw this phrase from Karl Popper, Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), 195. Original emphasis.  
 Stein 1 
Introduction  
What is it for a cyborg to read fiction? Already, we find this question to be entangled with 
others: questions of distinction and definition, questions of category and difference. But from out 
of this snarled web, one question in particular, one differentiation, comes to the fore, closely 
linked with the first. Who? Who is this cyborg who reads?  
This second question does not present itself entirely of its own accord. I am inclined to 
choose it, to present it in such and such a way, to write of the cyborg with the pronoun who in 
conjunction with the what that is her act of reading. By casting the cyborg as such, I accord her 
agency, subjectivity, personhood, and so refuse (if implicitly) to reduce her being to a function. 
She is an actor possessed of a function, but not a function herself. She is someone who reads, the 
pure locus of the subject who takes her verb and her object as her own.  
But this framing of the question and the one being questioned is troublesome. We 
encounter in it the same problematic as when the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy asks us, who 
comes after the subject?21 The choice of who, the stability of its position as an eminent question 
here, in the present study, is tenuous. Who, as we have only just seen, implies a person, a subject, 
an agent. To imply such a being, and to import such being to the cyborg, is to gloss over the how 
and the why of this cyborg’s act of reading. The thoughtful critic pauses at our hasty act of 
personification, is skeptical of our equation of carbon and silicon, of base-4 and base-2. These 
questions operate by sleight of hand, the critic contends, allowing in the who by a back door. 
How can one so casually ascribe subjectivity to a being manufactured from circuitry and the 
dreams of authors of science-fiction? We are left with an uncomfortable syntagm, an entity of 
                                                 
21 Jean-Luc Nancy, introduction to Who Comes After the Subject?, eds. Eduardo Cadava, 
Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991). 
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ambiguous status, an actor, act, and object yet to be described: who is this cyborg and what is it 
for her to read fiction? Is this double question groundless, pointless to ask of our cyborg? Have 
we merely started in the wrong place or with the incorrect terms? Or worse, is this nothing but an 
academic exercise, a speculative game, a rearranging of words with no bearing on reality? 
To respond to such accusations, we cannot succeed by relinquishing the who. We must stay 
with this particular question, stay with the discomfort it provokes, before asking any others. To 
ask why, seeking after our cyborg’s motivations, would be to overshoot the mark; to ask how, 
obsessed by the mechanism of our cyborg’s reading, would be to fall short; and to ask what 
would be to fail to acknowledge the complexity of the entity who faces us. Yes indeed: this who 
must be the point of access to our field of inquiry, because the who determines our description of 
the how and what. Our who is a joint in language, a fold in the world, a site of articulation 
between signs and bodies incorporating and being incorporated by each other. We must ask who 
and let ourselves be provoked, in the process turning our questioning back upon ourselves and 
considering why we are troubled by this question and the figure of the cyborg being questioned. 
So, then, it is for us now to question the question who itself, following Nancy in his analysis of 
this deceptively simple word and the subject it invites us to examine, if we are to have any hope 
of truly asking it of the technological subject put in question above—our cyborg. 
 
The Troublesome Subject 
In his introduction to the collection of essays Who Comes After the Subject?, Nancy does 
not begin with an explanation of his question, but rather with another comparably puzzling 
query: “Philosophy, today, world-wide: what might this mean?”22 Curiously, Nancy begins his 
                                                 
22 Nancy, 1. 
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inquiry into subjectivity with an object, a time, a space, while the subject, his titular subject, the 
who in question, is nowhere to be seen. Certainly, we can read the subject into this phrase, are 
tempted to do so by the subject matter, but Nancy resists such a move. His subject goes ignored 
while he pursues his questioning of philosophy, his laying of a ground for thought, a ground that 
he considers to be distinctly world-wide, which is to say, valid for every subject in existence. In 
making such a detour, Nancy endeavours to provide us with a survey of the terrain upon which 
his quarry is to be found—or perhaps upon which we are to be found by it. Rather than seek to 
provide immediate answers, to soothe his readers’ discomfort, it is Nancy’s task here, in this 
book directed by a question, to open the domain of questioning to view, and so to draw the 
questioner into dialogue with the questioned. Similarly, if we are to ask who of our cyborg, we 
must first prepare the ground for such a questioning. To this end, we will follow Nancy in his 
interrogation of philosophy, and so attempt to build on his conclusions.  
“Philosophy, today, world-wide”—three parameters delineating a site of inquiry. With 
respect to the first, Nancy is neither concerned with “a diversity of fields” or “tendencies” but 
with “different ways of thinking about philosophy itself,” 23 locating himself in the space of 
meta- or post-philosophy. Philosophy, in the “traditional” sense (i.e., that philosophy inherited 
from the Greeks, and primarily, for Nancy, that taken up by the German Idealists), “is gone, or 
finished.”24 This is so because of Nancy’s other two parameters: philosophy today and world-
wide has been revealed “as something essentially linked to Western civilization,” and as 
“something with which other civilizations—or a general shifting of cultures, also within the 
Western area—now have to deal.”25 He links philosophy in the “traditional” sense, the 
                                                 
23 Nancy, 1. 
24 Nancy, 1. 
25 Nancy, 1. 
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philosophy “shelved in our libraries,” with the Western, with a “Weltanschauung” or world-
view, and indeed with the “epoch” of “Weltanschauungen,” with another “today” when views 
and frames and perspectives could remain fixed—or at least appear so from this “today” 
(Nancy’s and our own) looking backward.26  Nancy proposes, by contrast, that the new site of 
philosophy is not so limited; his parameters for the practice and scope of philosophy encompass 
the world as a whole, and indeed present it as such. The “world” is now truly “world-wide,” and 
this fact holds profound significance for philosophy as a markedly Western endeavour.27 
What does Nancy mean by world-wide? At one level, the world-wideness of the world can 
be interpreted as “globalization.” Described by one scholar as the “integration of economic 
activity across borders” and the “integration” of “people and ideas,” globalization is the 
consequence of “[t]hree interacting forces—technology, institutions, and policy”28—an 
interaction that, to be sure, begins far further back in time than our contemporary politico-
technical milieu29. Through these forces, the circumscription of world-view as a boundary 
between cultures is erased and a new circumscription—the global—established. But for Nancy, 
there is yet another level to this world-wideness of the world: “the becoming-world of the world 
does not mean what is usually called the ‘uniformization’ of everything and everyone—even 
through technology.”30 Certainly, the integrated world relegates traditional philosophy (that is, 
for Nancy, Western philosophy—philosophy bound to world-view) to the archives, but we would 
                                                 
26 Nancy, 1. 
27 Nancy, 1. 
28 David Wolf, “Shaping Globalization,” Finance & Development 51, no. 3 (September 
2014): 22. 
29 As argued by Immanuel Wallerstein in The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture 
and the Origins of European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, repr. (1974; Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2011). 
30 Nancy, 1. 
 Stein 5 
be in error to consider this integration a total flattening. Within the integrated world, the global 
world, the world-wide world, “world also differentiates itself, if it is does not indeed shatter 
itself.”31 Despite the influence of technology and the effects of globalization, at this second, 
more metaphysical level, the “becoming-world of world means that ‘world’ is no longer an 
object, nor an idea, but the place existence is given to and exposed to,”32 and as such, as a site of 
exposure, the world can in no way be considered closed or complete, a totality. Technological 
uniformization and globalization are involved in the becoming-world of the world, and are signs 
of this new epoch, but they are not the whole of what has taken place, nor of what is continuing 
to take place.  
The becoming-world of the world “first happened in philosophy, and to philosophy,” 
Nancy argues, “with the Kantian revolution,” in which the world arises and is figured “as 
possibly of (or for) an existent being, possibility as world for such a being,” and in which this 
existent being, the transcendental subject, is “offered to a world as to its own possibility.”33 But 
this Kantian revolution cannot be said to be a breach of philosophy from without philosophy: 
“the condition of possibility of Kant himself” is “the beginning of the ‘Western’ as such, of the 
Western ‘Weltanschauung,’”34 Kant remains a philosopher.35 So, for Nancy, to speak about the 
becoming-world of the world, and its philosophical or metaphysical inception in Kant, is also to 
speak about “the totality of a history,” “our history,” and to mark in its span “the various breaks 
                                                 
31 Nancy, 1. 
32 Nancy, 1. 
33 Nancy, 1. 
34 Nancy, 1-2. 
35 One might recall here Derrida’s essay, “Violence and Metaphysics,” and his claim with 
respect to all (Western) philosophical revolutions as being instances of a generic movement 
intrinsic to the structure of the tradition itself. 
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out of which emerges ... the world as possibility, or the world as chance for existence.”36 In this 
world after Kant, this world contained as a kernel in Kant, Nancy contends that there are no 
longer any pure subjects standing over against the world-as-object, possessed of perspectives 
uniquely and solidly their own; the world courses through these subjects, unfolding in self-
differentiating communality, an open and collective subject-exceeding process. The 
metaphysical import of the global perspective is that the global, the world-wide, exceeds 
perspective, that in the uniformization of the world as world, the world opens itself within itself, 
collapsing the within/without distinction by which the Cartesian subject previously maintained 
itself in its transcendental remove. For Nancy, therefore, Kant marks a rupture of philosophy, a 
culmination of an inclination within the Western system toward the transcendental solidity and 
power of the subject’s view that shatters the barriers of that very system, opening the way for the 
in-pouring of the self-integrating, self-differentiating world. 
So, to speak of philosophy today and world-wide is, for Nancy, to speak of the multiplicity 
of “breaks” arising from, responding to, and replicating Kant’s rupture, which “represent,” in 
turn, “a disarticulation of the common space and of the common discourse of ‘philosophy’”—the 
view of the Western; Western metaphysics.37 For Nancy it follows, therefore, that to ask the 
question who is to be confronted with this “disarticulation.” Subject and world are inextricable. If 
Kant, within the Western system of philosophy, using the tools of that system, opens philosophy 
to the thinking of a transcendental subject present to the world as more than a view but as a site 
for existing, it is also Kant who opens this very subject to its troubling by the possibility and 
chance of such an existing. The “we” potentiated by the positing of a transcendental subject finds 
                                                 
36 Nancy, Who Comes After the Subject?, 1-2. Nancy’s emphasis. 
37 Nancy, 2. 
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itself “traverse[d]” by “[m]any lines of rupture,” the same lines of rupture traversing the tradition 
and discipline of philosophy. This ruptured we is a “‘we’ without ‘we,’” Nancy writes, a we of 
chance, released in the simultaneous “opening/closing” and “unlimitation/disaster” brought about 
by the world as possibility.38 This we, and the philosophy that gives it (the philosophy presumed 
gone and finished, yet still boiling forth from its wounds), is “separated from itself, outside of 
itself, crossing its own limits,” and in this, “discovering that it never did have proper limits, that 
it never was, in a sense, a ‘property.’”39 The common (that is, the common property), which is 
the common space and common discourse, and indeed, the common identity, annihilates 
property, self-destructs in the disarticulation of the contradiction that presumed something held 
in common could also be a property.  
Thus, for Nancy, the questioning of philosophy is inextricable from the questioning of the 
subject who was inaugurated by philosophy, and specifically, by the Kantian rupture of 
“traditional” philosophy. Philosophy today and world-wide is a philosophy that must also ask 
who because it is troubled by the “rest” excluded from the common, from philosophy, from the 
West, the “immense ‘rest’” that is the world and the beings existing it, the beings given to its 
“space of unimaginable possibilities.”40 Within the common is thus found the 
“incommensurable” and the “incommunicable,” that which properly ought to be without, that 
which troubles the common and is its disaster, but also its birth.41 The rest is that which has “no 
simple, absolute reference, nor pertinence,” but whose “meaning is nonetheless not void,” whose 
“traces” are “complex, sinuous, sometimes difficult to grasp, multiple, or effaced.”42 The rest is 
                                                 
38 Nancy, 2. 
39 Nancy, 2. 
40 Nancy, 2. 
41 Nancy, 2. 
42 Nancy, 2-3. 
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that which is not pertinent to the subject, that which is not permitted to be a subject, that which is 
denied the question who. 
To ask who comes after the subject? is, then, to “complicate the traditional way of thinking 
about the human subject,” which is also to complicate the traditional way of thinking about 
philosophy.43 A key example of this complication for Nancy is that of structuralism, which Paul 
Ricoeur has described as “a transcendentalism without a subject,”44 and which we can describe 
here as a powerful “disarticulation” of the “common space” (the world, the possibility of the 
subject’s existing) wherein the subject’s view is displaced in the structure of existence, dwelling 
in and traversing those “lines of rupture” between views that can no longer be conceived of as 
gaps but as saturations of the field of being, complex territories of distinction and mediation. So, 
Nancy argues, the lesson to be learned here from structuralism is not the “deconstruction of 
subjectivity” and “interiority” that it has effected,45 which is perhaps most clearly demonstrated 
in Roland Barthes’s essay, “The Death of the Author,” but the thinking of the between that this 
newly displaced subject now inhabits.46 If we are to break with the “traditional way” of thinking 
the subject we must resist the reactionary oscillation of a naïve deconstruction that follows in the 
style of this or that critique without drilling down to premises or closely engaging with the words 
that have been written. We must remain in a state of tension and allow for a transcendentalism 
between subject and no subject, and so resist the “nihilism” of the “supposed ‘liquidation’ of the 
                                                 
43 Nancy, 3. 
44 Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 53. 
45 Nancy, Who Comes After the Subject?, 4. 
46 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image-Music-Text, 142-48, trans. Stephen 
Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977). Barthes’s famous clarion call with which he concludes 
the piece captures the trajectory of the subject that we are discussing here: “the birth of the 
reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.” The Author’s power (the power of the 
transcendental subject) is dispersed in the network of quotations that the reader inhabits.  
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subject” that is “itself an implicit form of the metaphysics of the subject.”47 To hypostasize the 
negation of the subject is just as damaging as the hypostasization of a new subject. We need a 
subject-in-between. For Nancy, the subject is “never simple, never closed upon itself without 
remainder,” and therefore requires all the more attention, all the more care.48 We are thus “not 
relieved of thinking this some one.”49 We still must ask who. But now, having followed Nancy’s 
detour, we see that this question is just as complex, just as multifarious, just as incommensurable 
and incommunicable, as that which it questions. Nancy’s discussion of the subject has not 
clarified our own attribution of subjectivity to the cyborg, but only complicated it further, 
rendering it impossible to merely position the cyborg as a possible instantiation of the category 
‘subject.’ Our who, our cyborg, remains an open question.  
 
The Subject of the Present 
How do we ask this question? How do we think this some one? In questioning, in doing 
philosophy, we find our questions troubled, threatened with disaster, and there is no one to blame 
for this but ourselves: we opened the back door; we opened the breach. But we must recall: such 
difficulty, such danger, is a consequence of a particular way of thinking. In questioning the who, 
we do not relinquish it, do not seek to negate it, but instead let ourselves be troubled and 
overcome by it. We have been brought here, into the purported afterword of philosophy, by the 
“Kantian revolution” and the “principal axes” of thought that developed and diverged from it: 
“the Husserlian, the Marxian, the Heideggerian, and the Nietzschean.”50 Far more than a 
                                                 
47 Nancy, 4. 
48 Nancy, 4. 
49 Nancy, 5. 
50 Nancy, 3.  
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“capricious variation of fashionable thinking,” however, far more than a duplication of any of 
these thinkers, the deconstructive motif that Nancy raises is an “event” that has “emerged from 
our history.”51 We can truly say after, here, while at the same time this event remakes the after, 
sending ripples of consequence backward and forward in time. Again, if we look to the example 
of structuralism, as does Nancy, we see that it “has never been one”—structuralism saw its after 
emerge almost simultaneously with its rise as a philosophical movement, a post- that does not 
belong to its “posterity.”52 From its beginning, structuralism, in displacing the transcendental 
subject (the who given over to the world as possibility of its existence) into the transcendentalism 
of structure, cleared the way for its own critique, opening the subject, in her interpretation of the 
structure before her, to the generativity of the world becoming-world.53 But insofar as 
structuralism has never been one, neither does the plurality of structuralisms constitute the 
entirety of this opening of the world within the world; rather, the plurality of structuralisms 
participates in this opening, interacting with those other modalities of thought that have also 
arisen from the world-wide milieu that proliferated from the Kantian rupture of Western 
thought.54 These various modes of thought (for Nancy, those that stem from Marx, Nietzsche, 
Husserl, and Heidegger) participate in that to which Derrida has referred as the “structurality of 
structure,”55 that which makes it impossible for any transcendent to maintain itself in purity, 
                                                 
51 Nancy, 4. 
52 Nancy, 2. 
53 But we must be careful here. Structuralism was not first; it illuminated an event that was 
already going on. 
54 Indeed, another vocal participant here is the phenomenological school inaugurated by 
Husserl, and which, similarly to structuralism, is characterized by the numerous “heresies” that 
have emerged from the master’s teaching. See Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of his 
Phenomenology, trans. Edward G. Ballard & Lester E. Embree (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1967), 4. 
55 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in 
Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2001), 352. 
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simplicity, or closure—including structure itself. The subject, interpreter of the world, finds in 
her capacity for interpretation a fatal compromise—the world is there, at home and within her, 
threatening the borders of that within, her self. If we are, then, to think this one on the other side 
of this historical event of rupture, if we are to think the subject of our questioning, if we are to 
persist in asking who, we must think with and through the logic of the incommensurable, the 
logic of the between, the logic that does not permit our some one to be exactly one, pure and 
complete and untouchable in her being. Whatever transcendental status previously ascribed to 
the subject can no longer be considered her own, no longer be considered her property; the 
transcendental is a possibility of the world in which she lives, a possibility of her becoming. 
Such a thinking of possibility and the between is, for Nancy, a “practical exercise.”56 To 
“deal” with a mode of philosophy that is intrinsically Western, and which has now been exposed 
to and shattered by the world becoming-world, is to find ourselves “between or beyond [the] 
‘praxis’ and ‘theory’” that would permit a dealing without involvement.57 We are in the breach, 
in the space of the world as possibility, as chance for existence. We are not exempt from the 
event that Nancy heralds, the deconstruction of the subject precipitated by the constitution of the 
subject as such. We cannot do philosophy as removed practitioners, as pure subjects 
contemplating the world from afar; philosophy is an activity of some one bound up in the world 
in its becoming. To do philosophy requires that we get our hands dirty. 
As we have already noted, Nancy argues that the chief accomplishment of the Kantian 
revolution was the establishment of the “world” as the “place existence is given to and exposed 
to,” the “condition of possible experience” for the transcendental subject “offered to [it] as to its 
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own possibility.”58 But for many, the transcendental subject comes to elide the possibility of its 
own existing, presenting itself as the world’s principle of organization, its absolute interpreter. 
Though the transcendental subject requires the world for its experience, the metaphysical 
privileging of its powers inclines many to think that the subject is primary, indeed, that the 
subject might even exist without the world. Thus, Nancy considers the clearest representation of 
this “philosophical (or ‘metaphysical’) subject,” the one to which we are most beholden today, to 
be “the one proposed by Hegel: the subject is ‘that which is capable of maintaining within itself 
its own contradiction.’”59 If the subject exists as a power over against the world, independent 
from the world and in the solidity of its existing giving unity to the world, then its being is 
precisely its “alienation” from or “extraneousness” to the world that it must therefore make its 
“ownmost.”60 The Hegelian subject, seeking to navigate Kant’s rupture, is that which “consists in 
reappropriating [its] proper being-outside-of-itself,” reappropriating the world that is its 
condition of experience and existing it.61 It is for this reason that Nancy claims that this 
“appropriation is made by the verb ‘to be,’” which here “means ‘to have’ or ‘produce’ or 
‘understand’ or ‘support.’”62 The metaphysical subject is not the world, but is what exists the 
world, appropriating it to itself in this process of its being. But for this to be so, it is “necessary 
that the subject be, absolutely and without predicate.”63 The subject’s existence is made 
absolute—solid, authoritative, complete, and final.  
With this concretion of the transcendental subject as an ideal power, the world so recently 
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59 Nancy, 6. 
60 Nancy, 6. 
61 Nancy, 6. 
62 Nancy, 6. 
63 Nancy, 6. Nancy’s emphasis. 
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revealed as possibility, as the total site of existence, finds itself covered over by a popular 
absolutism, an everyday adoption of the metaphysical subject that provides Western society with 
a new organizing principle, a new transcendental authority. This distinctly modern 
hierarchization leads, in turn, to the upsurge of the “diverse figures of the ‘subject’” throughout 
history, the revolutionary punctuality of the rest excluded from the question who and subjected 
to the authority of this new subject, seeking recognition.64 But here we see that “the question of 
an ‘after’ (in history),” the question of the rest in its rise before the subject, its progressive, 
piecemeal appropriation by and inclusion in the subject, is “just as much a question of the 
‘before.’”65 This inversion signals a break in the consecution of history, the disaster that is the 
return of “the logic of being ... invit[ing] a different kind of retracing of history: that which 
comes to us has preceded us.”66 The subject cannot maintain itself as absolute. Ripples of 
consequence reshape the surface of time. In opening the question who, our inquiry finds the 
question already to be there. And so, Nancy writes: 
Before the subject of a predication (let us say: before the subject-of) there is (il y a—this is 
Levinas’s ‘word’—Heidegger’s word is: es gibt, it is given, it gives) the Being of the 
subject, or the subject without ‘of,’ the subject-being, existence. Metaphysics, 
deconstructing itself (this is its logic and its history), indicates this ‘before’ as ‘after’: 
existence. Not the subject of existence but existence-subject: that to which one can no 
longer allot the grammar of subject nor, therefore, to be clear, allot the word ‘subject.’67 
                                                 
64 Nancy, 4. See also Étienne Balibar, “Citizen Subject,” in Who Comes After the Subject?, 
33-57, eds. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991), 
for a more in depth discussion of this new hierarchization of society. 
65 Nancy, 6. 
66 Nancy, 6. 
67 Nancy, 6. Nancy’s emphasis. 
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Metaphysics, the history of Western philosophy, encapsulated in Kant’s revolution, discovered 
the subject of existence, hailed it as before that which it exists. But in trying to articulate the 
logic of this existing, the subject found itself before the rest of existence crying out for 
acknowledgment, the rest already at home in the world that now the subject sought to 
appropriate. There is the world. There is existence. In absolutizing the subject, in making the 
subject into rule and law, the predicate does not disappear. It is the murmur of the surround that 
the subject denies, that which is there, that which the subject appropriates as its own while 
proclaiming its own purity of being.68 What Western metaphysics failed to realize is that the 
subject belongs with being, the cry of a who emanating from within the folds of existence. 
The grammatico-ontological scission of subject and predicate, subject and world, cannot 
persist. That which comes to us has preceded us. The silenced remainder throws off its muzzle. 
The solidity of the subject’s existence is threatened by the overwhelming demand of the 
“existence-subject,” that which is “not an essence,” but “whose essence it is to exist, actually and 
in fact, in experience”—“the existent.”69 The existentialist doctrine is not an exclusive property; 
the existence of the common precedes its essence. And “[w]ith this in mind, the question asks 
‘who?’ Which means that the question of essence—'What, existence?’—calls forth a ‘who’ in 
response.”70 Finally, we see with Nancy that our question about the cyborg’s subjectivity, that 
troublesome subject, was “a response to the question of existence,” the question who, the 
question that precedes us, that precedes the subject, the question of the rest to whom we are in 
fact always after, the rest whom we now find before us.71 The questioning of our cyborg is a 
                                                 
68 I take the language of the “surround” from Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, The 
Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study (New York: Minor Compositions, 2013). 
69 Nancy, 6. Nancy’s emphasis. 
70 Nancy, 6. 
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questioning of the matter of our being. To ask who of our cyborg is let to ourselves be drawn into 
this questioning of what it means to be a subject, to let the privilege of our own borders be 
overrun, to let a plurality of whos, incommensurable and incommunicable, arise from being 
without the authorization of power or property. 
It is an intellectual fascism to deny the logic of being that, when heeded, inverts the 
privileging of our own history. “Every ‘what’ that exists is a ‘who,’” Nancy writes, “if ‘who’ 
means: that actual, existent ‘what,’ as it exists, a factual (even material) punctuation of Being, 
the unum quid [what one?]” in its cry for recognition.72 For Nancy, every existent is a material 
fact that, in its punctual cry, presences as who. To ask who is thus “an affirmation: the being is 
who.”73 This does not mean that a stone who exists in the same manner as a human who, but 
rather that it is an individuated existent showing itself as a figure upon the ground of existence. 
The individuated always shows itself in this relational structure, joined with rest of existence in 
intimate distinction. Taken in this way, Nancy’s who is more general than what we might 
normally expect, but it remains distinctly material as an ontological term, while being more 
generous and encompassing than other materialist ontologies. To ask who of being is to refuse to 
authorize the particularities of this punctuality over that. It is therefore in no way a question of 
consciousness; it does not ask: who is conscious? This would be to ask, “What is who?” not 
“who is who?” Our question who is rather a “question of presence: Who is there? Who is present 
there?”74 Such does not ask after the properties of this or that existent, the properties of this 
person, this subject, this agent, this cyborg, but the “presence of the existent,” which “is not an 
essence” but a way of presencing. The existent as present there “is that which occupies a place,” 
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a “site,” the “coming into space of a time, in a spacing that allows that something come into 
presence, in a unique time that engenders itself in this point in space, as its spacing.”75 So we 
say, in response to this spacing, in response to the question that precedes us: “some one 
comes.”76 We affirm the who. 
The “self” or subject of the present existent is “only the to (the taking-place, the spacing) 
of presence,” and “never the subject of itself.”77 The subject is not absolute. Presence is presence 
to “the world,” which is the “shared taking-place of all places,” the common.78 So, Nancy writes, 
presence “thus comes to presence, without being to its-self”—and this relational, non-substantial 
presence he names “freedom.”79 The self that we encounter here, the subject in question, is not a 
property (in both senses: neither attribute nor possession): it is “mine” but not “in the manner of 
an appropriation by ‘me.’”80 My presence is “presence in common,” in the “plural,” in a 
                                                 
75 Nancy, 7. Nancy’s emphasis. Existence is not presence; existence is presencing. It is 
occupying, it is engendering, it is spacing, it is coming. Existence is a process; existence is 
dynamic. Nancy’s argument comes directly from Heidegger (see, for instance, Introduction to 
Metaphysics and Heidegger’s discussion of phusis). Existence is not “objective presence”; to say 
that a stone is not a human being is to dabble with such a notion. To say who to the stone in 
Nancy’s way, however, is to recognize the uniqueness of the stone’s spacing, the concreteness of 
its self-showing, its material style (its personality or character, or perhaps more comfortably, its 
structure), just as to say who in Nancy’s way to a human being is to recognize the uniqueness 
and concreteness of that human being’s spacing, self-showing, or style. Thus, we see that 
Nancy’s who can be situated within his larger ethical project in Being Singular Plural, in which 
he determines a relational, dynamic being-with to be an existential fact marking all existents. 
Beings are not self-sufficient but share in being and share in being with each other. The question 
who is thus not a question of consciousness at all, but of something much richer and more 
welcoming than such a lifeless abstraction could ever be. Life, existence, presencing: these terms 
signify the material dynamism of being, the relational kineticism of all beings. 
76 Nancy, 7. Nancy’s emphasis. A coming in the sense of an individuation, the existential 
spacing of a material being. “Consciousness” (or “mind”) as mere objective presence, self-
subsisting and complete, is a crippling reduction of the living existent. 
77 Nancy, 7. Nancy’s emphasis. 
78 Nancy, 7. 
79 Nancy, 7-8. Nancy’s emphasis. 
80 Nancy, 8. Nancy’s emphasis. 
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“community without the essence of a community” because it is beyond any question of property, 
any question of essence. The “plural liberates” what is my own, my “singular” existence, and the 
“singular liberates” the “plural,” each awakening the other to a “community without subject.”81 
This without is a liberation from appropriation, and so a liberation from the subject that does not 
simultaneously annul the who. It is this liberated who with whom we now think. 
 
The Subject and the World 
But let us hesitate for a moment: can we truly say liberated with respect to our who? 
Where are all these liberated subjects? We have, to this point, remained in the domain of 
philosophy which, despite Nancy’s claims, persists in its concern for the traditional questions of 
metaphysics. Nancy, like Kant, remains a philosopher. If we let ourselves be absorbed by his 
prose, we might come to think that our labour for this “community without subject” is no longer 
necessary. The revolution is accomplished, the critical work is done, the intellectual prejudices of 
the Western tradition surmounted. But, at the same time, if we take Nancy at his word, if we 
consider philosophy to be a “practical exercise,” a way of involved dealing in the world that is 
not afraid of muck and mire, then we must turn our attention to the material conditions of our 
discourse and the materiality of the who under discussion, our cyborg, who to this point has 
remained an abstract counterpoint or mimetic foil to the propriety and authority of the 
metaphysical subject. We must ask whether or not the subject is liberated in fact if we are to 
determine whether our cyborg is truly recognized or recognizable as who. We cannot content 
ourselves with aphorisms—a “community without subject,” for instance—and presume our work 
to be done. The world-wideness of the world today includes the incommensurable and 
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incommunicable, that which cannot be reconciled with itself, that which can never be closed 
upon itself without remainder. It is this lack of closure that allows for the diversity of subjects 
and non-subjects, the diversity of reasons and their critique (pure, dialectical, instrumental, 
cynical, postcolonial, economic, extremist, and otherwise), that are constantly deployed and 
debated in areas of human existence well beyond the reaches of philosophy and the academy. It 
is the ongoing process of the world’s becoming that permits such a rich, everyday dialogue, and 
that awakens us, if we pay attention, to the nonlinear structure of generation that is history 
continuously remaking itself through the ripples of the “event” of the subject’s deconstruction. If 
anything, our “practical exercise” needs more praxis, more flesh and blood, if it is to effectively 
gear in to the “existence-subject” it presumes to articulate.  
We have already noted the world-wideness of the world in two different registers or at two 
different levels: the philosophical (the Kantian inheritance) and, briefly, the socioeconomic (the 
process and structure of globalization). Nancy capably explicates the world-wideness of the 
world in the first of these registers, but due to his elliptical style, the limits of his context (an 
editorial introduction to a collection of essays), and his particular intellectual commitments, we 
are left, as readers, with few practical points of application—and perhaps truly only one: to read 
further. In the second register, though, we have seen this concept of world-wideness expressed in 
more concrete terms, and with one term in particular that is more readily accessible to the 
cultural conversation writ-large, to the everyday dialogue of beings existing the world: 
globalization. Globalization, as we have seen, is the “integration” of economy, persons, and 
knowledge “across borders,” effectuated by the interaction of “technology, institutions, and 
policy.”82 Kant did not bring about the world becoming-world by himself, and indeed, most 
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people are neither concerned with, nor even aware of, the effects of his philosophical revolution 
on their day-to-day lives. His philosophy, and the philosophies of those that followed him, in a 
complex interchange with “technology, institutions, and policy,” contributed to a world-structure 
(beyond a world-view; the space between views that is productive and interactive as well as 
perceptual and interpretive) that encompasses, affects, and shapes the entire world—the global 
world, the integrated world—and has been doing so for at least two hundred years. If we are to 
reckon with the question who, if we are to labour for a community without subject, if we are to 
truly ask who of our cyborg, we must engage with this concrete dimension of our history. 
Though we have identified technology, institutions, and policy as the driving forces behind 
globalization, the integration of these forces can be attributed primarily to technology: 
“technological and intellectual innovation ... increas[e] opportunities for profitable economic 
exchange over greater distances,” leading institutions (governments, corporations, multilateral 
organizations) and policy-makers to make changes to better take advantage of these 
opportunities.83 While institutions and policies must balance many competing interests, 
“technology’s arrow has moved in one direction—toward opportunities for economic 
integration.”84 Institutions and policy lagged behind technology in the wake of the World Wars 
and the Great Depression, but with the administrations of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, 
and Deng Xiaoping through the 1970s and 80s in the UK, US, and China, respectively, and the 
establishment of the EU’s single market in 1985, these two cultural forces finally received the 
“loosening” necessary for the economic integration being driven by technological development 
to occur.85  
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Because we do not have the space here to consider the entire history of “technology’s 
arrow” in its movement toward global integration, we will instead examine what appears to be a 
unique culmination of a technological trend or confluence of technological forces, as does Nancy 
in his reading of Kant. Kant was not the end of Western philosophy but the crystallization or 
fusion of many traditions, concepts, and forces in the Western world, an eminent example of a 
broader and more complex sociocultural milieu. Here, then, we will look in turn to the domain of 
concrete human instruments and systems—specifically, the electronic instruments and systems 
developed in the twentieth century—so as to consider their unique material presentation of a 
broader and more complex sociocultural inclination. Without the “technological revolution” of 
electronics technologies that potentiated the “integration of communications and computing,” the 
changes in institutional structures and policies that allowed for economic and political 
globalization, which began well before any semblance of the modern computer had appeared, 
could not have been realized in the uniformized (or more precisely, hyper-uniformized) form that 
provokes Nancy.86 Technological integration made possible the infrastructure upon which a 
global sociopolitical order of the same could be established and institutionalized, recapitulating 
the sameness of the transcendental subject inaugurated by Kant (which was subsequently 
deconstructed by his successors). We will examine the particular structure of electronics 
technologies and the role they have played in solidifying and proliferating this system of global 
sameness—even, we might add, bringing it to maturity.87 This is in no way to reduce the history 
of technology and globalization to that of a single technology, but rather to highlight the singular 
structure of a specific technology as it has impinged upon everyday living and upon the thinking 
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of such scholars as Nancy, and others to be discussed below. 
Nancy himself takes note of the significance of technology but does not analyze the 
“uniformization” that it effects.88 He is more concerned with the shattering of uniformity and 
homogeneity by the becoming-world of the world, bypassing the question of technology so as to 
remain in his characteristically abstract register. We have already followed him in this 
manoeuvre above, but it will serve us well to summarize here: traditional philosophy, world-
view philosophy, allows for differences between subjective views, but this philosophy is 
finished, relegated to the scholarly archives; the world becoming-world obliterates all such 
boundaries, producing a metaphysical uniformity of subjects (and/or non-subjects) over against 
the world; but, in the very structure of the world as “existence-subject,” every “that,” every 
“actual, existent what,” comes as who, as individual, as subject of existence;89 the being of the 
individual is not absolute presence, absolute identity, but relative presence, relative identity; 
presence “comes to presence, without being to its-self”;90 this to is the individual, the existent, 
rising up in the world, which is the “shared taking-place of all places”;91 the individual can never 
be absolute, then, because the individual’s identity depends on this relative “spacing,” which is 
the very condition of presence and identity;92 but this is in no way a relativism, because the 
individual is not empty, neither pure presence nor pure absence; the transcendental subject is not 
entirely liquidated; the subject is a who, individual, singular, particular, affirmed in its existence, 
but now acknowledged to be bound up in the world to which it comes as “presence-to”;93 and 
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this is the subject’s freedom, the freedom of the individual, of every “that,” of the world itself; 
the world becoming-world does indeed shatter itself, but this is its opening to the liberating 
question, “Who is there?”; a “presence-to that is not to-itself” is the very differentiation that 
passes beyond uniformization, while also passing beyond the traditional logic of fixed terms and 
views, which depends on the identity of a transcendental absolute present to itself, subject of 
itself, for its authorization and continuance; on the contrary, the subject-in-between, the subject 
after the subject, is a “factual (even material) punctuation of Being,” but a punctuation that in no 
way founds itself; the subject after the subject is the “singular plural,”94 and as such, this subject 
is free. 
From this summary of the foregoing it should be clear why Nancy does not attempt to 
analyze the “uniformization” or flattening that modern technology has wrought. There is an 
important difference between Nancy’s logic and the logic of globalization. The world in its 
structure, the world as structure, cannot be reduced to a monolith, its disparate parts joined in 
perfect integration. For Nancy, technological uniformization obscures but cannot halt the 
generativity of the world, the force of its becoming. To maintain the erasure of this ongoing 
process by technology as an unambiguous fact, to reduce metaphysics, politics, sociality, 
economics, and matter to informational exchange, to proclaim the global order of the same 
propagated by technological integration as the solution to strife and disaster, would be an 
obscuration indeed. Indeed, such reductivist thinking requires a reversion on our part to the 
paradigm of the metaphysical subject beyond which Nancy has already brought us, the positing 
of a transcendental user over against the world-as-object. Such is the uniformization of 
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technology in the domain of thought, the flattening of all problems and meanings to 
technologically solvable and interpretable ones, the diffusion of what is in code. 
And yet, Nancy also describes the metaphysical subject’s basic approach to the world it 
potentiates as the “technological interpretation of Being.”95 The being of the metaphysical 
subject, in appropriating the world to which it is extraneous and alien, is technological. 
Technology is appropriative, and to be in the mode of appropriation is to be technological. The 
interpenetration of subject and world revealed to us in the wake of Kant makes clear the fact that 
metaphysics and technology, theory and practice, are intertwined; the metaphysical subject and 
the technological subject, the subject and the user, are one and the same. The theoretical and 
concrete operate on the same plane, are involved in the same processes. The self-integration/self-
differentiation of the world becoming-world is not a matter for some impossible ‘pure 
philosophy,’ nor is it restricted to some transcendental realm beyond concrete matter. The whole 
point of Nancy’s identification of the world-wideness of the world as an open totality (which is 
to say, existence as possibility, the irresolvable and self-exceeding totality of possibility-space) is 
the dissolution of the within/without divide (those old binaries of subject and object, mind and 
body, soul and flesh, conscious and unconscious) and the reintegration of former oppositions and 
disparate parts into a unitary plane that does not annihilate their difference, but rather finds itself 
continually beginning, continuously individuating itself, from out of difference. Therefore, if 
Nancy is able to move beyond metaphysical uniformization by way of his thinking of the 
becoming-world of the world, should we not, then, be able to move beyond technological 
uniformization in the same way, following a similar line of reasoning to that which we have been 
tracing here? Can we ask what it is for the liberated subject—the individual, singular, particular 
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who—to exist in a technologically uniformized world? What lines of traversal can such a subject 
pursue beyond the programmed pathways of the world-structure in its technological 
transformation into the uniformity of the world-machine? Or again, how might this technological 
uniformization be interpreted as a consequence of the same or similar structural pressures that 
saw the metaphysical uniformization of the subject, and how, then, might we transfer the lessons 
we have learned from Nancy to this concrete domain?  
Nancy himself remarks on the final page of his introduction that the “so-called 
‘technological’ world should not be excluded” from the presence that “is presence to presence.”96 
The structure of the world as existence-subject includes technology, and it follows, then, that 
technology should, in some fashion, obey the logic of self-differentiation that we have already 
seen exhibited by the world more broadly, even if it does, as a sub-structure of the world, also 
exhibit a unique inclination toward uniformity, flattening, and integration. We must take Nancy 
beyond philosophy, beyond himself, and look to the concrete shape of technological integration 
in the world of our present. The becoming-world of the world entails that even “the technological 
interpretation of Being will have allowed some places to come about as the places of a presence 
to technology.”97 These places are for us to locate, sites of resistance and rupture, sites where the 
revolutionary punctuality of the subject-after-the-subject, the subject-in-between, the subject-in-
common, might break open the technological closure, disrupting its flattening trajectory and 
exposing it to differentiation. Where might space be found or created within the circumscription 
of the global for the upsurge of the world to take place? We must read further and attempt an 
interpretation of the technology in which we are embedded, the technology to which we are 
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present, if we are to answer such a question. In doing so, we will round a bend in our detour that 
will bring us within view of a return to our initial troublesome question of the cyborg and the 
elaboration of a generative between from within the uniformized technological field, a space 
from which a reclamation of technological subjectivity might be mounted.  
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Chapter 1: The Integrated Circuit 
1.1. Interpreting Technology 
If we are to interpret technology and to see how its particular inclinations as a sub-structure 
of the world lead to uniformity, flattening, and integration, resisting and obscuring the plurality 
and generativity of the existence-subject, it is necessary that we articulate two guiding themes. 
First, to simplify Nancy’s arguments discussed above, we can say that the concept of the 
“existence-subject” entails the unity-in-plurality of everything that is. This is not to propose a 
totally pure whole without contradiction, but to acknowledge the unity of the world-structure as 
something that produces identities and individuals—singularities—that need not be 
commensurate with each other and yet are born of the same matter. Thus, we cannot say that 
technology is some intrusion into being, an alien contamination of the way things properly ought 
to be; modern technology is no different from the Kantian revolution, which above we saw to be 
a rupture of the system from within. So, then, we must look to the singular structure of 
technology while refusing to cast it as an invader. Technology is of the world; technology is of 
us; it shares our matter. Second, it is far too easy to speak of “technology” as a vague and 
homogeneous force. But, as we have already noted with Wolf, the concrete technological 
revolution that helped to solidify the structure of our global world was the “integration of 
communications and computing.”98 It does not suffice to speak of Technology with a capital t; 
we must analyze specific technologies—here, computing and communications technologies—if 
we are to interpret the broader phenomenon that we designate Technology in its contemporary 
form. How, then, did the integration of computing and communications technologies come 
about, and what does this integration imply for our question of the subject? For this, we must 
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examine the development of “integrated circuit” or “IC” technology, upon which modern 
computing and communications technologies depend. This examination will afford a clearer 
understanding of the particular technological history in question and the material conditions of 
living that it has encouraged, so allowing for a discussion of the cyborg that is rooted in the 
matter of existence, and the specific technological shaping of existence toward which human 
subjects have been working since at least the nineteenth century. By reading this history of 
integrated circuit technology, the unique constitution of the cyborg as a possible historical 
subject will become clear, allowing for a critical exploration of subjectivity that is better fitted to 
the technological situation of our present. 
 
1.2. Discovering the Electron 
One point of origin for this history can be marked in William Crookes’s Bakerian Lecture 
of 1879. 99 Building on the research of Michael Faraday in 1838,100 Heinrich Geissler and Julius 
Plücker in 1858,101 Johann Wilhelm Hittorf in 1869,102 and Eugen Goldstein in 1876,103 Crookes 
set about designing an experiment that would provide insight into the nature of “cathode rays” 
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(“Kathodenstrahlen”), a fluorescence caused by the electrical current in certain apparatuses that 
had yet to be conclusively explained. By running a current between two platinum terminals, a 
cathode (negative charge) and an anode (positive charge), placed in a glass tube filled with 
gaseous mercury, and then progressively evacuating the tube, Crookes found that the 
fluorescence of the cathode rays—a halo of violet light concentrated at the edge of the cathode—
would move further and further away from the terminal, leaving a dark space in the intervening 
distance. Duplicating the experiment with different gases, different voltages, and different 
configurations of his apparatus, Crookes found that the dimensions of the dark space depended 
on the density of the gas, and not on any other factor. He concluded that the thickness of the dark 
space was “the measure of the length of the path between successive collisions of the 
molecules,” and that the cathode rays were the effect of the “induction spark actually 
illuminat[ing] the lines of molecular pressure caused by the electrical excitement” at the negative 
terminal.104 Contrary to the conclusions of many physicists who preceded him, Crookes likened 
the behaviour of electricity in a vacuum tube to “cannon balls” fired from a cannon.105 He 
criticized the theories maintaining some sort of “perfectly flexible conductor” connecting the 
terminals, and proposed instead that the electrical “stream” between the terminals consisted of 
“molecules” being “projected” from the negative pole.106 His research produced concrete 
findings that shifted the study of electricity from the realm of speculation to the realm of matter. 
Spurred on by Crookes’s assertion of the particulate constitution of electricity, the physicist 
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J. J. Thomson conducted a series of experiments to test Crookes’s hypothesis. In an 1897 article 
in The Electrician107 Thomson reported his surprising results that, while being in “exact 
agreement” with Crookes’s hypothesis, required that the electrical particle be significantly 
smaller than a “molecule” (as Crookes had termed it), and even smaller than the smallest atom 
(hydrogen), which others had theorized to be the carrier of electricity.108 The math and the 
experimental evidence both indicated to Thomson a “state of matter more finely subdivided than 
the atom of an element,” the particles of which state he named “corpuscles.”109 He proposed that 
these corpuscles were negatively charged, fast moving, and importantly, identical to each other, 
all of which entailed the indissoluble linkage between electricity and a specific particle. Such a 
particle accounted for the predictable behaviour of the cathode rays seen across the range of 
Crookes’s experiments. In a subsequent article, Thomson directly challenged the vague notions 
of electricity previously put forward as being “due to some process in the æther”; his corpuscles, 
in comparison, were “wholly material,” and proved to be mathematically and experimentally 
coherent. 110 Using a more complex variation of Crookes’s apparatus, Thomson decisively 
demonstrated the particulate behaviour of cathode rays, and the essential unity of the rays with 
negative electricity. He saw no other explanation for these results than that cathode rays “are 
charges of negative electricity carried by particles of matter.”111 By following Crookes in his 
method, Thomson’s work evidences a kind of proto-physicalist metaphysics critical of those 
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other metaphysics postulating an immaterial realm and its attendant functions. Inclined to 
conceptualize electricity as a material process enacted by material existents, Thomson was better 
able to undertake research culminating in concrete and productive results—results that would 
directly contribute to the electronics revolution and the figure of the cyborg that would 
eventually emerge from it. Though neither his term for the electron (the corpuscle) nor his theory 
of subatomic structure (the plum pudding model112) would hold, Thomson’s conceptual 
commitment to the materiality of electricity, and his practical commitment to experiment backed 
with rigorous theory, persist in the discipline to this day—a dynamic entanglement of 
metaphysics and technology, theory and practice.113  
 
1.3. The Vacuum Tube Diode and Triode 
As Crookes’s and Thomson’s experiments were being carried out, other researchers were 
concentrating their efforts in the realm of engineering, applying the new theory of a material 
‘electrical particle’ to the manufacture of electrically powered devices. In 1880, Thomas Edison 
received his patent for the electric lamp, which swapped the cold cathode of Crookes’s and 
Thomson’s experiments with a hot cathode (a carbon wire filament) in order to use an electrical 
current running through the cathode to produce light.114 In 1883, Edison patented another lamp 
design that included a positive terminal within the bulb, allowing for the regulation and 
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measurement of the current emitted by the filament.115 In 1905, John Ambrose Fleming patented 
an adaptation of this design for use in a vacuum tube valve (or diode), which allowed for the 
manipulation and rectification of an alternating electrical current (fig. 1).116  
 
Fig. 1 
In his valve, Fleming nested a carbon filament b inside an aluminum cylinder c, both of which he 
contained in an evacuated bulb a. He connected the filament via leads e and f to the battery h. He 
suspended the cylinder from platinum wires d to prevent it from directly contacting the filament. 
He completed the circuit of the device with wire j, which connected the platinum wires with wire 
e, between which he interposed an induction-coil k (secondary winding) and a galvanometer l 
(used for the indication of current). Fleming connected the device to an aerial wire n and earth o 
by way of the primary winding of the induction-coil m. By bringing the carbon filament to a state 
of high incandescence, Fleming found that negative electricity would flow from the filament 
through the vacuum to the cylinder,117 but not from the cylinder to the filament, thus allowing for 
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the rectification of the alternating current received from the aerial wire through the induction coil 
into a direct current. If electricity travelled by way of a particle, Fleming concluded, its effects 
should therefore be predictable and manipulable. Matter could, in theory, be structured in such a 
way that the mostly invisible action of a natural force could be controlled. His valve was a proof 
of this concept, the embedding of a particular metaphysical conception of the world in a concrete 
feat of engineering. 
In 1907, Lee De Forest patented the design for a triode radio receiver that he named the 
“audion.”118 Modifying the basic design of Fleming’s diode, De Forest placed the cathode and 
anode adjacent to each other and interposed between them a grid-shaped platinum wire. He 
found that by including this third electrode he was not only able to achieve rectification of an 
alternating current, but also amplification of that same current by altering the configuration of 
the device. However, De Forest found the mechanism of his audion to be “exceedingly 
complex,” and so did not offer any theory as to the reason for its occurrence.119 In 1914, 
however, Edwin Howard Armstrong, then an engineering student working in the electro-
mechanics lab at Columbia University, published his research on audion-type devices, filling this 
theoretical gap.120 With circuit diagrams and oscilloscope measurements for a variety of device 
configurations, Armstrong demonstrated the function of the grid electrode as an “electron relay,” 
whereby a potential difference effected by the grid between the cathode and anode could be used 
to predictably incline the electrical current running through the device, with the ultimate intent of 
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either rectification or amplification of the current.121 Armstrong’s theoretical and technical 
expertise, along with his access to the space and instruments of a research lab, allowed him to 
take the mysterious operation of De Forest’s device and make it concrete, providing a practical 
basis for future innovation of solid-state electronics, which would in turn produce as a byproduct 
the imagination of an electronic being, the cyborg.  
 
1.4. Early Solid-State Electronics 
Though the vacuum tube triode marked a significant advance in electronics technology, the 
design was plagued with numerous weaknesses. Vacuum tubes leaked and the emitter filaments 
within them burned out, and these shortcomings only compounded in the largest vacuum tube-
based computers, which would come to employ in excess of 10,000 vacuum tubes; furthermore, 
such complex computers would require enormous amounts of power and space for their 
operation, and proved to be highly inefficient.122 Foreseeing such difficulties, inventors began 
working on triode devices that could utilize solid materials instead of vacuum tubes for 
conduction, and the dream of ‘solid state’ circuitry was born. 
In 1926, the physicist and inventor Julius E. Lilienfeld applied for a patent for an apparatus 
designed to manipulate an electrical current in the same manner as a vacuum tube diode or 
triode, but which utilized a solid body instead of an evacuated glass tube.123 By placing two 
strips of a conductive material like platinum across an insulating base, and applying a conductive 
coating to the entire surface of the device, Lilienfeld was able to recreate the anode-cathode 
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circuit of earlier devices, while avoiding their significant design flaws. Then, by inserting a piece 
of aluminum foil in a fracture in the middle of the base, halfway between the anode and cathode 
terminals, Lilienfeld was able to reproduce the function of the grid wire from De Forest’s design. 
By connecting a battery to the anode and cathode, and another battery to the foil electrode, 
Lilienfeld produced a potential difference in the conductive surface coating that, when in circuit 
with an exterior alternating current, allowed for the rectification of that current as it passed 
through the device. Lilienfeld concluded that the excess potential in the foil electrode supplied 
by the second battery, when in contact with the conductive coating, acted as a resistor that 
effectively prevented the external alternating current from flowing in the opposite direction 
through the device. With only slight modifications, Lilienfeld found that his device could also be 
used to amplify such a current, and with much more reliable performance than that of the 
vacuum tube triode. Lilienfeld had invented what is now termed a “field-effect transistor,”124 and 
what is generally considered the first solid-state electronic device. 
In 1928, Lilienfeld filed another patent for a refined version of his device that did not 
require a fracture in the base layer, using instead three layers of varying conductivity to achieve 
the same effects as in the prior design.125 In this configuration of the device, Lilienfeld spattered 
an aluminum base with a minute layer of aluminum oxide, which acted as an insulator, and on 
top of which he placed two contact plates. Lilienfeld coated the oxide layer and the contact plates 
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in turn with a minute layer of platinum to create a highly conductive surface between the plates. 
Lilienfeld connected the contact plates to a battery, and the base to another, and put the whole 
device in circuit with a transformer, which supplied an alternating current for the device to 
rectify. By making a depression in the conductive surface layer, Lilienfeld was able to produce a 
strong, localized electrical field in the same manner as the foil in his prior design. As before, 
Lilienfeld could achieve both rectification and amplification of an external alternating current 
routed through the device, but this time without the structural weakness of the fracture that had 
been necessary for the insertion of the foil electrode. His intuitions were directed by the 
metaphysical commitments of his discipline (specifically, the commitment of the likes of 
Thomson, Fleming, and Armstrong to the materiality of electricity) and he shaped the matter of 
his devices according to the observable and predictable inclinations of electricity as a physical 
force. Peculiarly, there is no evidence that Lilienfeld successfully produced either of his devices, 
beyond whatever initial prototypes he may have constructed before applying for his patents. The 
“simple, compact and substantial”126 construction of his devices was years ahead of its time; 
without the requisite theory explaining their mechanism, Lilienfeld’s devices were left to fall into 
obscurity. It would be over a decade before other theorists and engineers would catch up with 
him and flesh out the conceptual framework necessary for further development.  
 
1.5. Theorizing the Semiconductor 
In his 1928 doctoral dissertation, the physicist Felix Bloch established the quantum theory 
of solids through a study of the behaviour of electrons in metallic crystal lattices (published in 
                                                 
126 Lilienfeld, US Patent 1,900,018, 1. 
 Stein 36 
1929 in Zeitschrift für Physik).127 In two papers in 1931, the mathematician Alan H. Wilson built 
upon Bloch’s work, detailing his theory of electronic semiconductors.128 Wilson was intrigued by 
the “energy levels” that had been discovered in metals, and set about critiquing the prior theory 
that maintained the existence of two types of electrons—“free” and “bound”—in such 
substances.129 He proposed instead a “dual aspect” theory of electrons, which meant that 
electrons could behave as either free or bound in a metallic lattice, depending on external 
phenomena.130 Bloch had shown that, in metals with a perfect lattice, electrons are free to move 
throughout the solid substance. Wilson argued that such “free” electrons were not of a distinct 
type, but instead were any electrons excited by the application of an external electrical field from 
the “valency” level of the substance to the “conductivity” level of the substance, resulting in 
conduction.131 At the theoretical level, Wilson restored unity to the electron as a material 
particle, while describing the specifics of its behaviour in connection with its environment more 
sufficiently than had ever been done before. Good conductors did not have more “free” electrons 
than poor conductors, he argued, but rather a lattice structure more conducive to the excitation of 
electrons from one energy level to another.  
Wilson argued that in good conductors electrons are organized in such a way that there is 
continuity between energy levels or “bands,” allowing for the easy movement of electrons 
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between them.132 Therefore, at absolute zero in a good conductor, conductivity should be 
infinite, due to the impossibility of lattice perturbations interfering with the movement of 
electrons. On the other hand, higher temperatures and the presence of impurities in a metallic 
lattice should hamper conductivity by disrupting the lattice structure of the substance, making it 
harder for electrons to pass from the valence band to the conduction band. In semiconductors, 
however, these principles did not hold. Building on the research of Rudolf Peierls who had first 
noticed a gap in the energy bands of semiconductors in 1930, Wilson showed by mathematical 
argument that, in semiconductors, the energies of the conduction band lay entirely above the 
energies of the valence band, separated from each other by bands of “disallowed energies”—a 
discontinuity referred to as the band gap. 133 So, wherein good conductors lower temperatures 
improve conductivity by preserving the perfect lattice structure of the substance, in 
semiconductors lower temperatures deprive the electrons of the substance of the energy 
necessary for them to leap across the larger band gap, decreasing conductivity.134 The behaviour 
of electrons can thus in no way be attributed to an intrinsic difference between types of electron; 
electrons behave in predictable ways according to the differences in the material structures in 
which they are being observed. Though the discovery of the electron emphasized its materiality, 
the work of Bloch and then Wilson presents us with a material metaphysics that is distinctly 
relational or contextual in form. This development in the science would lead to the discovery 
that would pave the way for the boom in solid-state electronics, and the consequent potentiation 
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of a thought of a ‘solid-state subject’—the cyborg. 
Prompted by a peculiar finding that, in certain poor conductors, the introduction of 
impurities (whether by perturbation or foreign particles) increased the conductivity of the 
material,135 Wilson set about finding an answer to the problem of conductivity variance in metals 
in the second of his papers from 1931. By comparing the behaviour of insulators, conductors, 
and semiconductors, Wilson demonstrated that in substances marked by the presence of valence 
and conduction bands (fig. 2) the introduction of an impurity (fig. 2, line AB) altered the 
conductivity of the substance in predictable ways.136  
 
Fig. 2 
Wilson found that in insulators, where the band gap is very large, the electrons of the impurity 
atom faced the same difficulty as the electrons of the insulator and could not be sufficiently 
excited to jump across the band gap; consequently, impurity atoms in an insulator only 
contributed to the insulator’s resistance. In conductors, then, where the band gap is negligible, it 
is very easy for the electrons of the conductor to pass into the conduction band by excitation, but 
as such, the electrons of the impurity atom only have room to move down into the valence band; 
consequently, impurity atoms in a conductor, like those in an insulator, only contribute to the 
conductor’s resistance. But, in a semiconductor, where the band gap is of intermediate size, 
excitation by an electrical field can cause both electrons of the semiconductor and the electrons 
of the impurity atom to jump into the conduction band, thereby increasing the overall 
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conductivity of the substance from what it would have been without the impurity. From these 
findings, Wilson concluded that the only property distinguishing semiconductors from 
conductors and insulators was the degree of impurities present in the substance, and that the 
existence of semiconductors must therefore be “purely accidental,” a consequence of flaws in the 
constitution of any substance organized in a lattice structure.137 As such, semiconductors are 
those substances that find themselves perfectly poised at the intersection between impurity and 
conductivity, at which point impurities can be used to beneficially affect the conductivity of a 
substance, in the inverse of the usual behaviour of conductors. Because of these findings, the 
study of electrical conduction was irrevocably shifted from a seeking of mysteries—which is to 
say, the tabulation of ‘hidden’ electrical values presumed to be intrinsic to specific elements—to 
a calculation of accidents, a critical observation of particular structures interacting with a 
particular force and its force-carriers in a particular—and decidedly contingent—manner. The 
matter led theorists to a transformation of their metaphysics. 
From these conclusions, it became clear to researchers in the discipline that an 
understanding of the “accidental” existence of semiconductors meant that such accidents must 
also be engineerable. If an accident could be calculated and described after the fact, should it not 
also be possible to manufacture such an occurrence? To this end, in 1939, Nevill F. Mott applied 
Wilson’s theory of electronic semiconductors to the behaviour of crystal rectifiers, once again 
bringing together scientific theory and technological practice.138 For example, in a device such as 
Lilienfeld’s in 1928 where the aluminum semiconductor base was separated from a platinum 
conductor by a minute insulating layer, the insulating layer acted as a “potential barrier” that, in 
                                                 
137 Wilson, “Theory of Electronic Semi-Conductors—II,” 280. 
138 Nevill F. Mott, “The Theory of Crystal Rectifiers,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
London A 171, no. 944 (May 1939): 27-38, https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.1939.0051. 
 Stein 40 
its normal state, prevented the electrons of the semiconductor from moving into the conductor 
(fig. 3, left). 139 
       
Fig. 3 
The subsequent application of an electrical field, however, increased the energy of the electrons 
in the semiconductor, allowing them to flow over the barrier and along the surface of the 
conductor. Once these electrons had flowed from the semiconductor into the conductor, they 
could not climb back over the potential barrier in the opposite direction; by this process, an 
alternating current could be rectified (fig. 7, right). Lilienfeld had stumbled upon the utility of 
such variations in conductivity by way of experiment, led by certain intimations of the science of 
his day; with Wilson’s and Mott’s theories, however, the discipline finally received the 
theoretical framework for which it had been waiting.  
 
1.6. The Transistor 
In 1939, the physicist and inventor William Shockley mused upon the possibility of a 
solid-state amplifier device.140 In 1945, after the war, Shockley began organizing a solid-state 
physics research group at Bell Labs.141 That same year, he designed a “field-effect” device that 
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could utilize germanium or silicon semiconductors (which had been determined to be most 
useful in constructing such devices), but was informed that his invention had already been 
patented by Lilienfeld seventeen years earlier.142 To make matters worse, the field-effect 
mechanism he employed encountered difficulties in its operation.143 Shockley’s colleague John 
Bardeen theorized that electrons on the surface of the semiconductor might be interfering with 
the electrical field upon which the device relied; Bardeen and another colleague, Walter Brattain, 
began working on a solution to the interference of these “surface states.”144 In a 1947 paper, 
Bardeen suggested that the normal behaviour of a semiconductor when subjected to an external 
electrical field (as described by Wilson and Mott) could also produce at the surface of the device 
a disallowed energy band, negating through the doubling of surface layers the increased 
conduction produced therein.145 The very mechanism of the “field-effect” appeared to be 
nullifying itself, and the substances most suited to the construction of these devices—silicon and 
germanium—the most susceptible to such difficulties. Having schematized the ‘accidents’ of 
conduction, the discipline was confronted with a further accident of a form heretofore 
unforeseen, a new territory of existence requiring a further project of ‘calculation.’146  
Later in 1947, Bardeen and Brattain successfully produced a rectifier-amplifier device that 
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overcame this problem through a “point contact,” rather than field-effect, configuration.147 By 
this time, Wilson’s theory of electronic semiconductors was common knowledge in the 
discipline, and Bardeen and Brattain were able to apply this knowledge and build upon it in the 
manufacture of their device. Wilson had concentrated on the behaviour of negative carriers 
(electrons) in semiconductors, and Mott, though aware of the existence of positive carriers 
(electron “holes”), chose to discuss only negative carriers in his study.148 But Bardeen and 
Brattain theorized that negative and positive carriers could be simultaneously implemented in a 
semiconductor device to beneficial ends. They knew that in silicon an impurity like phosphorous 
behaved as a “donor,” contributing its electrons to the unfilled conduction band (which process 
Wilson discussed in his second paper in 1931); the donor thus increased the number of negative 
carriers in the semiconductor, rendering it “N-type.”149 But conversely, Bardeen and Brattain 
found that an impurity like boron in silicon behaved as an “acceptor,” taking electrons from the 
filled valence band and leaving positive carriers or “holes” in the lattice structure at the level of 
the filled band, which an electron would normally occupy. These holes acted like electrons, but 
with a net positive charge (in the absence of the negative charge of an electron), rendering the 
semiconductor “P-type.”150 Bardeen and Brattain determined that it should be possible to 
produce a potential difference near the surface of a semiconductor that could be used for 
rectification and amplification, as in a vacuum tube rectifier-amplifier, by layering a p-type 
region on top of an n-type region, rendering unnecessary an intervening barrier layer like that 
employed by Lilienfeld and thereby constructing a much simpler and more solid device that 
                                                 
147 John Bardeen and Walter Brattain, Three-electrode circuit element utilizing semiconductor 
materials, US Patent 2,524,035, filed June 17, 1948, and issued October 3, 1950. 
148 Mott, 31. 
149 Bardeen and Brattain, US Patent 2,524,035, 5. 
150 Bardeen and Brattain, US Patent 2,524,035, 5. 
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made use of the “surface effects” of such devices, rather than being hampered by them (fig. 4).  
 
Fig. 4 
To construct their device, Bardeen and Brattain treated a block of semiconductor material 1 
(silicon or germanium) to render it of n-type conductivity. They plated the bottom of the block 
with a base electrode 2 (equivalent to the grid electrode in a vacuum tube triode). They treated 
the upper layer 3 of the block to render it of p-type conductivity, which, as expected, by mere 
contact with the n-type block, resulted in a minute and intrinsic barrier region 4 between the n-
type and p-type regions. To avoid the complications of Shockley’s design, they affixed an 
emitter electrode 5 (equivalent to the cathode of a vacuum tube triode) and a collector electrode 6 
(equivalent to the anode of a vacuum tube triode) near to each other on the surface of the block, 
which together, through a potential biasing by the batteries 7 and 8, produced the rectifying 
resistance in the surface of the block previously accomplished by Lilienfeld and Shockley with 
an electrical field. The entire device was then connected to an output load and input signal by 
way of the transformers 9 and 10, respectively. Bardeen and Brattain found that the contacts 
between the electrodes and the semiconductor body, and the contact at the boundary between the 
n-type and p-type regions of the semiconductor, resulted in potential differences that could be 
used to rectify or amplify an electrical current routed through the device, depending on the 
configuration of its external connections and the modulation of the potential biasing of the 
electrodes. This meant that their device was capable of performing the same functions as had 
been previously accomplished by vacuum tube triodes, and could do so more reliably, quickly, 
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and efficiently. Their “compact, simple, and rugged” 151 device was dubbed the “transistor” by 
another colleague at Bell Labs, John Pierce,152 and Bardeen, Brattain, and Shockley jointly 
received the 1956 Nobel Prize in Physics for their discovery of the “transistor effect.”153 With 
this establishment of electrical rectification and amplification by way of an electronic relay as the 
“transistor effect,” the basis of modern computing technology was laid. With the transistor, the 
process of technological integration—the integration potentiating globalization, the integration to 
which our cyborg finds herself present—was dramatically accelerated. The world-wide 
“uniformization” of which Nancy writes was uniquely intensified by this miniscule and relatively 
simple device. 
In three follow-up papers,154 Bardeen and Brattain attempted to more thoroughly detail the 
mechanism of the transistor and the transistor effect, but Shockley was critical of their 
explanations. They had built upon Bardeen’s 1947 paper, continuing to emphasize the role of 
surface effects in transistor devices, but Shockley contended that such effects were only 
subsidiary to the passage of electron holes through the solid body of the semiconductor material. 
In 1940, Bell Labs electrochemist Russel Ohl had stumbled upon the “p-n junction” while 
working on silicon rectifiers for radar detectors,155 and patented a device utilizing his discovery 
                                                 
151 Bardeen and Brattain, US Patent 2,524,035, 1.  
152 PBS, “Naming the Transistor,” Transistorized! The History of the Invention of the 
Transistor, accessed January 30, 2018, https://www.pbs.org/transistor/. The live documentary 
was broadcast November 8, 1999.. 
153 The Nobel Foundation, “The Nobel Prize in Physics 1956,” The Nobel Prize, accessed 
January 30, 2018, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1956/. 
154 John Bardeen and Walter Brattain. “The Transistor, a Semi-Conductor Triode,” Physical 
Review 74, no. 2 (July 1948): 230-31, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.74.230; “Nature of the 
Forward Current in Germanium Point Contacts,” Physical Review 74, no. 2 (July 1948): 231-32, 
https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.74.231; and “Physical Principles Involved in Transistor 
Action,” Physical Review 75, no. 8 (April 1949): 1208-26, https://doi.org/10.1103/ 
PhysRev.75.1208. 
155 Computer History Museum, “1940: Discovery of the p-n Junction,” The Silicon Engine. 
 Stein 45 
the next year.156 By a process of progressive melting and cooling, a single ingot of silicon could 
be made to exhibit structurally different zones of opposite conductivity-type, divided by a 
striated barrier zone across which a current, applied through contacts at either end of the device, 
exhibited amplification. Though Bardeen and Brattain would implement a similar junction in 
their device so as to utilize the current-carrying capacity of electron holes, their reliance on 
surface contacts prevented them from taking full advantage of Ohl’s discovery. In 1948, 
however, Shockley developed a p-n junction-based transistor device that did not rely on the close 
proximity of surface contacts for its operation (fig. 5).157 This configuration allowed him to 
conclusively prove his theory of the transistor effect, over and against Bardeen and Brattain’s 
theory. 
 
Fig. 5 
To make his junction transistor, Shockley layered together three regions of semiconductor 
material—two n-type regions 62 and 63 on either side of the p-type region 61—producing at 
each point of contact an intrinsic p-n barrier. He affixed emitter and collector electrodes 66 and 
67, respectively, to either side of the device, and embedded a base electrode 65 in the middle p-
                                                 
156 Russell S. Ohl, Light-sensitive electric device, US Patent 2,402,662, filed May 27, 1941, 
and issued June 25, 1946. 
157 William Shockley, Circuit element utilizing semiconductive material, US Patent 
2,569,347, filed June 26, 1948, and issued September 25, 1951. 
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type region. This configuration eschewed the surface-orientation of Bardeen and Brattain’s 
device, relying on conduction entirely through the body of the device to produce the transistor 
effect (that is, the rectification or amplification of an electrical current)—an outcome previously 
deemed impossible. 
With two papers in the July 1949 Bell System Technical Journal, though, Shockley firmly 
established his impossible theory.158 Contrary to the surface-orientation of the “type-A” 
transistor (Bardeen and Brattain’s point-contact transistor), Shockley’s junction transistor took 
full advantage of the process of “hole injection” into an n-type semiconductor, from which 
Bardeen and Brattain had only accidentally and partially benefited.159 The forward current of the 
emitter electrode (which Bardeen and Brattain had previously discussed160) did not only cause 
holes to flow along the p-type surface of the semiconductor, but caused holes to be “injected” 
into and flow through the solid n-type body.161 Because the number of carriers in the lattice 
structure of a particular semiconductor is determinate, the introduction of more of said carriers 
(electrons in an n-type semiconductor, holes in a p-type semiconductor) by way of an electrical 
current can only induce a flow by displacement, without an increase of current.162 However, in 
an n-type semiconductor, where the presence of significant donor impurities has sufficiently 
                                                 
158 William Shockley, G. L. Pearson, and J. R. Haynes, “Hole Injection in Germanium—
Quantitative Studies and Filamentary Transistors,” Bell System Technical Journal 28, no. 3 (July 
1949): 344-66, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1949.tb03641.x, and William Shockley, “The 
Theory of p-n Junctions in Semiconductors and p-n Junction Transistors,” Bell System Technical 
Journal 28, no. 3 (July 1949): 435-89, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1949.tb03645.x. 
159 Shockley, Pearson, and Haynes, “Hole Injection,” 345. 
160 Bardeen and Brattain theorized that an excess of acceptor impurities at the surface of their 
device was at least partially responsible for the transistor effect, unaware of the process of hole 
injection in the main body of the semiconductor. See Bardeen and Brattain, “Forward Current in 
Germanium Point Contacts,” 232. 
161 Shockley, Pearson, and Haynes, “Hole Injection,” 346. 
162 Shockley, Pearson, and Haynes, “Hole Injection,” 348. 
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altered the band structure of the substance, the injection of holes produces a positive space 
charge that can only “be neutralized by an increased concentration of the [negative carriers] 
normally present,” allowing for “two processes of electronic conduction” to occur 
simultaneously in the body of the semiconductor, thereby producing a total increase in current 
within it (fig. 6).163 Shockley demonstrated that a sweeping current Ib (left, fig. 6) supplied by a 
battery to a germanium filament that was also connected to an emitter electrode ϵ would evidence 
amplification equal to itself plus the injected current Iϵ (right, fig. 6). The transistor effect in 
semiconductors depends on this mechanism of dual conduction.164  
 
Fig. 6 
With these two papers, and a subsequent monograph, Shockley cemented his position as an 
authority on the science and production of semiconductor electronics.165 Following Shockley, 
transistor design became, in many respects, a science of materials, predicated on a kind of 
structural monism committed to the essential integrability of matter and function, and the 
complementary generation of an infinity of processes from a small set (ideally, a set of one) of 
replicable components (or, in a metaphysical register, principles).  
                                                 
163 Shockley, Pearson, and Haynes, “Hole Injection,” 349. Their emphasis. 
164 The same effect can be achieved in the inverse by the injection of electrons into a p-type 
semiconductor, allowing for great versatility in the construction of junction transistor devices. 
See Shockley, Pearson, and Haynes, “Hole Injection,” 354. 
165 William Shockley, Electrons and Holes in Semiconductors: With Applications to 
Transistor Electronics (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.) 1950. 
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1.7. The Integrated Circuit 
In 1950, two patents were filed by Bell Labs chemists Morgan Sparks and Gordon K. Teal 
for methods of growing junction transistors from single crystals of semiconductor materials like 
germanium and silicon.166 These methods allowed for much simpler production, more solid 
devices, and higher levels of perfection in semiconductors, which contributed to higher 
performance than had been previously possible.167 In 1951, Shockley, Sparks, and Teal jointly 
published a paper detailing the construction and applications of germanium n-p-n grown-junction 
transistors, combining their practical and theoretical expertise.168 In 1952, another chemist at 
Bell Labs, Calvin Fuller, developed a technique for introducing impurities into semiconductors 
by way of diffusion, allowing for more precise demarcation of n- and p-type regions,169 and in 
1956, Morris Tanenbaum and D. E. Thomas at Bell Labs published their research on and design 
for a silicon n-p-n diffused-base transistor, building on Tanenbaum’s work on a silicon n-p-n 
grown-junction transistor the year before.170 Tanenbaum and Thomas found that by using the 
diffusion “doping” process they were able to obtain the simplicity and precision of grown-
junction devices, but achieve significantly thinner base layers, which improved the high-
                                                 
166 Morgan Sparks and Gordon K. Teal, Method of making p-n junctions in semiconductor 
materials, US Patent 2,631,356, filed June 15, 1950, and issued March 17, 1953, and Gordon K 
Teal, Methods of producing semiconductive bodies, US Patent 2,727,840, filed June 15, 1950, 
and issued December 20, 1955. 
167 Gordon K. Teal and J. B. Little, “Growth of Germanium Single Crystals,” Physical Review 
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168 William Shockley, Morgan Sparks, and Gordon K. Teal, “p-n Junction Transistors,” 
Physical Review 83, no. 1 (July 1951): 151-162, https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.83.151. 
169 Calvin. S. Fuller, “Diffusion of Donor and Acceptor Elements into Germanium,” Physical 
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170 Morris Tanenbaum and D. E. Thomas, “Diffused Emitter and Base Silicon Transistors,” 
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frequency operation of their devices. During the same period, Teal left Bell Labs to form a 
research team on silicon transistor technology at Texas Instruments. His researchers found that 
silicon could handle higher power and temperatures than germanium, which had previously been 
the semiconductor material of choice due to its easy manipulability.171 In 1955, Shockley also 
left Bell Labs and founded Shockley Semiconductor in Palo Alto, with the intent of researching 
and producing silicon semiconductors.172 Shockley Semiconductor was the first semiconductor 
company to arrive in what would become Silicon Valley (which, we should note, stands as a 
powerful geographic fusion of theory and practice, metaphysics and technology). Fairchild 
Semiconductor, a prominent player in the history of transistor technologies, was formed in 1957 
by eight of Shockley’s disgruntled engineers. Through the research conducted by these 
companies, silicon was established as the industry standard in semiconductor materials by the 
end of the 1950s. It remains the key element of computing and communications technologies to 
this day, the essential substrate of the technologically integrated world.173  
In 1955, Lincoln Derick, N. J. Colonia, and Carl J. Frosch of Bell Labs patented a process 
for masking silicon wafers during diffusion that would become integral to the ongoing 
manufacture of transistors,174 and in that same year, Jules Andrus of Bell Labs patented a 
“photolithographic” technique for etching complicated designs into their new masking layer.175 
                                                 
171 Willis A. Adcock, et al., “Silicon Transistor,” Proceedings of the I.R.E. 42, no. 7 (July 
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172 PBS, “Shockley Semiconductor,” Transistorized! 
173 Computer History Museum, “1954: Silicon Transistors Offer Superior Operating 
Characteristics,” The Silicon Engine. 
174 Lincoln Derick, N. J. Colonia, and Carl J. Frosch, Oxidation of semiconductive surfaces 
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175 Jules Andrus, Fabrication of semiconductor devices, US Patent 3,122,817, filed August 15, 
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This combination of masking, photolithography, and diffusion allowed Andrus to make complex 
transistor devices that far exceeded the utility of earlier, more rudimentary designs. Concurrent 
with the research at Bell Labs, Moe Abramson and Stanislaus Danko of the US Army Signal 
Corps developed a technique for printing, rather than manually wiring together, components on 
circuit boards, rendering the manufacture of circuit boards a much simpler process, and making 
possible significantly smaller and thinner devices.176 In 1957, Jay W. Lathrop and James R. Nall 
of the US Army Diamond Ordnance Fuse Laboratories patented a method of printing 
semiconductors in similar fashion to Abramson and Danko’s method, making possible the 
integral incorporation of semiconductors into printed circuit boards.177 Such integrated devices 
saw a significant decrease in size and increase in shock and vibration resistance, allowing for 
their application in a wider variety of technologies. In 1958, Jay Last and Robert Noyce at 
Fairchild Semiconductor adapted these two printing techniques into a “step-and-repeat” camera, 
bringing transistor manufacture a step closer to commercial production, which would in turn 
allow for the proliferation of integrated circuit devices across the globe.178 
It was not until September of 1958 at Texas Instruments, however, that the engineer Jack 
Kilby finally accomplished the dream toward which these scientists and inventors had been 
working.179 Spurred on by the limits of segregated design and manufacturing, Kilby proposed a 
                                                 
176 Moe Abramson and Stanislaus F. Danko, Process of assembling electrical circuits, US 
Patent 2,756,485, filed August 28, 1950, and issued July 31, 1956.  
177 Jay W. Lathrop and James R. Nall, Semiconductor construction, US Patent 2,890,395, 
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178 Computer History Museum, “1955: Photolithography Techniques Are Used to Make 
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miniature electronic circuit with all of its components constructed from a single substrate.180 
Kilby had determined that miniaturization depended on the use of as “few materials and 
operations as possible,” and preferably, one material only.181 The entirety of Kilby’s new circuit 
was, therefore, “integrated” in the body of the semiconductor through the precise shaping of the 
material, making it “smaller, more compact, and simpler” than any prior design (fig. 7).182  
 
Fig. 7 
By taking a single crystal of semiconductor material, shaping it into a “mesa”183 (as depicted in 
fig. 7), and then through the masking of the surrounding area and diffusion of dopants producing 
a p-n junction 26 in said mesa, Kilby was able to make a transistor configuration similar to 
Shockley’s original junction transistor design, without need of such unrefined solutions as 
Shockley’s embedded base electrode (fig. 5). The body of the semiconductor 25 functioned as 
the collector region of the transistor, separated by the junction 26 from the base region 27. An 
emitter region 28 made rectifying contact with the base region, and the base and collector 
contacts 29 and 30 completed the circuit. By this same process, Kilby was able to create 
transistors, diodes, and capacitors on a single-crystal wafer, increasing the potential complexity 
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180 Jack S. Kilby, Miniaturized electronic circuits, US Patent 3,138,743, filed February 6, 
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182 Kilby, US Patent 3,138,743, 2. 
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of applications of integrated circuit devices by reducing the complexity (in the sense of 
multipartedness but not in the sense of utility) of the devices themselves. Rather than cobble 
together components that had been designed separately, Kilby saw in the relational-contextual 
material metaphysics of his predecessors the potential for a monolithic structure possessed of an 
intrinsic plurality of functions (although the first true monolithic integrated circuit would be 
invented a year later by Robert Noyce at Fairchild Semiconductor).  
Meanwhile, Fairchild Semiconductor began manufacturing a high-voltage silicon transistor 
for use in North American Aviation’s B-70 Valkyrie’s state-of-the-art on-board computer.184 
Two teams, one led by Gordon Moore and the other by Jean Hoerni, began work on two different 
designs for the device;185 Moore’s team’s device was selected, and announced to the world in 
August 1958 (the month prior to the announcement of Kilby’s integrated circuit).186 Later that 
year, North American Aviation’s Technical Research Laboratory—Autonetics—received a 
contract from the US Air Force for what would become the Navaho and then the Minuteman 
nuclear missile programs.187 Autonetics implemented the same transistor manufactured by 
Fairchild that they had been using in the B-70 to drive the guidance-and-control systems of these 
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missiles.188 It was due to this partnership that Hoerni developed his revolutionary planar process, 
responding to failures in Fairchild’s transistors that compromised the functionality of 
Autonetics’s missiles.189 Wherein prior designs the masking layer surrounding the transistor 
mesas for the purpose of diffusion (in both Fairchild’s non-integrated and Texas Instrument’s 
integrated circuits) was stripped from the transistor following diffusion, Hoerni theorized that the 
masking layer might in fact have a positive function.190 In comparison with mesa-style transistors 
(such as fig. 7), Hoerni’s design employed a “planar” or “flat topography,” inverting the mesa 
structure and retaining the masking layer (fig. 8).191 
 
Fig. 8 
In Hoerni’s planar transistor,192 the main body of the device 32, acting as the collector region, 
consisted of n-type silicon. The surface of the collector region was coated with a masking layer 
31, through which Hoerni formed a base region 36 of p-type silicon by diffusion, resulting in a p-
n junction 37. He formed an emitter region 39 of n-type silicon by a second diffusion, resulting 
in a p-n junction 41. He then made openings 33, 42, and 43 to allow for the connection of 
emitter, base, and collector contact leads. Such a configuration could be produced at minute scale 
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(one millimetre wide by one micron thick) and operate at very high frequencies without fault, 
resolving the issues encountered by Autonetics in their missile tests.193 Hoerni’s design 
demonstrates a furtherance of the circuit-design logic concretely realized by Kilby, bringing the 
electronics industry a step closer to the dream of a final integration that would unify all 
computing functions (and eventually, all world functions) in a singular, infinitely replicable 
system. 
In 1959, Robert Noyce of Fairchild (co-assignor of Moore’s patent for the transistor 
implemented in the computers of the B-70 Valkyrie and Minuteman missile) took Hoerni’s 
planar process and applied it to Kilby’s integrated circuit devices to create the first “monolithic 
integrated circuit.”194 Noyce replaced the impractical wire connections that Kilby had used in his 
design with aluminum connections deposited directly on the planar surface of the newly 
redesigned transistors at Fairchild. Noyce’s process took the intuitions and concepts of prior 
scientists, engineers, and inventors, who had all been striving for greater integration and 
miniaturization in transistor design, and fused them with the latest advances in the technology to 
inaugurate a methodology that is still basic to integrated circuit design today, and in which we 
can clearly see the contemporary form of our technologically uniformized world taking shape.195  
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1.8. Integration and Proliferation 
With the concrete realization of the “monolithic idea” by Kilby and Noyce, transistor 
technology found itself newly opened to universal application.196 Improvements in transistors 
meant improvements in electronic devices and systems, which meant improvements in the 
human experience of such devices and systems, and therefore improvements in human life more 
generally. Since the invention of the monolithic integrated circuit, the structures of our everyday 
living have seen the steady incorporation of more and more such devices and systems, a 
progressive transistorization of the technological domain of our world. Through the continuous 
production of new, transistor-based technologies, the intrinsic sameness of the monolithic 
integrated circuit started to reproduce its structure in the extrinsic world, drawing on prior 
structures of uniformity to reconfigure the globe in its image and collapse the intrinsic/extrinsic 
distinction in the process. We turn now to the innovations that followed upon Kilby and Noyce’s 
work to see this process of technological flattening at work. 
In May of 1960, Dawon Kahng filed his patent for a field-controlled semiconductor device, 
the first functional and commercially manufacturable field-effect transistor since Lilienfeld’s and 
Shockley’s attempts at such a device.197 His design overcame the interference of surface states 
through the layering of a metal “gate” on top of the oxide insulating layer of a silicon diffused-
junction semiconductor, which could be manipulated for field-effect rectification and 
amplification, as opposed to the earlier point-contact and junction methods of the same. Kahng’s 
“MOSFET” (Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor) could also be made smaller 
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than such “bipolar junction transistors” (which utilized the dual conduction mechanism 
formalized by Shockley), and required less power for their operation.198 Such circuits form the 
material basis of all modern computing operations, cooperating en masse to carry out incredibly 
complex tasks through the seriated implementation of the relatively simple transistor effect. By 
1964 MOS transistors would be implemented in logic and amplifying circuits, and today MOS 
transistors are the primary type of transistor used in the manufacture of integrated circuits.199 
That same month, Fairchild began manufacturing its first monolithic integrated circuits using 
Noyce’s design, and in October 1961 Texas Instruments announced its own version of the 
device.200 In 1963, Frank Wanlass of Fairchild patented a design for a logic circuit utilizing a “p-
channel” and an “n-channel” MOS transistor in a “complementary symmetry circuit” with near-
zero power leakage when in standby.201 Wanlass’s design allowed two field-effect transistors of 
opposite carrier type to function as active loads for each other, thus routing leakage between 
them and effectively closing the circuit to all but the most minimal drain, which further reduced 
the need for the implementation of components other than transistors in integrated circuit 
design.202 This “CMOS” design would be developed by Gerald Herzog at RCA Research 
Laboratories in 1965 for use in an Air Force computer, the resultant product of which would 
evolve into RCA’s 1975 microprocessor that was used in Chrysler engine systems, paving the 
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way for future consumer applications of similar minimal- or zero-drain circuits.203 
As competition in the production of transistor devices intensified, Gordon Moore at 
Fairchild wrote a paper in which he compared component density with component cost over 
time, predicting that component density would double every twelve months.204 He envisioned the 
future of the integrated circuit, claiming that the “future of integrated electronics is the future of 
electronics itself.”205 Though, Moore noted, the integrated circuit had arisen as a necessity for 
military electronics, already in 1965 those technologies with military applications were 
penetrating the consumer market. Integrated circuit-based technologies steadily absorbed every 
capacity of prior electronic technologies, clearing the way for the “proliferation” of integrated 
circuits beyond the military, and (Moore anticipated) their incorporation into such everyday 
technologies as “home computers,” “automobiles,” and “personal portable communications 
equipment.”206 Moore predicted that, by 1975, a single chip one-fourth of a square-inch in size 
would be able to hold 65,000 components;207 today, chips are manufactured with several billion 
components.208 As component density increased, integrated circuits began to make it possible for 
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the computers they powered to undertake more complex tasks, and with IBM’s Electronic 
Design Automation (EDA) system in the late 1950s, and Douglas T. Ross’s Computer Aided 
Design (CAD) system in 1960,209 these computers started to be turned back upon themselves by 
their users.210 Circuit designers no longer required specialized laboratories to make new and 
innovative circuit configurations, but could do so with the very devices made possible by such 
circuits. Developers could precisely and quickly design and test incredibly intricate circuits, 
which could be used in new, more powerful computers, which could in turn be used to design 
even more intricate circuits. The concrete realization of Moore’s prediction brought about a 
feedback loop in integrated circuit design: self-innovating, self-expanding, self-proliferating—
technology folding in upon itself. 
One of the final key steps in the incorporation of integrated circuity into human existence 
occurred in 1967, when Robert Kerwin, Donald Klein, and John Sarace at Bell Labs filed a 
patent for a MOS-type transistor utilizing silicon instead of metal for the gate,211 and Fairchild 
commercialized this design in 1968.212 The use of a silicon-gate could quintuple chip speeds 
while requiring less surface area than chips using metal-gates.213 That same year, George Erdi at 
Fairchild developed an integrated circuit designed for converting between analog and digital 
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signals (necessary for the eventual translation of analog waves into digital streams of 
information, and so the digitization, transistorization, or computerization of communication 
technologies),214 and in 1970, Steve Geller and Ray Holt of Garrett AiResearch incorporated the 
F-14A Tomcat’s central processing unit (CPU) into a MOS chip set; Intel produced its first 
microprocessor (MPU) chip set incorporating a CPU in 1971,215 accomplishing the idea of what 
had been termed by some a “computer on a slice.”216 Where before single circuits were built on 
‘slices’ and then incorporated into larger systems, now entire systems could be built on slices, 
further integrating and uniformizing computing technology. In 1974, Peter Stoll at Microma 
manufactured the first system-on-chip (SOC) integrated circuit, for use in a digital watch.217 The 
system-on-chip design took the computer on a slice concept to its logical conclusion, integrating 
all the necessary components for an electronic device on a single chip. These improved circuit 
designs made possible the absorption of more and more computing functions into integrated 
circuits, in turn making possible the further proliferation of the integrated circuit as the basic 
substrate of computing and communication technologies. 
A few months after Kerwin, Klein, and Sarace filed their patent, Dawon Kahng and S. M. 
Sze published a paper on their concept of a “floating-gate” in semiconductor devices, which 
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allowed users to program the logic gates in integrated circuits themselves.218 This innovation 
made it possible to erase and reuse read-only memory (ROM), providing greatly increased 
flexibility for designers and users.219 By 1978, developers determined that programmable ROM 
(PROM) could be used for simple logical operations, and created programmable logic arrays 
(PLAs) to allow users to program integrated circuits in the field.220 PLAs allowed designers to 
input circuit functions as Boolean logic operations, which would be instantly converted into 
integrated circuit plans on designers’ computers. PLAs made it unnecessary for users to know 
how to design and manufacture the individual transistors implemented in their circuits designs, 
making electronics technology accessible to far more people than would have otherwise been 
possible. The theory of the integrated circuit was integrally incorporated in its concrete structure, 
its metaphysics made to consist in its matter. 
 
1.9. Integration Today  
The integration of today’s communications and computing technologies emerged from this 
long, laborious history of scientific and technological development that we have been 
considering here. Our consumer electronics and digital technologies are rooted in this 
technological history, whose final achievement was to erase itself from view. Obscured by the 
glamorous and disposable gadgetry with which we fill our lives, the integrated circuit has been 
dematerialized by its own ubiquity, rendered elemental, as invisible as air or gravity. And yet, 
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the integrated circuit is just as vital within its own domain, basic to the systems it potentiates. 
The integrated circuit has become fundamental to our global political, social, and economic 
order, taking over and replacing the operations of prior philosophies, institutions, and 
technologies, interposing itself as their final possibility, their utmost end. Consequently, the 
integrated circuit finds itself contributing to the dynamic process of globalization that has 
brought about the border-traversing interaction of people and ideas and the integration of policy, 
economics, and governance, a traversal that shatters the frame of the nation-state, troubling the 
very notion of world-view at its roots in everyday dealings. Daily living has been transformed by 
globalization, by the world-wideness of the world, and with integrated computing and 
communications technologies we find this transformation to be more intense and more intimate 
than perhaps ever before. Indeed, this transformation has touched even the constitution of the 
transcendental subject, that supreme invention of modernity, as discussed above with respect to 
Nancy’s reading of Kant and the history of philosophy. 
Our technologies are not neutral; the practices they make possible bring with them a 
metaphysics, configuring through their use our interpretation of and involvement in the world. 
Everything becomes information, calculable or computable by integrated circuit technologies; 
everything is or soon will be absorbed by our machines. Every domain is replicable as data, 
including the domain of everyday living. This is not just a matter for philosophers. We are 
caught up in the feedback loop of the circuits we have created, entangled in the interchange of 
theory and practice. As such, we cannot say, with Nancy, that we are truly liberated subjects if 
we uncritically let our practices be shaped by our technologies, because such a shaping leads us 
back into the subjectivity that Nancy tries to surpass. At the material level, technology 
uniformizes everything, and in that uniformization, structures everything it incorporates 
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according to its own logic (integrate, flatten, invisibilize); how, then, are we to think difference, 
to allow for the incommensurate, to ask who, if every existent is to be reduced to a 
technologically communicable and exchangeable datum, an algorithmically calculable unit? The 
global technological world-structure divorces us from the becoming-world of the world, freezing 
the action of generativity in our experience of the world so that the disruption and danger and 
disaster of such a movement might be homogenized into oblivion. The real is consumed by the 
world-machine, only to be spat back out better than before, at higher resolution—we might say 
that our 4K screens have ontological status. The call to uniformity drowns out all other sounds, 
and now this call, which goes back at least as far as Kant, finds itself availed of the radical 
world-mutating potentiality of the integrated circuit. In it, we hear more seductively than ever the 
promise that technology will bring prosperity: become a user, a pure avatar, and you will be 
prosperous too; the world is yours to be appropriated. But, as we have seen, such a position is 
untenable. The condition of technological being, of the transcendental subject or avatar, is 
openness to the world it seeks to appropriate. The Kantian revolution destabilizes itself, and so 
too does technology. The rest troubles the global network, the world-machine, challenging its 
terms of use. The question who, the question of existence that has already preceded us, demands 
to be answered. Who comes? It is for us now to ask this question of the integrated circuit, to ask 
who is present to the global technological order, to let the becoming-world of the world unravel 
the totalization of the grid from within. 
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Chapter 2: The Integrated Body 
2.1. Beyond Integration 
Recall our assertion above that metaphysics and technology are intertwined. Theory orders 
practice, and practice orders theory. We have seen that the metaphysical subject, the subject of 
Western philosophy, is structurally inclined to appropriation, and that it is therefore 
technological in its being. Kant, in making the transcendental subject the principle of the world’s 
organization, made the subject’s technological power, its interpretive grasp, supreme. But to do 
so, the subject also had to be made pure, simple, uniform, excluding any difference that might 
threaten its power. With Nancy, we saw that this exclusion was doomed from the moment of its 
inception, compromised by the necessary grammatico-ontological interrelation of its terms. The 
transcendental subject is open to the world as the condition of possibility for its experience, but it 
cannot maintain itself in the absolute self-presence necessary for it to be prior to the world in 
some theoretical hierarchy of being. The subject is in and of the world; the subject is worldly all 
the way down. 
Unsatisfied with pure theory, however, we turned our attention to the global technological 
order, interrogating the historical and material conditions of its existence. We saw how the 
integrated circuit is structurally inclined to integration, to flattening, to invisibilization, thereby 
allowing for its proliferation as a necessary and fundamental interpretation of the world, and 
more so, a total interpretation absorbing all others (the economic, the political, the social, etc.). 
The integrated circuit flattens existence into a field of uniformly interpretable, graspable, and 
exchangeable entities, a uniformization that produces the logic of the world-machine, the global 
network, ready to be manipulated by the pure, transcendental user. The rest is subjugated, 
rendered a property to be ruled, and promised the status and solidity of subjectivity if only it will 
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behave with the propriety fitting a ‘true’ who, a subject no more and no less than one. And yet, 
we concluded that, if the appropriative, technological, transcendental subject is troubled by the 
rest of existence that is its condition of possibility, then should not this rest, historically 
‘resolved’ or configured by the subject as integrated network or circuit (or at least appearing so 
to the privileged eyes of the subject-as-user), be troubled by the non-appropriative activity of the 
subject-after-the-subject, bursting forth in the world? Can we not look to such a subject, to the 
plurality of incommunicable and incommensurable individuals who constitute the Western 
surround, for a revolutionary force that might create a rupture in the global technological grid, 
for a user whose actions cannot be reduced to an algorithm? 
The goal of a revolution here is not, however, to annihilate modern technology, to liquidate 
it or condemn it as evil. Instead, just as the troubling of the metaphysical subject allows us to 
think a subject-in-between without liquidating the subject—an individuality without a fixed, 
pure, absolute essence; a singular plural existent—a troubling of the technological order should 
allow us to a think a technology-in-between—a technology of becoming; a technology in the 
singular plural—and so to arrive at a new interrelation of subject and world, metaphysics and 
technology, through and beyond the prior closure. To seek the liquidation of the technology with 
which we are entangled would be to presume an existential remove on our part that we have 
already seen here to be theoretically and practically tenuous, if not nonexistent. Can we instead 
follow the trajectory of technology as a distinct movement of being while resisting a flattening 
that annihilates the singularity, the punctuality, the spacing, of existents? What is more, can we 
accept the dissolution of the false priority of the transcendental subject while still allowing for 
agency, generativity, and incommensurability in the world? Or vice versa, can we challenge the 
totality of technological integration while still recognizing its concrete reality as a world-
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encompassing structure? In short, can we hope to navigate oblivion? It is in response to these 
questions that we once again take up the question who and, in the process, finally attempt to 
respond to the question of our cyborg. 
 
2.2. The Technological Element 
In “The Ethnography of Infrastructure,” sociologist Susan Leigh Star elaborates a 
methodology for the study of “boring things,” a methodology that will greatly aid us in our 
pursuit of our cyborgic who.221 Rather than attempt to theorize abstract forces or powers at work 
in a given situation, Star emphasizes the “ecological” interrelations of the situation in question, 
and the “materiality” of these relations.222 Her goal is to avoid the reification of dynamic 
processes and interactions into “things,” thereby allowing for the consideration of those actors 
and backgrounds that might otherwise be “neglected” by studies that might be considered more 
exciting for their scope or style.223 Star’s research concentrates on information systems in 
workplaces, looking at the ways in which professional communities of individuals with 
particular knowledges carry out particular practices in order to do particular kinds of work. In 
keeping with her commitment to “boring things,” Star is not concerned with the ideologies of 
these workplaces, but instead with the “surfacing” of their infrastructures, so that she might 
examine the concrete design choices through which “practice, culture, and norm” are “inscribed” 
in their material form.224 The “hidden mechanisms” and forms that Star pursues are not abstract, 
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world-historical movements or contours, but can be gleaned from “lists of numbers” and 
“technical specifications” and the silent “dramas” of routine that quietly direct everyday 
practice.225 These mechanisms and forms are hidden in plain sight, rendered invisible by their 
innocuous ubiquity. And yet, when surfaced, they evidence an “embedded strangeness” rivalling 
that of abstract drives, archetypes, or ideologies, but furnish us with more explanatory power 
than any such abstraction.226 So, for Star, the “backstage” of a given work situation is not a 
transcendental realm only accessible to the all-powerful researcher, but a site of concrete 
“assemblage,” of the “delicate, complex weaving together” of “resources” and “routines,” and 
the actors working with, in the midst of, and sometimes even against this situation.227 
As such, we can say that the metaphysics of a workplace are expressed in its design, that 
the structural inclinations of a concrete work situation manifest that work situation’s 
metaphysics. The infrastructure of a workplace embodies its ideology, materially inscribing a 
particular interpretation of the world through the repetition of tasks, the routinization of 
practices, and the systematization of habits. This means that, if we are to ask who is present to 
our technology?, we must look to the concrete intersection of theory and practice in work and 
analyze their “recursive[]” relation to each other, carefully considering the ways in which 
infrastructural form motivates or discourages particular practices of working subjects, and the 
ways in which particular practices utilize, resist, and transform infrastructure.228 The 
conceptualization of a revolutionary force disrupting the global technological grid from within is 
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not sufficient. We must treat the oblivion of technological and metaphysical integration as a 
concrete phenomenon, as complex and sometimes even inscrutable, but also practicably 
navigable, as much as any other system or network. We must look to the mechanisms and actors 
already present and operative in the concrete design of our integrated circuit technologies if we 
are to make our way through the technological closure and do justice to our who, to question her 
in her concrete performance of concrete actions in concrete situation. The integrated circuit has 
become boring, disappearing in its self-effacement; only a study that maintains its emphasis on 
the particular form of this structure can hope to reckon effectively with such a totalizing 
phenomenon, and hope to draw from it the figure of this emergent who who is continuously 
being threatened with invisibilization and dissolution by the uniformizing force of the 
technologically-integrated world. 
To be clear, Star does not consider theory and practice to be reducible to each other. 
Theory is not equal to practice, nor does it deterministically cause practice. Instead, theory and 
practice, situation and action, infrastructure and work, inform and incline each other in 
discernible but complex ways. What is key for Star, in the disentangling of human work systems, 
is the recognition that theory and practice belong to the same “subject matter,” but are 
distinguished therein by “different levels of reference.”229 As such, it is necessary that we 
analyze the feedback between these levels, which Star materializes through the terms 
“production/coordination work” and “articulation work.”230 We must attend to the drama of 
work, to its unfolding as a complex interplay of form and action.  
Production and articulation mutually determine each other, while referring to different 
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levels of the “local” situation.231 The contingencies of production lead to further articulations of 
the system of production so that production might be carried out more successfully. We saw this 
loop, the interdetermination of production and articulation, in the history of development of the 
integrated circuit, culminating, in our narrative, in the incorporation of the articulation of 
integrated circuits into the production process through computer-assisted design tools and user-
programmable devices: the user was absorbed into her technologies and made a function of 
them. What is more, we saw this loop extend beyond the sphere of technological development, 
transforming warfare and espionage, communications and commerce, inclining individuals and 
institutions to implement electronics in their workplaces and everyday practices. Increased 
uptake drove demand for more, better, and faster devices, feeding an enormous current of social 
pressure back into the design loop, inscribing “practice, culture, and norm” in the methods and 
goals of production. New use-cases motivated innovation, and innovation potentiated new use-
cases. The world in its world-wideness steadily inclined toward transistorization, toward the 
increased development and implementation of the integrated circuit and microelectronics, 
thereby self-propagating the material principle of its operation while hiding its concrete structure 
from view. The prior views of the world collapsed, their remains folded into the trajectory of 
technology’s arrow. Electronics technologies flattened the world, erecting a new global 
infrastructure, a globally integrated surface. As a consequence, the “local” work-situations that 
Star calls us to study have, through electronics technologies, become global. The global is 
technological, and the technological is global. Our everyday localities, through the integration of 
electronics technologies, find themselves structurally inclined to this globality. Indeed, the 
integrated circuit has transformed the very structure of the local, and as a consequence, everyday 
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practice and work. The technological becoming-world of the world sees its theory materialized in 
the global world-machine, its form made elemental, a bootstrapped law of nature.232 To consider 
our who in her concrete existence, then, we must consider her as present to this global situation. 
We must consider the globally integrated subject. 
 
2.3. Integrated Labour 
If the global technological work system is predicated on integrated circuit technology, and 
work can be analyzed in terms of “articulation work,” “production work,” and their recursive 
relation to each other, then there seems no better place to start than with the manufacture of 
integrated circuits. We have already conducted a thorough analysis of the “articulation” of the 
integrated circuit above, and though we certainly considered the material conditions of 
production of the integrated circuit by the researchers and engineers at Bell Labs, Fairchild 
Semiconductor, Texas Instruments, and the like, we would be naïve to think that such 
communities constitute the entire network of production. Indeed, as early as 1967, 
semiconductor companies began to offload the burden of manufacture to third-parties, allowing 
these companies to concentrate on “architecture and applications” without the distractions of 
production.233 By the 1980s, the displacement of articulation and production work between 
“fabless” semiconductor developers and semiconductor fabricators or foundries had become 
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commonplace.234 An entire “level of reference” (in Star’s terms) of the work-drama was 
outsourced and then promptly hidden from view, rendered an invisible and subsidiary function of 
the more glamorous and lucrative design process. Articulation itself became a perfect surface, a 
frictionless machine powered by competition, innovation, and wealth. 
In a 1980 report, however, Rachael Grossman, a staff member of the Southeast Asia 
Resource Center, set about surfacing this invisibilized domain of the integrated circuit 
industry.235 While Silicon Valley pulsed with the energy of invention, an enormous industry 
emerged in Southeast Asia to meet this demand. Upwards of 300,000 women constituting ninety 
percent of the “assembly workforce” (as opposed to management, development, etc.) were 
employed in electronics manufacturing foundries by the time of Grossman’s writing, many of 
which were direct subsidiaries of large electronics developers like Intel.236 As we have already 
seen, once simple design methods and systems of mass production were achieved, electronics 
technologies proliferated extremely quickly. Electronics provided “critical components to all 
other[]” domains of human practice.237 “Governments, banks, factories, armed forces and other 
major institutions,” as well as “individual consumers,” came to rely on electronics technologies, 
but if not for the “invisible element” of the “repetitive, semi-skilled labor of Asian women,” this 
world-technological order would not have been possible.238 In order to keep up with Moore’s 
Law, “virtually all major semiconductor companies” looked to Asia for “cheap labor,” and the 
governments of many Southeast Asian countries leapt at the chance to bring Western capital 
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within their borders.239 And yet, where the history of integrated circuit design in Silicon Valley 
can read as a thrilling narrative of intellectual creativity and technical prowess, the history of 
integrated circuit manufacture in Asia is not so glamorous. To maintain production levels, 
semiconductor companies developed “a whole battery of methods to manipulate and control the 
women who work[ed] in their plants,” synthesizing “authoritarian discipline with the most 
sophisticated human relations techniques.”240 By encouraging certain “attributes of femininity” 
characteristic of the local cultures—such as “passivity, submissiveness, sentimentality, [and] 
sexual desirability”—and simultaneously promoting a workplace culture that divorced factory 
workers from the very cultures from which these attributes were derived, factory managers were 
able to integrate female bodies as functions in the machine of production.241  
To meet quotas, “fail-proof factory discipline” was required of workers—a robotic 
discipline, we might say.242 To achieve such levels of mechanistic performance, factory 
managers employed large numbers of personnel staff to “create[] activities,” mobilizing 
recreation and competition to pacify and divide workers, thereby rendering them “easily 
trainable and controllable.”243 Any dissatisfaction with workplace conditions could be appeased 
with entertainment, American consumer goods like clothing and makeup, and the enticement of 
infrequent monetary bonuses. These benefits would be dangled before the factory workers as 
goals to be attained, leading them to strive against each other to get the most out of their 
repetitive duties and “fun” workplace activities.244 In addition, shifts would be structured in such 
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a way that workers found it hard to participate in activities outside of work, leading to greater 
participation in their workplaces and the activities they offered, and therefore greater control. 
Workers became incorporated in the “highly integrated Asian circuit of semiconductors 
factories,” the silent remainder potentiating the abstraction of Moore’s Law.245 The global 
technological order that we have been discussing here was built upon this “global assembly 
line.”246  
In countries like Malaysia, the government went so far as to introduce exceptions into their 
law and remove protections for workers to make foreign investment from Western electronics 
companies more profitable. Such exceptions did not reduce poverty or unemployment, as the 
government said they would, but created instead a “new category” of worker, the perfect 
producer (in the inverse of the perfect user above) who did not contribute to the local economy, 
and who would be left without protection once she aged out of factory work due to its rigors.247 
And yet, such a life still appeared more desirable than the alternative; to become a perfect, 
robotic producer in an electronics factory was to take up a neatly packaged individual identity, to 
escape from the hierarchy of the family and the struggle of rural labour into the dispersed 
tyranny of the technologically integrated economy.248 Such a life offered the sweetness of 
choice, despite that choice being limited to the consumer goods offered by the sales 
representatives hired by factory management. The “economic role[]” of a worker in an 
electronics factory offered to Southeast Asian women a level of “independence” unimaginable to 
that which would have been possible as a female in her traditional household role.249 The 
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alienation that came with such independence was a small price to pay. Thousands upon 
thousands of these women accepted the oblivion of the world-machine in exchange for this 
semblance of freedom. 
Grossman would not have us stop here, however, satisfied with such an empty victory. To 
praise Western companies for this hollow liberation, the emancipation of women into merely a 
different tyrannical regime, would be a failure. Rather, like Nancy, Grossman would have us 
think through the closure with which we are now presented, listening to the murmur of the rest 
that threatens its disaster. Western employers introduced Western concepts of individualism and 
competition to their Southeast Asian subsidiaries to fragment and flatten their workforce, and so 
to incorporate their workers into the circuit of production, the global technological surface. But 
in bringing workers into such a global network, Western employers found themselves confronted 
with the threat of a commonality across the differences of Western individualism and 
competition, a global solidarity made possible by the very technologies they were producing. 
The flattening of old hierarchies and traditions—metaphysically and materially—potentiated the 
building of new structures of relation, new geographies of belonging, that did not require the 
pure, substantial, essentialized identities of prior movements for their continuance. Where the 
purity of the globally integrated user is tenuous, threatened by the very globality that makes it 
possible, the purity of the globally integrated producer is n even a question: she is disparate, 
complex, dispersed, incommensurable, both singular and plural in the absoluteness of her 
experience that can never be universalized as absolute. She is the who we have been seeking, the 
punctuality of the rest, the incommunicable singularity who traverses the integrated network, 
versed in its terms, its systems, resources, and routines, while refusing to be contained by them. 
She is the who denied the rights of the user, and so is free of such fetters. She is our cyborg. 
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2.4. The Image of the Cyborg 
In her Cyborg Manifesto, spurred on by Grossman’s report, Donna Haraway articulates her 
“ironic dream” for a new sort of being—the being of the cyborg.250 She declares her dream to be 
ironic because irony “is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even 
dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together.”251 The “image of the 
cyborg” she presents is a “blasphemy” to the logic of wholes, the logic of purity, which is not, 
however, an “apostasy.”252 Rather, the “blasphemy” of the cyborg does not seek the power of the 
“moral majority,” “insisting,” instead, “on the need for community” without majority, without 
perfect communicability.253 As such, Haraway’s blasphemy remains “faithful,” but faithful to 
those communities that have arisen in response to power, to the dominion of the transcendental 
subject, namely variously by their attendant theories: “feminism, socialism, and materialism.”254  
Though some readers might balk at such a blatant invocation of these contentious 
positions, the foregoing discussion here should have made clear their relevance, and indeed, their 
entanglement with each other. We attempted to demonstrate above the relation between 
metaphysics and technology, theory and practice, discovering in the history of development of 
the integrated circuit the interrelation of these different levels of reference within the same 
subject matter. The material flattening of the integrated circuit brought about a commensurate 
flattening of every other domain of human experience, organizing practice according to 
technology’s arrow; vice versa, the metaphysical flattening of the transcendental subject into a 
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pure power, over and against the world, brought about a commensurate flattening of the world 
into pure surface, a field to be ordered and subjugated. From both angles, the recursivity of form 
and practice brought about an infolding, a collapse and an integration of the barrier between 
subject and world that had been fragile from the moment of its birth. We find ourselves 
immersed in the oblivion of the surface, abandoned to the wholity of what is. And yet, as we saw 
with Nancy, and then with Star and Grossman, this wholity is not closed, nor is this surface void; 
an open structure rises before us, around us, waiting to be navigated. With Star, we saw how 
surfacing can be a means of revealing that which has been obscured, of disclosing the concrete 
work of the many who go unrecognized by history. With Grossman, the surface became a means 
of solidarity, of a global community of the rest who power the machine but are not its users, a 
community beginning with the women employed in electronics factories that have been isolated 
from each other, and who cannot therefore build a collective identity on the basis of a common 
locality, common nationality, or common social condition. Instead, these women find themselves 
in a state of shared alienation that is concretely expressed in multiple and incompatible ways, 
contingent upon such material factors as locale, employer, workplace position, and family 
situation. The people of the globally integrated circuit are heterogeneous and complex, 
irreducible to a purity, to a general will or vox populi. It is in the bodies of these disparate and 
dispersed producers that Haraway sees a synthesis without dialectical resolution, a synthesis in 
difference—or, we might say, a community of the singular plural. Keeping all of this in mind, 
we find that we must remain faithful, with Haraway, to feminism, socialism, and materialism if 
we are to think through our situation and not fall back into that essentialist thought that we have 
repeatedly critiqued here. Or better, we must remain faithful to the concrete situations, levels of 
reference, or localities of the feminine, the social, and the material, and so let ourselves 
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encounter the cyborg who comes to us as “less and more” than an ideal whole or philosophical 
abstraction.255 The cyborg is the one present to the global technological order, a revolutionary 
punctuality in the world-machine. We must ask, then, what it means for our cyborg to be cyborg. 
 
2.5. Being Cyborg 
Haraway’s “ironic dream” is not only a dream but a “political myth,” and indeed, she 
draws together dreaming and politics over the course of her manifesto.256 It is a work of practice, 
a work of action; she means her words to do something. In taking up her thought here, it is our 
aim to let her words do something to us as well, and in this to return to the words themselves,257 
paying careful, critical attention to the recursivity of theory and practice, metaphysics and 
matter—or now, we can say with Haraway, dreams and politics. To adapt our discussion of 
Star’s study above, we can say that dreams are the infrastructure or articulation of the political, 
and that politics is the performance or production of the dream. Haraway’s manifesto does not 
declare the age of the cyborg, presuming it to be accomplished; the cyborg is never complete, 
and as such, being cyborg is always a labour. The dream inscribes a work to be done. 
The work of being cyborg begins, then, with an inscription, a dream that poses a question 
to existence: who is this cyborg? Haraway writes that a “cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a 
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hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction.”258 In 
this hybridity, the cyborg challenges the construction of “women’s experience,” the possibility of 
“this crucial collective object,” offering a new articulation in its stead of “what counts as 
women’s experience.”259 The cyborg does not annihilate the collective object that forms the basis 
of revolutionary “possibility,” but neither does the cyborg promise completeness or purity for 
this collective object, a unity of experience that would erase every difference, every 
incommensurability.260 The cyborg lives in a world that is “ambiguously natural and crafted,” a 
world full of “couplings between organism and machine,” a world on the outskirts of power and 
its reproduction that cannot be explained by the “history of sexuality,” but instead plays with a 
logic of “replication.”261 This means that the cyborg is a complex and open whole, irreducible to 
the purity of any of its parts: both natural and crafted, both organism and machine, inexplicable 
and unauthorizable in terms of inheritance or origin.  
Our cyborg is the woman in a factory in Malaysia hunched over a microscope while testing 
microchips, whose vision at twenty-five has so deteriorated that she must wear glasses and her 
coworkers call her “Grandma,” whose family has been fractured by the enormous social 
pressures created by foreign direct investment, who struggles to provide for her parents and 
siblings but can bring to their home none of the products she makes, and whose skills are so 
specialized that they cannot be transferred to another job.262 Our cyborg became cyborg through 
the incorporation into her body of the instruments of her work and her consequent transformation 
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by them, thereby allowing for her contribution to the system of “cyborg replication,”263 for her 
manufacture of new electronics technologies to power the global technological grid, which will 
eventually be implemented in her factory and her body to increase rates of production. But, as 
she ages and becomes less productive, her body failing to keep up with the machine, her 
employers hope that she will “marry and ‘retire,’”264 entering back into the system of “organic 
reproduction,”265 a system that the electronics industry has destabilized but upon which it still 
relies for the logic of patriarchal control and the production of future cyborg labourers. The 
culture of her locality is preserved insofar as it serves the global system of production, insofar as 
it can be fragmented into communicable and computable data points, but as such, there is no 
cultural unity, no common experience, to be drawn upon for resistance. Our cyborg is turned 
against her peers to compete for jobs, for benefits and bonuses, only to be broken by her work 
and left with no home, no people, to which she might return. The electronics factory “makes the 
nightmare of Taylorism seem idyllic,” insofar as its logic comes to shape the entire world, 
shattering every boundary, every barrier, that would attempt to preserve some measure of 
separation from the system.266 Home and factory, business and government, sociality and 
culture—all are flattened into cyborg replication. No space remains untouched, no space remains 
off the grid, because the grid has become elemental. 
And yet, insofar as our cyborg cannot escape the system, even once the system attempts to 
eject her (who can be ejected from what is?), we recognize in her hybrid, ambiguous existence 
that the site of transcendental power from which prior revolutions were mobilized only ever 
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succeeded in producing new tyrannies, new exclusions, new “border war[s].”267 Every time the 
within and without, the before and after (we might even say the one and many), have collapsed 
into each other (a movement that we have seen, at least since Kant, to be basic to Western 
metaphysics), a new absolute has risen up to fill the vacuum left by the old and restore the 
boundary between. But our cyborg, the subject-in-between, the who in question here, can never 
play such a role, can never dominate the between, because the cyborg can never be the pure site 
of power. Certainly, her body might be weaponized by another to such an end, mobilized to 
action by some other authority—as seen in “modern war,” which Haraway likens to a “cyborg 
orgy”268—but the cyborg can never be her own authority, self-founding, self-authorizing, and 
absolutely self-present. She is hybrid in her very being, in and of the world, compromised, 
contingent, and fragile. In this fragility, this weakness, together with every other cyborgic 
existent, every other hybrid being, she participates in a mass that repudiates power, a community 
without subject, a community without essence. Where power seeks to erect walls and declare 
them to be natural and necessary, the cyborg finds “pleasure in the confusion of boundaries,” 
while also taking “responsibility [for] their construction.”269 The cyborg does not seek to resolve 
differences through dialectical (or technological) subjugation and appropriation, but to allow 
them to proliferate, to encourage “fruitful couplings” across differences.270 The cyborg refuses to 
make difference an instrument of control, and as such cherishes it, plays with it, letting it be in its 
uncontainable generativity. In the “cyborg world,” the “relationships for forming wholes from 
parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical domination, are at issue”—we might say, then, 
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that in the cyborg world, difference is an end and not a means, something for which we ought to 
labour.271 In this, the possibility of incommunicable, incommensurable difference surely 
emerges, but also the possibility of a radical communicability, a radical commensurability, that 
takes the logic of replication beyond itself, that does not require the annihilation of singularity in 
uniformity for its operation. 
The cyborg world is not a relativistic oblivion; such a state can only be produced by the old 
metaphysics, which presumed the existence of an absolute subject of an absolute view. On the 
contrary, this oblivion is a complex and generative structure that cannot be laid bare by the 
illuminating light of the same, requiring instead a different method of navigation, a method with 
which our cyborg is intimately familiar. She is denied the rights of the user, but in being barred 
from access, given no recourse to an outside of power and appropriation, she learns to traverse 
the grid from within, and in so doing learns that the outside was an illusion from the beginning. 
She is ejected from the system and finds herself still within it, behind the scenes. The backstage 
is everything; it is the stage. For this reason, she is closer to liberation than the user, because she 
cannot comfort herself with the trappings of power, with the thought that the system is good for 
her. She is permitted to enjoy everything Western culture has to offer until her eyes fail and she 
can no longer perform her duties, no longer produce.272 Then she is reminded that her life, her 
cyborg existence, is one of compromise and precarity and depredation, and in this sensitivity to 
her situation she is awakened to an “international structure” that unites disparate individuals 
across “national” and “industry lines.”273  
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As such, to be cyborg is to be “resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and 
perversity,” which is to say, to be “completely without [the] innocence” of a pure origin, the 
innocence of an outside.274 The cyborg has always been in and of the world, always in and of the 
system. Organicity cannot be reclaimed, because organicity has been transformed in its very 
constitution, shown to be always already in a state of compromise, of openness, ready for 
incorporation. To be cyborg, therefore, is in no way to promote relativism, because the cyborg 
can never presume that a perspective, a view, is absolutely valid, absolutely fixed, nor that a 
perfectly closed subjectivity is even possible. The cyborg can make no absolute reference to a 
substantial, simple existent that she would call her own, because her being is fundamentally 
relational and complex, which is to say, singularly plural. We have seen that the condition of 
experience of the transcendental subject is openness to the world it organizes, and it is this 
openness that assures both the concreteness of perspective as a real feature of experience, and the 
ambiguity of perspective as a labile situation of involvement in the world. The priority, the 
purity, the beforeness, of the subject is unseated by the condition of its experience—or put 
otherwise, its seat is found to be located in the world: that which was after we now find to be 
before us. To be cyborg is to be honest about this compromise, this incompleteness and 
entanglement, to acknowledge oneself to be some one who is “less and more than one,” an 
unaccomplished whole given over to world that is one’s own possibility.275 So, then, being 
cyborg is partial, because it is always in progress; ironic, because it will not and cannot resolve 
into a perfect whole; intimate, because it seeks relation without recourse to an outside; and 
perverse, because this relation does not require an identity in kind, and in fact, requires no 
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identity at all. All of this means, simply but seriously (as Haraway remarks, irony is a “serious 
play”276), that to be cyborg is to acknowledge that one belongs with being. 
This is a radical reconfiguration of existence that dissolves the dialectical structure of 
Western thought,277 while preserving certain features of dialectics in the form of dialogue. 
Where dialectics requires the mediation of a third, a synthesis outside the relation of thesis and 
antithesis, dialogue allows for a communication between terms in an open-ended and mutual 
process of generation and change. The third is not outside the relation; the third is the relation, 
the medium of communion, a hyphenation or bond always already there, joining that which 
cannot be reconciled by dialectical synthesis. As the philosopher and critic Mikhail Bakhtin has 
written, dialogue is a “mediated semantic coupling” of two terms—“identity and non-identity”—
through which the world in its “worldwide wholeness” emerges.278 Dialogue means that “one 
does not coincide with one’s own individual meaning,” that one does not stand as self-founding, 
self-present surety for oneself, but rather that individual and meaning, thing and word, cannot be 
resolved into a perfect correspondence.279 A meaning is not a static representation of an existent 
but an act joining existents in the world; it does something. Bakhtin’s conception of dialogue 
entails that the terms joined in a “mediated semantic coupling” are involved in a recursive action 
that always remains open, always in process, always a labour. There is no higher order 
resolution, no hierarchical imposition of one term over the other. On the contrary: “Things [are] 
fraught with the word,” and, we might say, words are troubled by things.280 Dialectics seeks the 
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closure, and thus the end, of this distinctly open-ended action. Bakhtin notes the dialectical style 
powerfully at work in Hegel, who sought to overcome the complexity and compromise of 
difference—the fraughtness of things, the troubling of words—through the establishment of one 
“continuous text,” his infamous absolute Idea.281 For Bakhtin, this text is certainly “continuous,” 
but continuous in its “bottomlessness,” its infinity, its impossibility of closure.282 Meaning and 
thought, like things, are “in the world,” but the world itself is an “event,” an unfolding, never an 
“existence in ready-made form.”283 Thus, for Bakhtin, dialectics marks a phase of thought, and 
so a phase of the world-event in its unfolding, that is “born of dialogue so as to return again to 
dialogue on a higher level,” or perhaps better, a more fundamental level.284 Such is the 
reconfiguration of existence accomplished by our cyborg. In her exposure to precarity, the 
intimate involvement of power and technology in her everyday life, the cyborg understands that 
the surface of being is open to change, open to growth, open to conversation. This amounts to 
saying that the cyborg in her being lets possibility be. It is precisely in being barred from power 
that the cyborg discovers a revolutionary power that is in no way of power, a power that can 
encounter the difference of another singularity and neither seek to overcome and absorb it, nor 
annihilate it, but to simply, seriously, let it come. 
It is for this reason that Haraway writes that “the cyborg has no origin story in the Western 
sense,” while also standing as the “awful apocalyptic telos” of the West in it “escalating 
dominations of abstract individuation.”285 The cyborg is less and more than individual, a 
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concrete puncture in the abstract indifference of the transcendental subject. For the cyborg to 
have an origin story, for the cyborg to be worthy of appropriation to the absolute, would require 
a “myth of original unity, fullness, bliss,” precisely that which is not possible for the cyborg. She 
is the “illegitimate offspring of militarism,” “patriarchal capitalism,” and “state socialism,” a 
conglomerate body, an experiment.286 The cyborg has no hope of inheritance, cannot claim the 
name of her father, and so neither can she “dream of returning to dust,” to the “Garden of Eden,” 
to wholity.287 The before to which she dreams of returning is always after, always to come.  
 
2.6. Being Compromised 
How are we to participate in this cyborg labour? How are we to dream with our cyborg of a 
liberation and a future to come? Certainly, our cyborg, “needy for connection,” joins with a 
multitude of her disparate peers in a “united front ... without [a] vanguard party,” less solid base 
than ocean swell, a tide of singularities.288 But how can I, with all of the power and privilege 
invested in my position by virtue of my concrete historical situation, presume to stand among 
them? Am I not one of the users, one permitted to be a subject, one invested with the power of 
the global regime? Am I not everything the cyborg must resist? Am I not the enemy? How can I 
presume to join with the cyborg tide? 
In her paper “Reclaiming Animism,” philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers presents us 
with a methodology that we might employ to move forward.289 Stengers writes of her desire to 
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be a “bridge-maker[],” not someone who “divide[s] and classif[ies],” to be someone who can 
take a barrier and transform it into a “living contrast, one whose power is to affect, to produce 
thinking and feeling.”290 But she also acknowledges that “bridge-making is a situated practice,” 
that she, a philosopher, is herself situated, “a daughter to a practice responsible for many 
divisions.”291 She imagines that this practice of philosophy might “also be understood as a rather 
particular means of bridge-making,” that doing philosophy “implies feeling the text as an 
animating power—inviting participation ... that will make a bridge to the past, that will give 
ideas from the past the power to affect the present.”292 Such is her hope. Yet still, Stengers is 
wary of the possibility that, in casting her practice in such a way, she will “take advantage of the 
possibility that philosophy is a form of textual animism” and use this to “delocalize” herself, “to 
feel authorized to speak about animism.” She continues: 
Indeed, where what we call animism is concerned, the past to be considered is primordially 
the one in which philosophical concepts served to justify colonization and the divide across 
which some felt free to study and categorize others—a divide that still exists today ... I 
must acknowledge the fact that my own practice and tradition situate me on the other side 
of the divide, the side that characterized ‘others’ as animists. ‘We,’ on our side, presume to 
be the ones who have accepted the hard truth that we are alone in a mute, blind, yet 
knowable world—one that is our task to appropriate.293 
If I am in fact stranded on the other side of this divide, doomed with Stengers to a monological294 
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interpretation of the world as there for appropriation, how can I hope—how can any of us 
hope—to be a bridge-maker? How can I dream of the non-power of a global, replicative, dialogic 
solidarity when I owe the present position of my individual existence to a tradition built upon the 
dialectics of power and technological appropriation?295 How can one in a position of power form 
a relation with one denied power that does not appropriate or annihilate her singularity?  
Stengers is very much alive to this problematic. However, rather than lapse into a guilt that 
maintains itself in repressed complicity with an oppressive system, Stengers “accept[s]” that she 
cannot “feel free to speak and speculate in a way that would situate others,” while recognizing 
that this does not prevent her from speaking to her fellow practitioners of Western philosophy 
and critically attending to their own situation.296 She, as one singularity on the other side of the 
divide, is indebted to the rest she faces, the rest who come to presence before her, who demand 
that she not remain silent, that she not remain complicit.297 The rest who come are already 
situated, already there, already at home with being. To presume to situate them otherwise, to 
order them according to some transcendentally imposed hierarchy, would be an act of willful 
denial. So, Stengers takes up her position on her “side” of the dialogue because “there is some 
work to be done on this side,” a work to right the inversion of being that casts the Western 
metaphysical subject as absolutely existent, above and before the rest of existence, a work of 
critique challenging the “hard truth” of the philosophers.298 Stengers’s goal of “reclaiming” 
animism, of bringing to Western philosophy the thought of a “living contrast” (in Haraway’s 
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words, a “fruitful coupling,” or in Bakhtin’s, a “mediated semantic coupling”), is to bring to 
philosophy the thought of a relation that cannot be reduced to an “object of knowledge,” an 
irreducible relation that preserves the singularity of its terms.299 
A philosophy that does not pursue “object[s] of knowledge” is not a practice of staid 
observation but of “adventure,” a process whereby one is “enrolled as a ‘partner’” in a work 
inclined toward the “achievement[]” of a knowledge-event, of a particular, concrete presence to 
the world in its becoming.300 The achievement of such knowledge can in no way effect a closure 
or division, because such knowledge “always coincide[s] with the creation of new questions, not 
with new authoritative answers to questions that already mattered for us.”301 What is produced 
by such an endeavour is not the “hierarchical figure of a tree” but a “rhizome” (a concept that 
Stengers draws from Deleuze and Guattari), a “connecting of heterogeneous practices, concerns, 
and ways of giving meanings to the inhabitants of this earth, with none being privileged and any 
being liable to connect with any other.”302 This rhizomatic relationality is a “figure of anarchy,” 
a structure without a transcendental absolute for its illumination that still maintains the 
transcendence of possibility, of “events,” of “linkages,” and of “symbiosis,” a differential, 
ecological, multiple transcendence. The question of objects is entirely beside the point, because 
these objects are always symbiotically twined with others, meaningfully coupled in such a way 
that their independent existence is always subsidiary to their contextual, worldly belonging. This 
belonging is precisely anarchic because it does not require the plurality of singularities to be 
singular in kind. Where a hierarchical inquiry requires one to categorize and divide, the 
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“ecological anarchy” of rhizomatic inquiry allows one to “think by the milieu” (another Deleuze 
and Guattari phrase), to think “without reference to a ground or ideal aim,” to think without 
“separating something from the milieu that it requires in order to exist.”303 The belonging of 
existents here, then, is not an objective, self-sufficient presence-with, as if standing before master 
or judge, but mutual presence-to, a recursive interdependence, a complex facing. The cyborg is 
of being, and at every moment she is faced with the rest of being, is present to the presence of the 
multitude of others.  
Thus, we see how the cyborg’s dialogic configuration of existence can in no way be 
representational. Cyborgs in conversation do not compare correspondences between words and 
things but engage in a “metamorphic ... relation to the world,” a relation wherein words and 
things are not each other, nor do they represent each other, but on the contrary are of the same 
matter, at play at different levels of reference in the same milieu. The cyborg configures 
existence in this way, or rather, lays bare this structure of existence, because she is not permitted 
to do otherwise, not permitted to be a user, a subject, with recourse to the surety of an outside for 
her meanings. Meaning as correspondence is meaning as technology, meaning as power, a 
strategy of union for those who can presume to the purity of a shared language. The cyborg has 
no such transcendental solidarity. She is exposed to her situation, cannot get outside of it, but in 
this, she reclaims it, reclaims situation as such. The situation, the milieu, the rest of existence, 
was already there before her, shaping her. The grid of power, the possibility of total 
communicability and commensurability, was constructed from the situation and within the 
situation, a possibility of the world in its becoming, but this possibility could never be whole, 
could never be a final event. The “infective power” of the milieu remained, silently and invisibly 
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troubling the metaphysical subject, potentiating its technological grasp, its hard, objective truths. 
But the cyborg was never permitted the purity of genius, the authority to declare laws of nature, 
the right to name the elements (and designate the elemental), because she herself was such an 
achievement of genius, an experiment, a mechanism of the world-machine. She has only ever 
had access to the rhizomatic anarchy of thought, the thought denied the status of thought, the 
thought that preceded the transcendental thought of the metaphysical subject and gave it birth. 
The cyborg has always been compromised, always been infected by being, without pure origin. 
But, without the naïvety of an illusory innocence, our cyborg is also the who we have been 
seeking, the one who gives us a new “ontology,” an ontology for the era of the world becoming-
world, an ontology of singularity-in-integration and integration-in-singularity, an ontology of the 
between.304 
“Reclaiming means recovering what we have been separated from,” Stengers writes, “but 
not in the sense that we can just get it back.”305 Dialogue moves through dialectic to return to 
itself at a more fundamental level, Bakhtin tells us. Similarly, to recover the milieu means 
“regenerating what this separation has poisoned.”306 Recovery, return, and reclamation signify 
the simultaneous “need to struggle” and the “need to heal, in order to avoid resembling those we 
have to struggle against,” in order to avoid recapitulating the logic of Western metaphysics 
ceaselessly deconstructing itself.307 Stengers’s reclamation is “not a matter of resurrecting” the 
past but of “reactivating it”; in writing, in doing philosophy, one experiences a “metamorphic 
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transformation,” an animating “lure.”308 One is drawn into the milieu, drawn by the labour of 
thought in action, by the anarchic fervour of belonging with being. To be lured in such a way is 
“to honor experience,” to be “witness” to the cry of the rest of existence, to be enlivened by an 
“agency that doesn’t belong to us.”309 This experience requires the “forfeit [of] protection,” the 
relinquishment of the security of transcendental subjectivity, and the acceptance of a concrete 
singularity that cannot be authorized by any outside, but only in fragile, continuous, open 
participation with others.310 This experience requires that I relinquish my protection, my position 
as user, and acknowledge my own cyborgic being. I, too, am present here; I, too, am caught up in 
the world-machine. Liberation is my fight as well. 
 
2.7. Cyborg Dreams 
In embracing the “heterogeneous multiplicity” of rhizomatic thought, the complex 
relationality of cyborg being, I am given the “gift” of words that require of me the double action 
of the forfeiture of my power and the taking up of my own position.311 My situation is fraught 
with the cyborg’s claim upon me. In this, my subjectivity is de-weaponized but not annihilated, 
transformed from an instrument of appropriation and control into an instrument of relation and 
connection. Haraway and Stengers invite me, invite us, into the practice of a “craft,” an “art,” 
that is characterized by a “particular transformative efficacy.” 312 They invite us into a 
metamorphic work that seeks the recovery of a belonging with being through the inscription of 
the possibility of being, the performance of openness in everyday, concrete action. Where before 
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this inscription violently severed existents from each other, now this inscription traces 
connections and draws contrasts between them, a writing, a dreaming, that heals the “insistent 
poisoned passion of dismembering and demystifying,” that recognizes “that we are not alone in 
the world.313  
This cyborg dream “defines a technological polis” that does not originate in the integrated 
Western marketplace, which means that it does not originate with a new identity, a new 
technology, or a new policy.314 The cyborg dream cannot presume to such a pure beginning. 
Instead, the cyborg dream begins with a “revolution of social relations in the oikos, the 
household,” with the heterogeneity, irreducibility, and intimacy of relation.315 This revolution 
reclaims oikonomia from economics, 316 reactivating and regenerating it in such a way that the 
boundaries of communicability and commensurability are shattered. Technology’s arrow made 
all of what is exchangeable, but the cyborg cannot rest with such a monologous integration of 
being. Born of integration, the cyborg moves through integration, beyond integration, 
discovering in her traversal a plurality of integrations, a belonging in the plural. Herein, 
Haraway identifies “three crucial boundary breakdowns” that occur: “between human and 
animal,” “between animal-human (organism) and machine,” and “between physical and 
nonphysical.”317 Such distinctions do not mark uncrossable schisms but sites of connection and 
play, sites of continuous, recursive inscription that require of us the act of “reading.”318 And, 
insofar as every site has been integrated into the world-machine, the global network, our 
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“reading” must attend to the “microelectronic devices” that are “everywhere” and “invisible,” the 
“irreverent upstart god[s], mocking the Father’s ubiquity and spirituality.”319 Modern technology 
was made to be elemental; it is something produced. As such, the “silicon chip” is not absolutely 
itself but “a surface for writing,” a surface luring us to read.320 The uncovering of this 
inscription, this “etch[ing]” at “molecular scales,” is the “ultimate interference for nuclear 
scores,” the repudiation of the totality, the finality, of technological power.321 Such a reading is 
absolutely vital if we are to “see politically” and “materially.”322 The machines of the “Sunshine 
Belt,” unlike those of the Rust Belt, hide themselves from view. Only the “witch-weavings” of 
the “displaced” and “unnatural” cyborg can respond to such dazzling oblivion; only the cyborg 
“who read[s]” the technological “webs of power so very well” can navigate this inilluminable 
darkness.323 We need a household revolution, not the “militant labor of older masculinist politics, 
whose natural constituency needs [the] defense jobs” offered by the “sun-worshippers” of Silicon 
Valley.324 We need an intimate, reparative politics, one shaped by “women’s enforced attention 
to the small,” to the concreteness and mess of care, a politics “in which people are not afraid of 
their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and 
contradictory standpoints.”325 We need a politics of the “monstrous and illegitimate,” built from 
“affinity, not identity.”326 
This is a “hopeful” politics “born of the skills for reading webs of power by those refused 
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stable membership in the social categories of race, sex, or class.”327 The cyborg mobilizes a “sea 
of differences,” a “disorderly polyphony,” a union without “appropriation,” “incorporation,” or 
“identification.”328 No transcendental subjectivity means no transcendental solidarity, only the 
“excruciating[] conscious[ness] of what it means to have a historically constituted body,” a body 
constituted by power while being denied its privileges.329 But in this painful reproduction, these 
bodies utilized as means, constituted as tools, discover that the “networks of connection among 
people on the planet are unprecedentedly multiple, pregnant, and complex.”330 Symbiotic 
linkages are produced across radical differences, resisting at every turn the “white humanism” 
that would have the revolution select “a single ground of domination to secure [its] revolutionary 
voice.”331 The cyborg tide repudiates monology while embracing relation, the “confusing task of 
making partial, real connection.”332 As those who built the machine, the cyborg tide refuses to 
play by its rules. 
And yet, the cyborg still plays. We cannot say that there are two different sets of rules, 
because the world in its world-wideness is existence flattened into a singular surface. To cast the 
cyborg revolution as coming from outside this surface would be just as arrogant and naïve as 
every prior revolution that has lapsed into tyranny. Instead, confronted with the logic of the 
world-machine—what Haraway terms the “informatics of domination”—the cyborg turns this 
logic upon itself, exceeding it at every turn.333 The world becoming-world cannot be interpreted 
“in terms of essential properties, but in terms of design, boundary constraints, rates of flows, 
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systems logics, [and] costs of lowering constraints.”334 These are the rules of technology’s arrow. 
But, as an integrated subject—complex, relational, and incomplete—the cyborg does not recoil 
against this inscription, but participates in the “play of writing,” traversing the unitary field of 
being by way of the embedded pathways of the rhizome cutting across the technological grid.335 
Against the “informatics of domination” the cyborg employs a multiplicity of “cyborg 
semiologies,” modes of reading that are “dispersed and interfaced in nearly infinite, 
polymorphous ways,” like the bodies made to be so by the world-machine and then denied the 
privilege of personhood.336 Deprived of a self, the cyborg codes a new one, a “disassembled and 
reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self,” a self that is less and more than one.337 
And in this, the technologies that have been “recrafting our bodies” become the instruments of 
our dreams.338 Haraway echoes what we have been asserting ad nauseum here: “myth and tool 
mutually constitute each other”;339 metaphysics and technology are intertwined. But still, we 
cannot say that this work is finished. We must turn, in concluding this chapter, to the concrete 
application of these “cyborg semiologies” to the technologies surrounding us, considering how 
we might realize our cyborg ontology in everyday life. 
 
2.8. Real Cyborgs 
To be clear, saying that we have yet to realize our cyborg ontology is not to say that it is 
unreal. On the contrary, we have seen already how metaphysics and technology, infrastructure 
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and performance, dreaming and politics, and most recently, myth and tool, are entangled, 
recursively informing each other. These terms do not constitute binaric tables of correspondences 
but rather tensions or hyphenations, manifestations of the ineluctable and incommensurate bond 
between word and thing.  
As such, a cyborg semiology cannot be carried out in the manner of an ideological 
tabulation, matching things to their ideal values and configuring those values in a deterministic 
semantic system possessed by any given subject. Tools enact myths; myths inscribe tools—they 
do not represent each other, subsisting in two separate spheres of existence that require the 
transcendental mediation of an absolute interpreter to explain the mystery of their union. As 
such, we can follow the artist and political organizer Jonas Staal in approaching what we have 
previously and provisionally termed ideology or metaphysics as a “morphology.”340 A cyborg 
semiology does not provide us with a key for unlocking a total system of belief, but rather with a 
laboratory and a plurality of instruments—a background, a backstage—for reading the form of 
the world. Indeed, for Staal, ideology equals form; it has a “material reality.”341 To “‘read’ form” 
is thus akin to performing an “anatomy” of bodies, reading their “morphology” to discern the 
“archetypes” or “rules” of their “form,” “formation,” and “transformation”—that is, to read the 
inclinations of their becoming.342 To realize our cyborg ontology is, therefore, to read in such a 
way that the “status of the real” is metamorphosed, to allow for the generative unfolding of being 
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in the tension of subject and world that the cyborg discloses.343 Cyborg reading—cyborg 
semiology or morphology—is a transformative action. Furthermore, this means that we can 
assent to Haraway’s assertion that “the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an 
optical illusion.”344 Dreams, myths, fictions—these do not exist outside what is. They are 
realized in the practical, performative, political changes that they effect in the field of existence, 
in their inscriptions of connections and contrasts that contribute to the ongoing becoming-world 
of the world. Our dreams, our myths, our fictions are decidedly real; they are matters of “life and 
death.”345 They are the languages “mapping” the relations between bodies that make our 
rhizomatic art, our cyborg ontology, possible.346  
Our mapping begins with the oikos, the household, because the household captures the 
relationality that destabilizes the world technological grid from within, that takes the logic of the 
grid, the multiplicity of its connections, beyond itself. “‘Networking,’” for Haraway, “is both a 
feminist practice and a multinational corporate strategy.”347 The inclinations of the technological 
surface can be diverted to other ends, can be articulated differently, exposed in their rhizomatic 
entanglement: “weaving is for oppositional cyborgs.”348 It is for this reason that we say that the 
new technological polis does not begin with an identity, technology, or policy, because such 
could be made a pure, authorizing object, a unitary origin, a transcendental tyrant. Rather, the 
new technological polis begins with the oikos. The household, in its networked intimacy, 
expresses “the profusion of spaces and identities and the permeability of boundaries in the 
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personal body and in the body politic” that have, to this point, been wielded as instruments of 
technological domination and integration, but can now be reclaimed and reactivated as tools of 
realization for the cyborg dream.349 We must focus, with Haraway, on the “homework 
economy,” because herein the power structures that have historically constituted the feminine, 
the social, and the material are laid bare, exposed in the bodily intimacy of their operation.350 A 
revolution in terms of power can only reproduce the structures of power. To map the household, 
to realize our cyborg, we must look to those who have “no ‘place,’” those who have no power, 
those who have been forced to “learn how to read these webs of power and social life,” and have, 
as a consequence, learned “new couplings, new coalitions,” new powers, that do not obey the 
proprieties of the former system. Cyborg semiology is, therefore, not a matter of reading “from a 
standpoint of ‘identification.’” Cyborg semiology is a reading of “dispersion”; its “task is to 
survive in the diaspora.”351  
So, then, what are the material conditions of the household, the homework economy, that 
we must surface so that we might carry out a new articulation, a new inscription? Haraway 
identifies numerous factors, more than we can discuss here. It will have to suffice to mention a 
few. The homework economy sees the “reemergence of home sweatshops” and “home-based 
businesses,” linked with “[w]omen’s continuing consumption work, newly targeted to buy the 
profusion of new production from the new technologies.”352 This new circuit of production and 
consumption sees increased precarity, maintained by “new time arrangements” like “flex time, 
part time, over time”—and the pervasive feeling of “no time” that so many women in the 
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homework economy experience.353 Contingent upon this restructuring of female labour in the 
home is the continued stratification of the workplace into “two-tiered wage structures,” whereby 
any woman who seeks to participate in the broader global economy finds her own position 
subordinated to the abstract metrics that invisibilize the ideal hegemony of the masculine.354 The 
global market in turn sees the “close integration of privatization and militarization,” and the 
solidification of relations between “high-tech capital” and “public education,” reinforcing the 
division of labour that subordinates the homework economy to the global technological economy 
through its incorporation as a mechanism of world-wide reproduction.355 This world-wide 
reproduction is assured by the “[i]ntensified” application of electronics technologies to 
“women’s bodies” in the domain of medicine, rendering their “boundaries newly permeable to 
both ‘visualization’ and ‘intervention.’”356 The female body is a site to be observed (an 
objectification that extends far beyond the reaches of medicine), a resource of the grid requiring 
management. 
From this situation of “permanent partiality” the cyborg emerges, mobilizing the resources 
of the economy enforced upon her to reclaim the relations of the oikonomia that are neither 
useful nor authorizable, but singularly, concretely meaningful in their perverse and threatening 
traversal of the grid. The cyborg teaches us “how not to be Man, the embodiment of Western 
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logos,”357 how not to obey his present incarnation in the informatics of domination, which for 
me, in my situation, from my position, does not mean the dissolution of my own (situated and 
situational) masculinity, but a new opening, a new unfolding, that is welcoming of connections, 
that acknowledges an indebtedness that can never be repaid,358 that revels in its belonging with 
the rest that gave it birth. I, too, am partial; “we are all chimeras” here.359 Thus, the cyborg 
teaches us the apocalyptic disaster of the West while welcoming us into a dreaming that traverses 
this disaster, a hopeful navigation passionately involved with being, seeking reparation. 
In this, I find myself welcomed, lured into and animated by the work of “[c]yborg writing,” 
the inscription of a new myth in the surface of the global network. The cyborg’s articulation of 
the dream of her realization is about “seizing the tools to mark the world that marked [her] as 
other.”360 These tools are “often stories, retold stories, versions that reverse and displace the 
hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities,” those idealized consolidations of Western 
technological power.361 As such, the cyborg’s revolution, the tremor of her singularity in the 
system of exchange, is her weaving of fictions, political dreams that trouble the domination that 
has been “built into the literal technologies,” the “technologies that write the world,” the 
technologies that inscribe the grid in the becoming-world of the world.362  
In a stroke, our original question emerges, and now along with it the continuous question 
of a labour. For a cyborg to read fiction is for her to “struggle for language” while “struggl[ing] 
against perfect communication,” to rejoice in the “illegitimate fusions of animal and machine,” 
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dreaming and politics, to “subvert[] the structure and modes of reproduction of ‘Western’ 
identity.”363 For a cyborg to read fiction is for her to reclaim the fact that “‘We,’” the singularly 
plural, the impermissible and unauthorizable, “did not originally choose to be cyborgs,” and that 
as such we are “freed of the need to ground our politics in ‘our’ privileged position,” in our 
origin story, that we have already been “written into the play of a text that has no finally 
privileged reading,” that, in reading and retelling and “rewriting the texts of [our] bodies and 
societies,” our very “[s]urvival is at stake.”364 We are always already entangled with “this play of 
readings,” always already compromised.365 For a cyborg to read fiction is for her to acknowledge 
that what is is still becoming, still in a state of transformation and metamorphoses, and that she, 
as one who reads, is intimately involved in this unfurling. Some one comes, and that someone is 
our cyborg, wrapped in her stories, twined with her fictions, entangled with others who are as 
singularly complex, partial, and “potent” as she knows herself to be.366 For our cyborg to read 
fiction is for her to find her voice in the midst of a “powerful infidel heteroglossia,” while 
refusing to wield that voice as a power, but as a means for responsibility and communion.367 For 
a cyborg to read fiction is thus in no way frivolous or escapist, but a matter of life and death. 
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Chapter 3: Navigating Integration 
This reading is a terrorism. Any reading that wrests stories of origin from the grasp of 
power is a terrorism. It for this reason that Haraway describes the cyborg with the term “infidel,” 
that polyvalent indicator of heresy. Jonas Staal has written as much, reporting on his work with 
the Kurdish revolutionaries of Rojava and their attempt to articulate and perform stories of 
resistance and assembly outside the view of and without view to power: “we’re all terrorists 
here.”368 The cyborg is a heresy of governance, as much a heresy as the “stateless democracy” of 
the Kurdish revolutionaries; indeed, both are heresies of the same form, refusals of the global 
logic of integration and power, joined by affinity across their differences of situation.369 Just as 
the managers of the electronics factory in Malaysia want their workers to retire to the household, 
the site of organic bodily reproduction, the “managers” of the global factory—that is, of the 
globalized economy—want their consumers to “retire” to citizenship, the site of organic national 
reproduction. But the cyborg repudiates the illusion of any such organicity—household, nation, 
or otherwise—fragmenting the integrated network that first fragmented her by an intensification 
and reclamation of the network’s own logic. The cyborg in her being is oppositional, an 
incommunicable and incommensurable singularity irreducible to an exchangeable datum. The 
cyborg is an agential machine refusing her own functionalization while simultaneously refusing 
the purity and the identity that would arise from her assertion of an ideal voice. The cyborg is no 
ghost in the machine, no pure subject. The cyborg is here, a disaster of illegitimacy, present to 
the system that birthed her and that now seeks to deny her.  
Being cyborg, cutting across the networks of global reproduction, is a terrorism. Such a 
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claim is not, however, to promote a violent terrorism, a terrorism of power. Though branded a 
terrorist, historically constituted as a terrorist, the cyborg is birthed of intimacy, a birth that is 
marked by the suffering of connection. The cyborg seeks communion outside the mediation and 
the dominion of exchange, the communion of relation, of play, of fiction. In the world-machine, 
relation is only relation if it respects the clearly demarcated boundaries and pathways of the grid, 
play is only play in sanctioned spaces and at sanctioned times, and fiction is only fiction if it can 
be safely removed from the field of existence, sequestered in the imagination of the 
transcendental subject. But when our cyborg enters into the play of reading, she upsets every 
propriety, every place of power, that would enforce her continued cooperation in her own 
subjugation. Relation is not a matter of correspondence between perfectly reflected, perfectly 
pure subjectivities, but of action in concrete situation, of the negotiation and honouring of 
differences. Play is not a matter of achieving predictable and repeatable outcomes, but of 
improvisation, the creative implementation of boundaries in the weaving of a shared space. And 
fiction is not a matter of escapist fantasy but of politics, the articulation of dreams that we wish 
to realize, a process wherein the fantastic is discovered to be the very engine of what we deem 
most real, most saturated with existence, the engine of the world in its becoming. Every cyborg 
who labours in the global grid is thus a terrorist, but this is a terrorism of a different kind.370 
We must emphasize: cyborg terrorism is in no way a violent terrorism, and indeed, we 
acknowledge the troubling resonance of the term, the bodies and the trauma it signifies, while 
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drawing upon it for the cultural significance it bears. Haraway tells us that the “cyborg body is 
not innocent,” and we must acknowledge—I must acknowledge—the complicity of our bodies in 
the infrastructures that shape our everyday practices.371 In replicative connection with Staal, we 
can say that the essenceless singularity of our being-cyborg requires a continuous process of 
“self-interrogation” and “self-critique,” an ongoing morphology of our “hybrid” existence, if we 
are to remain vigilant to the lure of power.372 So, in discussing “cyborg terrorism” here, we do 
not seek to recapitulate the masculinist image of resistance that, for instance, Jean Baudrillard so 
insightfully articulates in his The Spirit of Terrorism, but rather to cut against the grain of this 
logic, seeking its beyond.373 We must examine the birth of those popularly and politically 
branded terrorists and attempt to draw a “living contrast” between their acts of terrorism and the 
terrorism of our cyborg. Such is the responsibility, the care, the attention to detail, required of 
those who will not consent to the use of power. 
In The Spirit of Terrorism, Baudrillard argues that terrorism “is the act that restores an 
irreducible singularity to the heart of a system of generalized exchange.” He continues: 
All the singularities (species, individuals and cultures) that have paid with their deaths for 
the installation of a global circulation governed by a single power are taking their revenge 
today through this terroristic situational transfer. This is a terror against terror—there is no 
longer any ideology behind it.374 
Terrorism is the “shadow” of the global system, the only form of resistance possible within such 
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a total, integrated dominion.375 But terrorism is not from outside, not an alien invader; “[it] is at 
the very heart of this culture which combats it.”376 Terrorism is “triumphant globalization 
battling against itself.”377 The end of the Cold War, the third World War for Baudrillard, saw the 
dawn of a “single world order,” the order of globalized exchange, which “finds itself grappling 
with the antagonistic forces scattered throughout the very heartlands of the global, in all the 
current convulsions.”378 This grappling, “so impossible to pin down,” is the form of the “Fourth 
World War,” the war of “the world, the globe itself, which resists globalization.”379 The Fourth 
World War is a “fractal war of all cells, all singularities, revolting in the form of antibodies,” 
“viral in structure.”380 The terror of final integration, of the world in its world-wideness closing 
upon itself, the surface of existence terminating in the complete knowledge of the transcendental 
subject, finds itself confronted with the incommunicability and incommensurability of the world 
in its becoming-world, the world as it shatters itself, with the tremendous exhalation of being in 
the cry of the rest labouring for a community without subject. The morphology of terrorism with 
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which Baudrillard presents us is thus that of singularity puncturing integration, of an inversion 
within the surface, an inversion of the surface, a folding of technology’s arrow upon itself, across 
itself, around itself—a formal resistance (formal insofar as it has been produced by the form of 
the global) that denies the communicability of all terms, threatening the inevitability of the 
technological element in its absorption of what is. “The antagonism is everywhere, and in every 
one of us.”381 We are all terrorists here.  
Key to understanding this new paradigm, the paradigm of “terror against terror,” is the 
recognition of a structural “asymmetry.”382 The world in its world-wideness, the global world, is 
“[at] odds with itself,” and as such “can only plunge further into its own logic of relations of 
force,” the imposition of absolute idea and transcendental tyranny, but this logic “cannot operate 
on the terrain of the symbolic challenge and death,” a terrain with which the terrorist is 
intimately familiar in his historical constitution.383 As we have already seen with Haraway, a 
cyborg’s resistance, her weaving of new stories, is a matter of life and death, the absolute 
upsurge of a singularity that cannot be made an absolute, nor seeks to be so. Similarly, in the 
terrorist’s “symbolic and sacrificial” death, the extinguishing of his singularity constitutes an 
“absolute, irrevocable event” that, as an event, can neither be made an absolute.384 It is a victory 
that cannot be appropriated by the system and generalized through consumption because it is a 
victory in its defeat of the system, its absolute refusal of the totality. The “death of the terrorist is 
an infinitesimal point,” almost inconsequential, but it “creates a gigantic suction or void, an 
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enormous convection.”385 No matter the performances of remembrance and grief offered the 
victims of the terrorist attack, no matter how genuine, how compelling, how full of love, the 
death of the terrorist and the deaths of thousands of victims at his hands stand in utter 
“nonequivalence,” utter asymmetry.386 The singularity ruptures the very metric of exchange, the 
total commensurability of all values, in its repudiation of the final value, the value of integrated 
globality, of global equivalence. In this fantastic spectacle, this mythic performance of an 
impossible dream—the dream of escape from the total integration of what is—the terrorist 
mobilizes the engine of the real against itself, producing an “excess of reality” under which the 
“system collapse[s].”387 Thousands die for nothing—which is to say, for the nothingness of 
annihilation. There is no equivalence here. In the terrorist’s violence, reality “has absorbed 
fiction’s energy, and has itself become fiction” in a “contest” of the “unimaginable.”388 The 
terrorist weaves a story of power that proclaims the ultimate liquidation of power, an 
unimaginable apocalypse that sees oblivion consume itself. This is the asymmetry that troubles 
the world in its world-wideness: the “more concentrated the system becomes globally ... the 
more it becomes vulnerable at a single point.”389 The “formidable condensation of all functions 
in the technocratic machinery” of the global surface climaxes in utter condensation, existence 
draining from itself through an infinitesimal wound.390 Such is the “impossible exchange” that 
the “very structure of generalized world trade” produces, the fantastic asymmetry of singularity 
penetrating the heart of what is.391 
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“Only symbolic violence is generative of singularity,” Baudrillard tells us.392 We have, 
however, already asserted above that cyborg opposition, the assertion of her singularity in 
relation against the flattening totality of the system, is powerful precisely insofar as it is a non-
power, that the cyborg’s goals and commitments are neither in view of nor with a view toward 
power. The terrorist’s dream is a “fiction surpassing fiction” because in it there occurs a 
“resurgence of the real,” demonstrating the reality of fiction, that “[r]eality and fiction are 
inextricable.”393 But in the cyborg’s dream we encounter the perverse collusion of fiction and 
reality in a generative, rather than destructive, entanglement with each other. Indeed, the “living 
contrast” that must be drawn between Baudrillard’s terrorist and our cyborg, despite their formal 
similarity as singularities in a global system, is the cyborg’s attention to living contrast, an 
attention that we might go so far as to consider a commitment. Fiction and reality are not 
identical, but they do affect each other; cyborg writing, the inscription of dreams in the global 
technological surface, is committed to this recursive affection.  
So, let us draw our contrast. The terrorist removes himself from the system in a symbolic 
performance of the meaninglessness of the system, ripping open the “fracture” at its heart so that 
all might be consumed; as such, the terrorist’s opposition is a violence and a “hatred.”394 The 
cyborg, on the contrary, cuts across the system, makes her way through the system, to join with 
others in the production of meanings that cannot be counted by the system, and more, do not 
count in the system; unlike the terrorist, then, she seeks out the fractures, in the plural, that 
suffuse the system, in which between-spaces she might encounter other radical singularities and 
enter into dialogue with them. Rather than rip open these fractures, the cyborg folds herself into 
                                                 
392 Baudrillard, 23. 
393 Baudrillard, 21-22. 
394 Baudrillard, 8. 
 Stein 108 
them, along with any others who would join her. This is a terrorism of radical positivity.395 Thus, 
where the terrorist’s opposition is a hatred, the cyborg’s is a passion. This is not to say love in 
the romantic tenor still so prevalent in our discourse, the amorous affectivity that covers over all 
differences, all weaknesses, all wrongs, but love as suffering, love that embraces the joys and the 
pains of partial but real connections, the concreteness and contingency and disaster of relation 
without security or power. The cyborg’s passion acknowledges wounds, but does not wish for a 
final wound, for apocalypse. Where Baudrillard’s terrorist violently recapitulates the logic of 
“Man,” inverting the purity of his transcendence in an ultimate cleansing, the cyborg, in her 
historical form as feminine, refuses this existential trading of blows.396 Women, children, the 
colonized, the poor: all of these, the rest of history, have been subject to history’s depredations, 
to the violence of tyrants and terrorists alike. To be cyborg is to acknowledge this woundedness, 
this partiality, this incompleteness, to navigate this historical dispossession while resisting the 
temptation to claim the power of possession. As such, this is a living contrast we attempt to draw 
here, insofar as it does not erase the possibility to which it is opposed. The logic of the West is 
the logic of violent revolution, of overthrow, of exclusion and appropriation, a logic promising 
power in exchange for blood. The cyborg must be attentive, constantly self-interrogating and 
self-critiquing, if she is to resist being animated by the lure of this logic, if she is to resist the 
violent nihilism of the West in its crises of inversion, the continual convection of its hierarchical 
dualisms in the dialectical spiral of sublation. To eschew the violence of this circuit, the cyborg 
instead tells stories that reclaim the very “control strategies” that have been used to subjugate 
her, “concentrat[ing] on boundary conditions and interfaces, on rates of flow across 
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boundaries—and not on the integrity of natural objects.”397 She who has not been permitted to be 
one speaks as less and more than one, welcoming every other incommensurable singularity to 
join in her passionate labour. 
 We see, then, that where the terrorist resists power by wielding power, the cyborg resists 
power through the practice of “skill”; she finds “[i]ntense pleasure” in her skillful traversal of the 
network, while the terrorist’s pleasure is in seeing the network’s annihilation.398 The cyborg’s 
“enforced attention to the small,”399 in every one of her historical situations—from home to 
factory and between—does not produce a unified point of power but a textured ensemble of 
abilities. Her knowledge is neither pure nor complete, but embedded in the world, a partial, 
complex, and open heterogeneity. She cannot pretend to genius but recognizes that her 
knowledge is a mode of doing, a fusion of articulation and production in everyday practice, a 
dialogue with being. Indeed, the cyborg’s existence names genius for the illusion it is, insofar as 
she must always be aware of her situation and her daily labour, must always acknowledge her 
debts and cite her sources.400 She is denied purity of origin, but in this illegitimacy she finds a 
power that takes her beyond power, beyond the logic of technological appropriation. The cyborg 
mobilizes her illegitimacy to take advantage of the fact that she has always been in and of the 
system, that she knows better than anyone that there is no outside to the system, but that this in 
no way means that the system is closed. With skill, she navigates the fissures of the system, 
communing with the multiplicity of her others in the total night of integration. She sees without 
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sight and knows without knowing, feeling the surface of oblivion with her language and reading 
its contours through her work. Cyborg skill is therefore a deft performance of mobility, a playful 
involvement in situation akin to that of a dancer or wrestler, an attentiveness to the rhythms and 
inclinations of her partners and the forms and intertias of the space in which she finds herself 
entangled with them. Cyborg resistance undoes everything Western metaphysics and Western 
history teach us about resistance. We have been taught eye for eye, man for man, Idea for Idea—
the perpetual violence of dialectic. But the cyborg speaks, and in her voice we hear the hum of an 
opening that is inilluminable by the powers of this prior logic. The opening is here, but it must be 
felt. The terrorist act of our cyborg’s reading, her violation of the strictures of Western 
subjectivity—no recourse to the outside or the Ideal, and therefore no displacement of fiction to 
the unreality of imagination, but the injection of fiction, or the fictive (the political practice of 
dreams), at the heart of the real—is the terrorism of a passion, a singular affectivity needy for 
connection, a resistance committed to relation and not power. Our cyborg’s passion is a terrorism 
because it refuses love in its ideal passivity, and instead puts love skillfully and attentively to 
work. 
To take our reading beyond integration, to traverse the oblivion of technology, we must 
follow our cyborg in her skillful, passionate labour, and not Baudrillard’s terrorist in his hatred. 
Though Baudrillard certainly provides us with a comprehensive hermeneutic of globalization, 
potentiating a reading of globality in conflict with antagonistic singularity (which also means, 
with itself), he does not have the space in this text as he does in others to consider those 
singularities that do not subscribe to terroristic violence. In the final essay of The Spirit of 
Terrorism, Baudrillard remarks that there are in fact singularities that “are not necessarily 
violent,” and that there are “some subtle ones, such as those of language, art, the body or 
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culture.”401 But this is only a brief aside, and he quickly returns to the vengeance of the terrorist 
in his fantastic puncturing of the globally integrated circuit. Baudrillard remarks that “all 
different, singular forms are heresies,” but he is so concerned with the overwhelming spectacle 
of the “singular form” of the terrorist that he cannot take the time to consider the otherwise, to 
look beyond the monologous conflict of global power and terroristic destruction.402  
This has been our project here, to look beyond, to ask after the otherwise, to read further. 
We have attempted here to respond to the question of the cyborg, which we found to be 
intimately involved with the metaphysical question of the who raised by Jean-Luc Nancy. We 
took up this question in response to the question with which we opened this study, the question 
of the cyborg and fiction, and through a series of readings determined that the cyborg makes no 
alibi for her fictions, her writings and readings—the involvement of her semiology—and that 
through her practice we discover fiction to be at the heart of the real, to be in fact the engine of 
the world in its becoming. Furthermore, we have seen that the logic of this “cyborg semiology” 
is not a logic of illumination and vision but sensation and touch—for a cyborg to read fiction is 
an affection, not a speculative, passive imagination. In being in and of the system—the globally 
integrated circuit, the world-machine, the surface of existence—the cyborg knows the truth of 
existence, that she has no recourse to an outside, and that she is therefore responsible for the 
drawing of living contrasts here, and not the imposition of rigid categories and divisions from the 
impossible vantage of a without. Thus, the cyborg refuses both total integration and total 
annihilation, labouring instead to realize the openness of what is through a communion in the 
dark, navigating the webs of power not in order to destroy them but to join with other 
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singularities in passionate communion. In so doing, the cyborg welcomes us, lures us, to join 
with her in her work, to return to the rest that gave us birth while acknowledging the partiality 
and complicity of our own particular situations. We are all cyborgs here. This is our fight too. It 
is for us to elaborate the forms that Baudrillard does not. It is for us to look beyond annihilation. 
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Chapter 4: Cyborg, Fiction, World 
In his short essay, “On Fiction,” the philosopher Vilém Flusser takes up the troubling “loss 
of faith in reality” that has come to be an “atmosphere of our life.”403 What was once “given” 
and “discoverable” is no longer there to be grasped; there is only “pretense”; the real is 
annihilated. And yet, this “sense of the fictitious all around us” is not new. Flusser quickly 
sketches some epochs of this sense, in each of which he sees the world appearing as “fiction” 
standing over against “some external reality.” But something has changed. Flusser tells us that 
this something marks the thought of Wittgenstein and Kafka, Einstein and Sartre, Hitler and the 
Beatles, even himself—and it marks his readers too, which entails that it marks us. We are 
embroiled in this change, which we have already discussed here in the terms given us by Nancy: 
the world becoming-world, self-integrating and self-differentiating, a generative, incomplete, 
compromised whole. As Flusser writes, “there is no comparative reference for the fiction that 
surrounds us. Fiction is the only reality.” We take up this hyperbolic claim here, after all these 
pages of analysis, because it should now be clear what Flusser is trying to articulate. The 
transcendental realm of the ideal subject—aloof, untouchable, pure—is no more. Our attempts at 
situating a simple, transcendental reference culminate in “madness,” in “pretense,” and—if we 
follow Flusser to the letter—in “nothing”: the “feeling of absurdity and the atomic mushroom are 
there to prove it.” 
Flusser’s essay is a terrorism of the violent kind, wounding the oblivion of reality with an 
indictment of its “mere virtuality.” But, as we argued in the preceding chapter, this oblivion—
this virtuality—is not a nullity, but a terrain of an all-together different sort, one that confounds 
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the powers and instruments of the prior paradigm. Our cyborg, born of our technological night, 
makes no claim to the subject’s illuminative capacity, to the power of transcendental vision that 
might penetrate the shadowy fictions of the surface like a nail and fix them to the unchanging 
depths of the real, arranging existence in a grid around the punctuality of the subject’s genius. 
Our cyborg is born of the surface and knows that the surface is what is, but our cyborg also 
knows that her inilluminable dwelling is rich with pathways and connections that cannot be 
reduced to the calculable geometries of the grid. Her fictions allow her to participate in the 
becoming of the world, allow her to see without sight, to skillfully navigate the unfolding surface 
without recourse to the tyranny of absolute knowledge. Our cyborg is situated and partial, 
acknowledging her own embedment and embodiment as gifts, not weaknesses—or rather, as 
weaknesses suffused with possibility, weaknesses as chances for existence. Our cyborg 
welcomes fiction because she knows it to be part of her, part of the world in its world-wideness, 
the vehicle of the world’s generativity. The “sense of the fictitious” is not something to 
resignedly accept, nor something to herald as the end of all things; the sense of the fictitious is 
the sense of beginning, the sense of a beyond waiting to be realized here. 
But how do we make our way between, from Baudrillard and Flusser’s terrorism to cyborg 
reparation? This is a bridging work to be continuously undertaken. We have asserted that we are 
all cyborgs, and yet our reading too often remains trapped in dialectics: metaphysical tyranny or 
apocalyptic nihilism; absolute value or no value; subject or no subject? Flusser’s essay, though 
provocative, has the applicative quality of a mic-drop, the performative termination of all 
dialogue. And yet, by positioning Flusser at this point in our study, an opening shows itself. He 
tells us that the “atomic mushroom” is here to “prove” the virtuality, the fictiveness, of the real, 
the utter infolding of what is with the stories that we tell; this proof that is the nuclear bomb 
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provides our understanding with a concrete handle from which we might begin to feel our way 
through our situation. We must continue to read further if we are to see the beyond of power 
realized, if we are to practice a cyborg singularity that does not resort to monological violence. 
The hyperbolic power of the nuclear, the culmination of our technology, our appropriative 
capacity, has potentiated the utter annihilation of the world. Technological integration made 
possible the world-wide circulation of people, ideas, goods, and wealth, but also the world-wide 
circulation of destruction—or rather, the world-wide circulation of a precarious position on the 
brink of destruction. The solidity of the earth has vanished beneath us; we stand poised to 
obliterate our planet with the turn of a key, the push of a button, a gesture so inconsequential as 
to be absurd. Whether from aggression or nihilistic recompense the nuclear spells our final 
doom, the total closure of what is in the end of all life. The simple, absolute reference of a 
judge—whether God or transcendental subject—is displaced into the global circuit, and 
judgment becomes a complex balancing act of “design, boundary constraints, rates of flows, 
[and] systems logics.”404 The shattering of the world in its self-differentiation is materially 
realized by the nuclear bomb, a fantastic concretion of the possibilities of our histories—our final 
possibility, the finale to possibility, our ultimate performance—that far exceeds the possibilities 
of any singular existent, while simultaneously implicating every existent on the planet in the web 
of mutually assured destruction. The nuclear bomb is the product of the fictive engine of the real 
in overdrive, the inscription in the technological surface of an absolute technology, a terrible 
dream, the realization of which entails the annihilation of the real—that is, the annihilation of our 
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dreams, our histories, our lives.  
To draw out the material implications of this global power, we need only briefly turn to the 
history of the integrated circuit that we analyzed above. Solid-state electronics were born from 
technological developments during the “wizard war”—World War II—and some of the most 
significant advances in integrated circuit design were achieved to improve the function of first 
the B-70 Valkyrie nuclear bomber, and then the Minuteman nuclear missile, the third version of 
which is still in service today. Specifically, the planar process, developed by Jean Hoerni to 
resolve operational problems in the Minuteman, directly contributed to the production of the first 
monolithic integrated circuit, a development that inscribed the laws of integration and flattening 
in microelectronics design.405 The infolding of depths into surfaces that we have been discussing 
here cannot be separated from the material history of technological uniformization, a history that 
hinged upon developments in nuclear technology. As the physicist Paul Handler notes, it was 
precisely the flattening of electronic devices that allowed engineers to take advantage of these 
devices’ monocrystalline solid bodies, manipulating their physical and chemical structures to 
produce useful differences in operation within the same material.406 At minute scales, the depths 
of a semiconductor film are its surface, and vice versa. It was in harnessing the “surface effects” 
of semiconductor devices that later engineers arrived at the MOSFET transistor, which is used in 
almost all microchips today.407 We see, then, that the technological infrastructure of 
globalization that we have been discussing here is directly connected with the nuclear order. 
Indeed, the nuclear took the “surface effects” of electronics beyond their minute scale and 
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localized operations, inscribing their form at the level of the global surface and materially 
producing the “continuous text” of the world in its world-wideness. 
In 1958, Jack Morton of Bell Labs remarked that it “may well be that these solid state 
electronics extensions to man’s mind will yet have a greater impact upon society than the nuclear 
extension of man’s muscle.”408 But the “nuclear extension” of humanity was far more than an 
extension of “muscle.” Nuclear power has emerged in real, intimate connection with the 
technological “extension” of the human “mind” by way of these electronics. Both are material 
generalizations of human experience; neither can be limited to a frame, to a world-view. 
Electronics and the nuclear bomb shape the very structure of the world in which we—every 
person, every existent—are involved. In the transistorization of our musculature, of our everyday 
practice, our mentality has been simultaneously nuclearized. The nuclear is as much a part of our 
globally integrated existence as our electronics. Morton’s reduction of the nuclear to mere 
“muscle” only serves to highlight the self-invisibilization of the globally integrated circuit. The 
nuclear is part of our technological element, an infrastructural inscription of a particular practice. 
In times of international tension, when the nuclear bomb emerges from its invisible ubiquity, we 
remember its power; what is usually nothing but a historical fact, an academic concept, a plot 
device, is discovered to have always been here, with us, shaping us. We find ourselves present to 
the possibility of complete annihilation, a possibility that, in its totalization of what is, inclines us 
to the global performance of deterrence. The network itself, of which we are all a part, is the 
katechon, holding back the apocalypse it potentiated. In other words, the only thing that stands 
between us and destruction is us. As such, we must think through this final plot point, this plot 
point to end all plots, if we are to mobilize our fictions, our dreams, to non-totalizing, 
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compassionate, plurilogical ends. 
In his 1981 study, Simulacra and Simulation, Jean Baudrillard takes up the profound 
possibility of the nuclear, this fictive climax to our history, as the materialization of the same 
metaphysical trajectory that we have been discussing here.409 The nuclear goes hand-in-hand 
with the uniformization of existence, the embedding of the subject in situation, the annihilation 
of the transcendental viewpoint. Technology’s arrow has folded every other inclination, every 
other domain of human experience, into itself. The technological surface constitutes the 
infrastructure of the world in its world-wideness, uniformizing what is according to an elemental 
law of perfect communicability and commensurability—the law of generalized exchange. But 
such a historical occurrence means that the domain of war has been folded into the technological 
surface as well, and consequently seen itself transformed in its structure by the structure of 
technology.410 War has been generalized, dispersed. World War I, in its inauguration of total 
war—no outside the war, no outside the system—was one of the first indicators of this 
generalization; the cataclysmic finale to World War II—the horrific bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki—marked its institution.411 It is the institution of the nuclear—its beginning and its 
structure—that troubles Baudrillard. Our material conditions under the nuclear have recursively 
transformed our metaphysics. If we are to tell a different story, if we are to weave new fictions, if 
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we are to refuse the “plot of original unity” wielded as a cudgel by the hands of power,412 we 
must follow Baudrillard in his analysis of this all-consuming, self-consuming, power.  
In a similar gesture to that made by Flusser, Baudrillard begins his study with the question 
of reference. Our technologies are always tied into our meanings, our metaphysics, and the 
practice of making reference is always involved in our technological involvement with the world. 
We have already noted the “sense of the fictitious” in its epochal development and Flusser’s 
characterization of the reality/fiction dichotomy in each of these epochs. This dichotomy, 
regardless of the terms employed, situates “fiction” over against “some external reality” that 
founds it. But, under the dominion of the nuclear, within the technological element, there is no 
“territory” of fiction to be set over against “a referential being, or a substance.”413 Fiction—or, in 
Baudrillard’s terms, simulation—cannot be enclosed, cut off from reality. Simulation “is the 
generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal.”414 The fictive term cannot 
be referred back to a substantial foundation; the fictive term is the real, more real than real—
thus, a hyper reality. As we have seen already, terroristic violence takes advantage of this 
collapse of the dichotomy, producing an “excess of reality” that wounds reality at its heart 
(which is to say, a heart which cannot truly be conceived of as ‘heart’ in a central, determinant 
way, but as generalized, dispersed, everywhere and nowhere, the network in its totality 
holographically present at every node).415 It is the “precession of simulacra” that “engenders the 
territory,” not some external, absolute power.416 Terroristic violence is thus the weaving of a 
particular fiction that concretely simulates the annihilation of what is, engendering a new 
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territory, and so a new logic, a new reason, in the process. Terrorism and its logic did not exist 
prior to 9-11—not in the way that we understand it today—but this does not mean it came from 
outside; terrorism was a possibility of the world in its becoming, a logic made possible by the 
realization of the globally integrated circuit, a logic which has consequently reshaped our 
understanding of what came before it. Similarly, then, the nuclear order did not exist prior to the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it was a possibility of the world realized by those 
horrific events. Only after do we discover these possibilities to have always been here, always 
been real. Only after does the event reshape everything that came before, and so too reshape the 
very structure of our understanding. We are already nuclearized; we are already terrorists; these 
possibilities have always been our own. 
This does not mean, however, that these possibilities could have been realized at any other 
moment in our history. The global order—polarized between nuclear totality and terroristic 
destruction—was not an abstract ideology lurking in the human unconscious. The analyses of the 
preceding chapters were an effort to resist such a naïve realism. The generational and recursive 
course of history, the circuit of theory and practice, the feedback between articulation and 
production in work, is the process of the real, a process that cannot be abbreviated. The circuit 
only shows itself after the fact; the precession of models only becomes visible in hindsight. As 
such, only in the revolutionary upsurge of the world in its becoming do we see, for a moment, 
that simulation is what is, see the world in its fullness as possibility, see that depth suffuses the 
surface in its unfolding. But, what has changed today, what marks us as different from those who 
preceded us, is that we have become simulacral. The fictive engine of the real has not retreated in 
the wake of revolution, has not hidden itself away to allow for the institution of a new, stable 
order. The cyborg self, the global self, the nuclearized self, the terrorist self, an existent 
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“disassembled and reassembled,”417 without original purity, constitutes itself in construction, in 
process, in simulation. Ironic and postmodern, this self sees the realist’s dream of 
correspondence between the “real” and his “models of simulation” evaporate.418 The tabulation 
of values is no longer required, nor even effective. The model itself, in its precessional drift, 
produces what is and our knowledge of it. The “sovereign difference” between real and fiction 
collapses, and in this collapse, “all of metaphysics ... is lost.”419 We are our own posterity 
contemporaneous with our present, living out the world-shattering possibilities of our dreams. 
The “mirror of being and appearances, of the real and it concept,” has been mobilized in the 
structure of our being.420 The very “imaginary of representation,” that sacred domain of human 
experience, has “disappear[ed] in the simulation whose operation is nuclear and genetic”—the 
global network collapses into our bodies; our bodies proliferate throughout the globe.421  
The situation in which we find ourselves should now be clear. As in Nancy above, the 
shattering of the world as a well-ordered field, of the perspective of the subject, of the totality of 
a vision, does not mean the dissolution of either world or subject, but their integration in a 
generative structure characterized by continuous, recursive becoming. In this we see becoming 
itself reveal itself, discover its operation to have always been here, always been our own 
possibility. But such a revelation is historically situated, an outcome of a history, our history, 
that is paradoxically generalized but not universalizable. We are all cyborgs here, but the cyborg 
is precisely that being who cannot posit transcendental solidarity in the referential purity of an 
absolute being. The cyborg is radically communicable and utterly incommunicable. Her being 
                                                 
417 Haraway, Cyborg Manifesto, 33. 
418 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 2. 
419 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 2. 
420 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 2. 
421 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 2. 
 Stein 122 
cannot be categorized, cannot be placed in the camp of totality or nothingness, of nuclear law or 
terrorist violence. She is the tension of the polarity itself, an infinite generation emerging at the 
limit, multiple and incommensurable yet always belonging with being. In being present to the 
becoming-world of the world, the cyborg cannot posit an unchanging real that has always been 
there, but only a real always changing. She participates in the real, lets herself be transformed by 
the real, witnesses the metamorphosis of the real through her entanglement with it. As such, the 
loss of all metaphysics does not mean the reduction of knowledge to mere physics, nor the 
institution of a new transcendental idealism, but a structuration of the surface of what is and an 
inversion and infolding of the hierarchy of the real. With Nancy, with Haraway, with 
Baudrillard, with all the rest who are with us, we witness the achievement of new pathways and 
new connections that our prior metaphysics never permitted. We welcome the drift of possibility. 
We embrace the replicative play of being. 
Problems arise, however, when we forget (wilfully or ignorantly) our simulacral existence, 
resorting to the old hegemonies of world-view in order to shore up a property in the flux of 
situation. This forgetting concretely consists in misreadings of the simulations with which we are 
involved, misreadings that take several forms. We can suggest three such forms here, based on 
the foregoing study: reductive totality, nihilistic resistance, and naïve deconstruction. The first of 
these welcomes becoming but declares what is now to be the culmination of what will be (e.g., 
the global technological-nuclear element). The second refuses becoming, declaring what is now 
to be a perversion, an illusion, a mistake (e.g., terrorism). The third welcomes becoming, but 
never dwells with what is now, never permits what has become to be in the fullness of its 
historical realization (e.g., any number of new critical philosophies, the risk of which I especially 
feel in my own writing here). This is in no way a complete or comprehensive list, but only a 
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rough sketch of the misreadings that we have already encountered above. What is now required 
is a development of a logic or semiology of simulation, a way of reading that cyborgs might 
employ in order to navigate such errors of interpretation. 
Let us return to the question of the nuclear. In following Baudrillard in his introduction of 
the concept of simulation, we are now ready to take up his explication of its nuclear logic. In the 
disappearance of the “imaginary of representation” into simulation, a different modality of 
thought emerges, one that is operational.422 For Baudrillard, such a thought repudiates the purity 
of genius (a thought that could observe the world from a transcendental remove), configuring 
thought instead as situated practice. Thinking does something. But, in its contemporary 
simulacral operation, it does something in specific ways, which Baudrillard terms the “nuclear 
and genetic.”423 Rather than impose a hierarchy or view, simulacral thought produces the real 
“from miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory banks,” from “models of control,” and the real 
“can be reproduced an indefinite number of times from these.”424 We see, then, how this 
distinctively postmodern way of thinking—positional, relational, contingent, rhizomatic—has 
emerged in recursive tension with the structure of the integrated circuit. Technology and thought 
do not represent each other, but rather work with each other, learn to read each other’s particular 
articulations of what is in a process of mutual inscription. Technology and thought are of the 
same matter; they are of the world. As such, they feed into each other, shaping each other, 
producing new territories in the process.425 Such is the interpenetration of the “nuclear and 
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genetic.” 
This nuclear logic means therefore that the real “no longer needs to be rational,” in the 
sense of closure and completeness, because it is instead “produced from a radiating synthesis” 
(as opposed to a dialectical synthesis) “of combinatory models in a hyperspace without 
atmosphere” (as opposed to the space of the real whose atmosphere was once the imaginary).426 
With simulation, there is no stratification of ‘ground’ and ‘atmosphere’ because the 
technological-nuclear grid encompasses the globe, suffusing the ‘ground’ with its principles of 
operation. Our representations are here; our presence to the world is relational and generalized. 
We see, then, that the first misreading, that of reductive totality, is the result of power taking 
advantage of this generalization of position in the global surface, whereby it enforces a 
metaphysical closure upon the navigational “models of control” that characterize simulacral 
thought, so bringing all of what is under the dominion of a monological interpretation of 
existence—the generalized exchange—wherein the recurrence of dialectical crisis serves to 
reinforce the system. We have already seen with Haraway, however, that the cyborg, in her 
enforced attention to the small, learns how to use the tools and systems of the network for other 
ends, a plurality of ends, “seizing the tools to mark the world that marked [her] as other.”427 
Simulacral thought is, therefore, without allegiance and ambivalent; it can be either a tool of 
power or a tool of liberation, a tool of the user or a tool of the cyborg labourer. 
To be sure, this ambivalence poses a real danger. In the hands of power, “all 
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referentials”—all partialities, all contingencies, all situations—can be liquidated and 
“artificial[ly] resurrect[ed]” in the “system of signs, a material more malleable than meaning, in 
that it lends itself to all systems of equivalences, to all binary oppositions, to all combinatory 
algebra.”428 Simulacral thought becomes a mobile, world-shattering weapon of domination and 
exclusion; the generalized exchange of the nuclear order consumes everything, converts 
everything into value, while simultaneously draining everything of any value that might not be 
calculable in its terms. Tyranny adopts the operations of terrorists, employing the “combinatory 
algebra” of simulation to co-opt the replicative play of being. The tyranny of the generalized 
exchange produces robots while preventing the emergence of oppositional cyborgs. We have 
already seen this co-option in concrete terms in Rachael Grossman’s report above. The women 
employed in microelectronics factories in Southeast Asia were lured with the promise of a global 
identity (i.e., a Western identity) in an “operation of deterring every real process”—
individuation, solidarity, resistance—“via its operational double”—individualism, competition, 
obedience.429 The microelectronics factory converts the operation of simulacral thought into an 
instrument of power: “programmatic, metastable, [a] perfectly descriptive machine.”430 
Difference vanishes in the absolute institution of identity, in the universalization of Western 
consumer habits as ‘real’ choice. These replicated robots find themselves trapped in the “orbital 
recurrence of models” and the “simulated generation of differences,” dispossessed of any ability 
to make bridges or draw living contrasts that might serve as tools for connection and 
liberation.431 
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But, since the logic of simulation is a lateralization of reason, its use by power cannot 
entirely shelter itself from the threat of seizure.432 There is a danger to be sure, but this danger is 
not final. The “orbital recurrence of models” does not entail a determining externality, an 
absolute outside, but rather the wholity of a structure suffusing what is. This logic is here to be 
used; only those seeking power can pretend to its ideality (or nullity). As such, the logic of 
simulation is also a logic of “irreference”—and one should here heed Baudrillard’s pun: without 
reference, without reverence—and is therefore a logic of traversal.433 Simulacral thought does 
not leave us adrift, vulnerable to the power of the technological element, to the “power of 
power,”434 but instead opens us to skillful navigation, whereby passionate singularities can learn 
to move with the drift, with the precession of simulacra, without resorting to the self-obscuring, 
self-authorizing strategies of power used by tyrants and terrorists alike to naturalize their rights 
to violent action. 
The history of metaphysics, the history of the West, has been a “wager on representation: 
that a sign could refer to the depth of meaning, that a sign could be exchanged for meaning and 
that something could guarantee this exchange—God of course.”435 But such recourse to the 
divine merely provided power with excuses for its depredations. We have already said that we 
cannot play at such innocence here. The cyborg is without alibi for her impurity, for her perverse 
conception at the hands of “militarism,” “patriarchal capitalism,” and “state socialism,”436 
choosing instead to responsibly, passionately pursue connection with other singularities in 
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mutual woundedness. As representation—the “principle of the equivalence of the sign and of the 
real,” the tabulation of words and things—collapses in the radical generalization and thus 
“radical negation of the sign as value,” the cyborg embraces the tremors of this collapse and the 
disclosure of a world that has no need for representational substantiality.437 The cyborg is not 
troubled that the “real is no longer what it was” because she knows that such solidity, such self-
sufficiency, was always an illusion.438 The ambivalence of simulation leaves open the possibility 
of power co-opting its resources, but this openness simultaneously entails the possibility of a 
traversal uncontainable by power, a traversal that seeks out the pathways and connections 
unknowable to power, a traversal that revels in the liberating chance of fiction suffusing the real. 
For the cyborg to read fiction is thus for her to witness the tyranny of representation crumble and 
the very principle of the world, the fictive engine of the real, emerge transformed but unscathed 
from the rubble. The sense of the fictitious for our cyborg is no problem at all, but a beginning 
without genesis, a beginning that has always been going on, an originary generativity. 
What is more, the cyborg not only experiences but embodies this “implosion and 
involution” of the system of representation.439 The cyborg is a singular culmination of the 
“deterrence machine” that constitutes the alliance between the Western and the global, a 
punctuality emerging from the “network of incessant, unreal circulation,” an infolding of the 
“incredible proportions” of the global circuit, an institution of a lived space, a structure, in a 
territory “without space, without dimension.”440 She dwells within the world, and the world 
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dwells within her. The cyborg is not ruled by the “precession of the model” because she herself is 
a product of the model, her existence “orbital like that of the bomb.”441 She is the blasphemous 
child of the “irreverent upstart god,” the spirit suffusing the nuclear mesh that forms the 
“technical basis of simulacra.”442 She is not innocent because the possibility of her singularity is 
owed to that global system of “circulation” that “constitutes the genuine magnetic field of the 
event”—her upsurge, in its revolutionary reshaping of time, is made possible by the global order 
that seeks to flatten everything in its “generalized cycle” of production.443 And yet, the cyborg is 
a “fact[],” a singularity “born at the intersection of models” in their circulation, embodying in the 
incommensurability of her voice the “secret of discourse,” that it operates according to the 
“impossibility of a determined position of power, the impossibility of a determined discursive 
position.”444 Haraway tells us that the “cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history,” because 
the cyborg is not permitted to be one, not permitted to be a subject; the cyborg never had the 
purity of a garden to reclaim.445 As such, she finds herself in the “[h]ell of simulation,” trapped 
in the “subtle, maleficent, elusive twisting of meaning” that the critics of postmodernism 
decry.446 But, this hell is also a “political space,” the sort of space with which we have seen the 
cyborg to be intimately familiar.447 This space is “magnetized, circularized, reversibilized,” a 
“torsion” of the ground that constitutes a repudiation and simultaneous proliferation of ground, a 
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navigation of the “infinity” of the exchange, its perpetual, replicative circulation, “folded back on 
its own surface,” a seizure of its “transfinite,” self-exceeding logic.448 
The cyborg, like the terrorist, is, in her being, a hyperreal event, but an event of a kind all-
together different from that of the terrorist. Where the terrorist violently shatters the mirror of 
“the real and its concept,” the cyborg incorporates the mirror in her body, embracing the 
“indefinite[] refract[ion]” of signs, of fiction, of possibility, through the concrete medium of her 
flesh, which cannot be severed from the rest of what is.449 Every wounding of her body is a 
wounding of the world; every wounding of the world is a wounding of her body. Her cyborgic 
replication of dreams and their performance “cannot be controlled by an order that can only exert 
itself on the real and the rational,” on the substantial object, the reductive totality that declares 
what is now to be the culmination of what is.450 The system of representation is a “determined 
power that can only reign over a determined world,” a tabulated world, but it “cannot do 
anything against this indefinite recurrence of simulation, against this nebula whose weight no 
longer obeys the laws of gravitation of the real.”451 For Baudrillard, the West, and specifically its 
concretion in capital, “is the one that fostered reality, the reality principle”—in Nancy’s terms, 
the world “as possibility of (or for) an existent being, possibility as world for such a being” 452—
but it “was also the first to liquidate it.”453 Power—and the power of power in its techno-
representational appropriation of the real—comes to “float[]” without ground, suspended in the 
nebulous oblivion of the generalized exchange.454 Simulation “short circuit[s]” reality in its 
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replicative disruption of the system of representation, denying power the recourse to an outside 
that would allow it to solidify the system as it is now and efface its construction, invisibilizing 
the artifice of the grid.455 Thus, the form of the cyborg’s singularity, her particular reading of her 
situation, refuses to refer the precession of models to an absolute ground, refuses to annihilate 
precession and ground in an act of violence, and refuses to skip irresponsibly from model to 
model without ever considering their historical concretion. Rather, in drawing living contrasts, in 
passionately seeking connection with others in woundedness and partiality, the cyborg weaves 
true fictions from the “manipulative truth of the test[s]” that tested her, the tests that “sound[ed] 
out and interrogate[d]” her body, that “touche[d] and pierce[d]” her flesh, that calculated her 
existence in terms of “preferred sequences” and the “combinations” of “genetic code.”456 As a 
hyperreal event, the cyborg is the model, but cuts across the “system of deterrence” in its 
refractive insistence that “‘YOU are the model,’” “YOU are information, you are the social, you 
are the event, you are involved, you have the world.”457 There is not “one instance of the model,” 
“no more focal point, no more center or periphery,” but a plurality of singularities erupting in the 
network, threatening the grid with the “pure flexion” and “circular inflexion” of the surface.458 
The cyborg stands witness to the “very abolition of the spectacular,” to the end of the view, the 
subject’s illuminating vision, and so to the end of the dialectical violence of totality and 
nothingness, tyranny and terror.459 In her plural incommensurability, the cyborg heralds the 
continuous arrival of the rest, the upsurge of the infinite otherwise of what is, the open finality of 
being.  
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Thus, the form of the cyborg’s singularity is the form of play, the replicative realization of 
dreams in coalition with others. This play is in no way frivolous, but a responsible, political 
navigation and structuration of oblivion, of the ground or “medium” in its elemental 
proliferation, its “diffract[ion] in the real.”460 The cyborg is lured by the medium to participate in 
the achievement of real and partial connection, learning to read the involution and inflexion of 
the surface, the “blending” of real and fiction, the “viral, endemic, chronic, alarming presence of 
the medium” that resists every attempt at illumination.461 The nebulous orbit of the medium, in 
its fusion of ground and atmosphere, “directs the mutation of the real into the hyperreal,” its 
metamorphosis into a system of “genetic,” generative replication that derives its energy and its 
plural, dispersed structure from the total force of the nuclear order.462 The “old polar schema that 
always maintained a minimal distance between cause and effect, between subject and object,” is 
gone.463 The “distance of meaning, the gap, the difference,” is present here, within the world, in 
the partial, wounded flesh of the cyborg, a genetic operation to which we cyborgs, too, find 
ourselves present.464 Polar relation “vanishes,” unsustainable in the dialectical separation of its 
terms; within the world-structure, the terms finds themselves in tension, in mediation—“there is 
a kind of contraction of one over the other, a fantastic telescoping, a collapse of the two 
traditional poles into each other,” an “absorption” of the “differential mode of determination” 
into the plural mode of simulation that is dialogic rather than dialectical, possessed of no 
determined position and no discursive end.465 
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So, then, we see that the cyborg in her play replicates the nuclear precession of models “at 
the level of living matter.”466 She has no choice here—this inversion of the global model in her 
body was an experiment conducted upon her—but she can choose to responsibly take up this 
compromise in her body, the material condition of being a “cop[y] without original[],”467 and 
feel her way along the rhizomatic pathways that only reveal themselves to one such as her, one 
denied equal access to the privileges of the network, one denied the right to be one. The nuclear 
fixes the global in simulacral “suspension,” forcing the continuous generation of hyperreality 
into its monological circuit, the “hypermodel” of “control” and “security” in the generalized 
exchange.468 But this “apotheosis of simulation” cannot fully account for the cyborg’s flesh in its 
excessive singularity, its intimate communion with others.469 The cyborg is the apocalyptic telos 
of the deterrence machine that is the West, but apocalyptic insofar as she dreams of other 
relations and other worlds and other ends, and not annihilation. She refuses the world-machine 
its final terroristic crisis; her practice is always that of metamorphic dialogue, not dialectical 
rupture. Her punctuality is the punctuality of transformation, not destruction, deriving its energy 
from the “implosive violence of [the] metastable system[]” of nuclear deterrence, but redirecting 
its nihilistic “involution” into the passionate articulation of her dreams.470 “The balance of terror 
is the terror of balance,” Baudrillard writes, but the cyborg has never had the privilege of such a 
fear, a fear of a situation worse than the one in which she finds herself, a fear of the loss of 
oneness.471 For her, the metastable balance of the system means precisely that it is full of 
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promise. The dialectic of tyranny and terror, totality and nothingness, lurches from crisis to 
crisis, terrified of a world that does not obey the only logic it has ever known. But the cyborg is 
sensitive to the minute instabilities in the orbital network, the subtle ripples in the global surface, 
that indicate a plurilogical otherwise intrinsic to the system, the open, originary generativity of 
what is. The cyborg refuses to acknowledge the claim of the global “Law” upon her, which 
demands that every one choose integration or oblivion (choices that we have already seen to be 
variations on the theme of indifference472), citing instead the “operational immanence of every 
detail that is law,” that the law is of us, that the law is of the world.473  
The nuclear structuration of the world results in the “whole world [being] satellized,” the 
“orbital inscription” of every existent in a dispersed and complex network.474 The “fallout” of 
this structuration is the “meticulous operation of technology” that “serves as model for the 
meticulous operation of the social.”475 But the cyborg is familiar with such “boundary-
maintaining images” as this between the technological and the social, the instrument and the 
user, having been forced to dwell outside the proper limits of the social due to the 
incompleteness of her being.476 She is technological; she is the model of the social in the globally 
integrated circuit; she is the to of presence, the in-between, teratological subject. As such, she is 
not troubled by the fusion of models and matter, atmosphere and ground, law and operation, 
because she has never been permitted the purity of a power that might have made use of such a 
scission. The cyborg has only ever been permitted the textured ensemble of skill; “meticulous 
operation,” scrupulous attention to the small, is her very mode of engagement with the world. So, 
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as the immanence of the nuclear law, the “vast saturation” of the “system by its own forces,” is 
realized, and power finds itself rendered dispersed and complex as a result, the cyborg revels in 
the new pathways that reveal themselves, the possibility of new fictions waiting to be written. 
The simplicity and shelter of “enclosure” evaporates the moment it is achieved; the very 
circumscription that establishes the integration of the global circuit, the world in its world-
wideness, find itself present at every node, a vital organ everywhere and nowhere in the 
system.477 The global order is panic-stricken at the virtuality of its motive force, the oblivion of 
its substance. Without an outside to which the system might be referred, it is rendered weightless 
and “nonexplosive,” feeding back into itself, and so is left with the sole “possibility of an 
explosion toward the center,” an “implosion”—which means the simultaneous implosion of the 
network at every point, the eruption of the infinitely exchangeable violences of tyranny and 
terror.478 And yet, the cyborg never possessed the luxury of enclosure, the hope of apocalyptic 
finality, and so she is not troubled when the illusion of transcendental Law folds in upon itself. 
Involution is not disaster, but a passionate return of being to itself, a reclamation of the blinding 
wound dealt to it by the absolute light of the transcendental subject. 
The system of representation and the realism of the world cannot maintain themselves in 
separation, cannot deny the fictive tension by which they are woven together. The transcendental 
absolute is drawn into the world, dispersed in the bodies of passionate, partial singularities, and 
“[a]ll energy, all events” find themselves “absorbed by this eccentric gravitation.”479 The earth 
“becomes a satellite,” the “terrestrial principle of reality” is subjected to drift, and the ideal locus 
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of the subject is made complex and concrete.480 The surface of existence “condenses and 
implodes toward the only micromodel of control (the orbital satellite), as conversely, in the 
other, biological, dimension, everything converges and implodes on the molecular micromodel 
of the genetic code.”481 The Law proliferates in the laws of generative operation—both local and 
global; always dynamic and plural—integrating the hierarchy of being in a lateral, heterogeneous 
plane rich with differences and connections. For Baudrillard, “this forking of the nuclear and the 
genetic,” the “simultaneous assumption of the two fundamental codes of deterrence,” means that 
“every principle of meaning is absorbed, every deployment of the real is impossible.”482 All that 
remains is for “these energies [to] be abolished in a catastrophic process,” a “reversion of the 
whole cycle,” the whole system of generalized exchange, “toward a minimal point,” a “reversion 
of energies toward a minimal threshold.”483 But we cyborgs now know better. “In the fraying of 
identities,” Haraway writes, “the possibility opens up for weaving something other than a shroud 
for the day after the apocalypse that so prophetically ends salvation history.”484 Totality, 
nothingness, and “boundless difference,” the three misreadings of our situation that we have 
been attempting to navigate here, erase the “[h]istory and polyvocality” of our being, those 
“differences [that] are playful” and that allow us to work for a world beyond the dialectical 
polarities of “domination.”485 Apocalypse is the fever dream of those who cannot bear the 
thought of the insecurity of existence beyond power, the liberation of being in relation. They 
choose the cycle of crises over the danger of an inilluminable otherwise. But where the tyrant 
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and the terrorist see only oblivion, the cyborg feels in the darkness the sinuous and vibrant 
possibility of a new beginning, the hopeful tremors of an afterword still to come. Fiction is only 
pretense and absurdity for tyrants and nihilists—for our cyborg, fiction constitutes the very shape 
of her global intimacy and wounded flesh. For our cyborg—for us—fiction is life. 
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Conclusion 
In his posthumously published essay “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” (written 
in 1873), Friedrich Nietzsche takes up the question of the subject, that disastrously troubling 
question, with respect to questions of thought and meaning.486 For Nietzsche, human “cognition” 
is the “most mendacious minute in the ‘history of the world,’” a peculiar inflation of the being of 
one set of existents to absolute status, absolute worth.487 Only the “possessor and progenitor” of 
such a being could presume to “house[] the axis around which the entire world revolve[s],” and 
yet, for Nietzsche, such a presumption is terribly naïve.488 Indeed, with the transcendental 
subject’s revelation of the world, of existence, as the total site of experience, the very possibility 
of the “history of the world” emerges, and in this expansive duration, the repudiation of the 
subject’s grand pretensions emerges as well. The world-becoming world shatters itself; the 
subject’s experience comes to encompass everything—becomes-world (the idealist pretension)—
only to crumple from the strain. 
For Nietzsche, however, subjectivity is but a detainment for “a minute within existence,” a 
“supplement” of little consequence to what is.489 The self-obsessed subject (a tautology, to be 
sure) claims the absolute power of reason, seeing in himself the perfect reflection of reality. He 
arranges and appropriates everything around him, ruling and subjugating and holding sway. But, 
Nietzsche asks, “[w]hat do human beings really know about themselves? Are they even capable 
of perceiving themselves in their entirety just once, stretched out as in an illuminated glass 
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case?”490 As soon as the transcendental subject attempts to grasp his own being, to arrest it in the 
same way that he arrests the rest of existence, to isolate his being in pristine seclusion, he is 
confronted with the collapse of the pure edifice of his identity, of the shelter of his solus ipse. In 
his reflection, he discovers the “mirror of being and appearances” to be there within him, a fatal 
wound or split that we cyborgs have already sought to knowingly, responsibly take up as the 
very condition of meeting, relation, presence-to.491 But for the transcendental subject, this split is 
baffling, even appalling, an inexpungeable weakness that he tries desperately to hide. He flees 
from the fact of having always belonged with being, having always been in and of the world, 
having always been impure and insufficient and incomplete.  
For Nietzsche, there is no pure subject, but rather a “constellation” of being, a complex 
interweaving and intermingling that can never be reduced to a self-sustaining identity.492 In fact, 
in his assertion of his own absolute being, his own world-historical importance, the 
transcendental subject opens himself to the very knowledge that undoes him, the knowledge of 
the world that preceded him and gave him birth, of the cry of the rest forever challenging the 
authority of his voice and the propriety of his place. The “existence-subject” 493—existence 
before predication—has always preceded him, and appears in glimpses through the cracks, the 
fractures, the fissures of existence, those in-between spaces in which the cyborg teaches us to 
dwell. But the transcendental subject refuses to learn, refuses to relinquish his mastery, and so 
these spaces remain for him unnavigable, inilluminable depths. Indeed, the surface of existence 
that we have been discussing here is the folding of such depths into a singular, heterogeneous 
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plane. It is the unity-in-plurality of a continuous, complex, irreconcilable subject matter. It is 
rhizomatic and fibrous, marked not by neatly bounded objects and orders of existents but by 
“twists” and “turns” and “flows,”494 by bridges and contrasts and vibrant connections. It is in 
such a space that our cyborg, our subject-after-the-subject, our subject-in-between, dwells, in the 
night of an original intimacy with the rest of being. For the pure subject, however, this dwelling 
is absurdity and perversity, a nightmare of oblivion. 
To challenge the transcendental subject’s disastrous commitment to the substantiality of his 
own being, his moralizing refusal of relation and dependence, Nietzsche turns to the subject’s 
peculiar preoccupation with truth. Insofar as human being consists in “constellation” and not 
purity, truth conceived as a transcendental subject’s correct representation of the world, or the 
proper correspondence between this representation and the world, is untenable. Instead, 
Nietzsche describes truth as a “mobile army of metaphors” that in being made an object for the 
transcendental subject to possess loses “all sensuous vigor,” all life.495 Truth before such a 
reduction, however, is complex and dynamic, involving the subject in the continuous process of 
the world’s becoming. For Nietzsche, it is therefore of the utmost importance that truth be 
reclaimed from its broken and ineffectual realization as correspondence and be taken up once 
more in its originally concrete and generative function.  
The intellectual “schema[s]” of certain societies and philosophers are “sublimat[ions]” of 
“sensuous metaphors,” obscurations of the original belonging together of subjects, meanings, and 
world, denials of their shared matter.496 The “pyramidal order” of “laws, privileges, 
subordinations, [and] definitions” is built upon the “sensuously perceived world,” but proclaims 
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itself to be “firmer, more general, more familiar, more human,” than sense, “and hence as 
something regulatory and imperative.”497 The relational and metamorphic mechanism of 
perception is obscured by the “great edifice of concepts,” that “complicated cathedral” which 
legions of harried masons struggle to shore-up, generation after generation, against the threat of 
its “moving foundations.”498 Terrified of disaster, humanity “strives for an understanding of the 
world as something which is similar in kind to humanity,” but a “humanity” evacuated of all 
plurality, complexity, or incommensurability, denying in a stroke the complex interweaving of a 
multiplicity of subjects with a world-structure that can never be reduced to a perfectly ordered 
grid.499 And in all of this, humanity forgets its original being as “artistically creative subject[s],” 
as intimately involved with being in an “aesthetic way of relating,” in dialogue with existence by 
“allusive transference” and “stammering translation.”500 For Nietzsche, humanity has forgotten 
the poetry of its being, that its presence to the world is “multiform, irregular, inconsequential, 
incoherent, charming and ever-new.”501 Indeed, humanity has forgotten what it is to dream, what 
it is to play with the fictive engine of the real.  
In response to this forgetting Nietzsche puts forward the figure of the poet who, like our 
cyborg, is “[f]ull of creative contentment,” which is to say, contentment with the creativity of her 
weavings, and not with the reductive objectification of the real at the hands of power.502 In her 
creativity, she “jumbles up metaphors and shifts the boundary stones of abstraction,” “cast[ing] 
off the mark of servitude.”503 Newly liberated, “[w]hatever [her] intellect now does, all of it, 
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compared with what it did before, bears the mark of pretence [sic]”—of fiction, virtuality, 
simulation—“just as what it did before bore the mark of distortion.”504 The poet “copies human 
life, but he takes it to be something good and appears to be fairly content with it.”505 She lets 
herself dwell with being and the others whom she meets therein, weaving stories of an otherwise 
and an after beyond the horizon of the ossified present. And so, Nietzsche exults: 
That vast assembly of beams and boards to which needy man clings, thereby saving 
himself on his journey through life, is used by the liberated intellect as a mere climbing 
frame and plaything on which to perform its most reckless tricks; and when it smashes this 
framework, jumbles it up and ironically re-assembles it, pairing the most unlike things and 
dividing those things which are closest to one another, it reveals the fact that it does not 
require those makeshift aids of neediness, and that it is now guided, not by concepts but by 
intuitions.506 
The poet’s thought lets her metaphors play, rather than fixing them in a grid of representations. 
As a consequence, she is more likely to suffer, and “suffers more severely” when she does.507 
She is branded a terrorist, driven off stage, forced to hide in caves far removed from the 
searching eyes of those bestowed with the privilege of an acceptable subjectivity. But as we have 
seen with our cyborg, those who have always suffered so do not see suffering as a final burden, 
but as a site of possibility, a space of compassion, or in Nietzsche’s terms, of “redemption” and 
“release.”508 Our cyborg and our poet are not afraid of their neediness but rather let this condition 
of their existence be. In their woundedness, our cyborg and our poet “shout[] out loudly and 
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know[] no solace,” dreaming together of a different tomorrow, labouring for a world still to 
come.509 Truly, for both, fiction is life. It is not a barren representation, not a trembling cathedral, 
but an intimate, active, responsible engagement with the world, a creative non-power embraced 
in the subterranean night of the caverns and dens and bowers in which such disparate and 
passionate subjects are forced to gather and dwell. Fiction is the participatory belonging with 
being of a subject who refuses the lure of primacy and privilege, but who also refuses the lure of 
a nihilism that would utterly obliterate the spirit of her cry, her shout which does not present the 
purity of an identity, a voice, but rather the spacing of a punctuation of being emerging as some 
one who is less and more than one, some one who comes as who, some one who dwells in 
unseeing and tactile intimacy with the rest who have given her birth, the rest who have always 
come before her and now come to meet her in love.  
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